A COGNITIVE STYLISTIC STUDY OF SELECTED SKITS ON AFRICAN SOCIAL MEDIA/ UN ESTUDIO COGNITIVO ESTILISTICO DE SKITS SELECCIONADOS EN LAS REDES SOCIALES AFRICANAS

This research aims at examining how the cognitive stylistic model of analysis can be useful in the interpretation of African skits. The analytical process reveals how viewers make interpretive connections between the text-world and the real world, by bringing their experience and background knowledge to interact with the text. Two skits – one Nigerian and one Ghanaian – were purposively retrieved from YouTube for the analysis, using a qualitative approach within the cognitive stylistic framework of Text World Theory. We discovered a congruence of the cognitive faculty, experience, and epistemic perceptions leading to the construction of the discourse worlds of the skits.

The Predictive Brain Must Have a Limitation in Short-Term Memory Capacity

Traditionally, short-term memory (STM) has been assessed by asking participants to remember words, visual objects, or numbers for a short amount of time before their recall or recognition of those items is tested. However, this focus on memory for past sensory input might have obscured potential theoretical insights into the function of this cognitive faculty. Here, we suggest that STM may have an important role in predicting future sensory input. This reconceptualization of STM may provide a functional explanation for its capacity limitation.

Mary Daly’s Philosophy: Some Bergsonian Themes

The primary goal of this article is point out certain close parallels between some ideas of the radical feminist theorist Mary Daly and those of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. These similarities are particularly striking regarding distinctions made by both authors between two fundamentally contrasting types of cognitive faculty, of time and temporal experience, and of self and emotion. Daly departs from Bergson inasmuch as she employs these distinctions in her own way. She does not—like Bergson—employ them to depict the result of a natural process of consciousness or life, and the dangers for human freedom and thought of not properly respecting these differences. Rather, she locates these differences within a more liberatory, ethical perspective to ground a sharp, inimical contrast between feminist creative movement on the one hand, and static, fixing, and “fixating” patriarchy, with its “technocratic” pretensions, on the other. My hope is that highlighting the similarities between Daly and Bergson will open new paths of appreciation and critique of Daly’s work.

Romantic Love for a Reason

In contemporary and historical contributions to the philosophy of love there has been considerable resistance to three claims concerning romantic love: (1) Romantic love is assessable for rationality, (2) romantic love is love for a reason, and (3) romantic love is reason-responsive. This chapter argues that these three ideas are intimately tied together. It offers justification for all three claims on the basis of more general considerations of the nature of emotions and evidence in support of the claim that romantic love is best rendered a complex emotion that when felt is truly multimodal. It attributes the property of causing certain internal qualities (e.g., a quickening of the heartbeat) that are experienced through interoception to a person identified through some perceptual or cognitive faculty (e.g., a sight of the beloved). Along the way it identifies some of the main ways in which romantic love differs from other kinds of love, such as friendship love and parental love.

KONSEP EPISTEMOLOGI AKAL DALAM PERSPEKTIF ISLAM

This article trying to analyze the concept of intellect according to Islamic scholar (ulama). Based on a library research, this research uses a descriptive analysis method to derive the data and information from the books of Islamic authoritarive scholar about the topic. The research shows that intellect according to Islamic scholar is an accidental abstract potential that placed in the heart, and the one who posses it have a capabililty to contemplate about a reality and meaning of everything and at once to justify and consider the value of the meaning and reality itself. Intellect is not just a cognitive faculty but also intuitive capability, it is not just a rational analysis, but also moral choice, it is not just a conceptual faculty towards empirical world, but also spiritual capability towards sprititual and ideal or imaginal world. For the conclusion, Islamic way of thinking is integrative or unified based on Tauhidic concept. In Islamic concept of rational and intellectual thinking, there is no dichotomy or separation between internal (batin) and external (zahir) reality, cognitive and intuitive, material and spiritual, rational and moral, knowledge and deed, sacral and profane, ideality and reality, and also this world and the hereafter. This concept is known as the Tauhidic Concept of Knowledge.Keywords: Epistemology; intellect; cognitive; intuitive Artikel ini hendak menganalisis pendapat para ulama Islam berkenaan dengan konsep akal. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian pustaka (library research), penelitian ini menggunakan metode analisis deskriptif atas data dan informasi yang diperoleh dan diderivasi dari buku-buku para ulama Islam yang otoritatif berkenaan dengan topik tersebut. Penelitian menunjukkan bahwa akal menurut ulama Islam adalah suatu potensi abstrak berwujud aksiden yang bertempat pada hati yang dengannya ia dapat melakukan kontemplasi dan perenungan terhadap hakekat dan makna sekaligus justifikasi dan pertimbangan mengenai nilai yang baik maupun yang buruk. Akal bukan sekedar suatu kepahaman secara kognitif namun juga mengandung unsur intuitif, bukan sedekar analisis rasional namun termasuk juga pilihan moral, dan bukan sekedar kemampuan konseptual terhadap alam fisik namun juga merupakan kemampuan spiritual terhadap alam metafisik. Kesimpulannya, Cara berpikir dalam Islam bersifat integratif atau terunifikasi berdasarkan konsep tawhid Islam tidak mengenal dikotomi atau pemisahan antara aspek internal (batin) dan eksternal (lahir), kognisi dan intuisi, material dan spiritual, rasional dan moral, ilmu dan amal, sakral dan profan, idealitas dan realitas, serta dunia dan akhirat.Kata kunci: Epistemologi; akal; kognitif; intuitif

Distinguishing The Cognitive Processes Of Mindfulness: Developing A Standardised Mindfulness Technique For Use In Longitudinal Randomised Control Trials

A capacity model of mindfulness is adopted to differentiate the cognitive faculty of mindfulness from the metacognitive processes required to cultivate this faculty in mindfulness training. The model provides an explanatory framework incorporating both the developmental progression from focussed attention to open monitoring styles of mindfulness practice, along with the development of equanimity and insight. A standardised technique for activating these processes without the addition of secondary components is then introduced. Mindfulness-based interventions currently available for use in randomised control trials introduce components ancillary to the cognitive processes of mindfulness, limiting their ability to draw clear causative inferences. The standardised technique presented here does not introduce such ancillary factors, rendering it a valuable tool with which to investigate the processes activated in this practice.

Constructing a Bernard-Hubmaier Trinitarian Model of Prevenient Grace

This article constructs a Trinitarian model of prevenient grace based on the insights of Bernard of Clairvaux and Balthasar Hubmaier. Accordingly, the three persons of the Trinity play roles in prevenient grace’s calling, convicting, illuminating, and enabling aspects. The model proposes that the Holy Spirit serves for all persons as the functional equivalent of a good cognitive faculty lost to humanity in the Fall. Hence, the Spirit suggests to each person that they enter into spiritual marriage with Christ and suggests good thoughts to unbelievers and believers alike. Without the Spirit, no one could be saved or do anything good.

The shift from life in water to life on land advantaged planning in visually-guided behavior

Other than formerly land-based mammals such as whales and dolphins that have returned to an aquatic existence, it is uncontroversial that land animals have developed more elaborated cognitive abilities than aquatic animals. Yet there is no apparent a-priori reason for this to be the case. A key cognitive faculty is the ability to plan. Here we provide evidence that in a dynamic visually-guided behavior of crucial evolutionary importance, prey evading a predator, planning provides a significant advantage over habit-based action selection, but only on land. This advantage is dependent on the massive increase in visual range and spatial complexity that greeted the first vertebrates to view the world above the waterline 380 million years ago. Our results have implications for understanding the evolutionary basis of the limited ability of animals, including humans, to think ahead to meet slowly looming and distant threats, toward a neuroscience of sustainability.

The Modality of Judgments

This chapter focuses on Kant’s account of the modal functions of judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason. There are two current strands of interpreting this account. The first understands the modality of a given judgment in terms of the judger’s attitude toward its content, based on their epistemic or psychological states. The second understands it solely in terms of its location in a syllogistic context. On the alternative interpretation defended in this chapter, Kant construes the modalities of judgments as instantiating relative logical modalities and expressing logical coherence relations between a judgment and a set of background judgments. This interpretation not only fits well with Kant’s revolutionary program of redefining modality as a feature of the relation between the conceptual representations of things and the cognitive faculty of the judger, but also captures the formal-logical infrastructure of his account of real modality in the rest of the Critique.

Modal Categories and Kant’s Revolution

This chapter reconstructs Kant’s revolutionary account of real modality as presented in the Schematism and the Postulates chapters of the Critique. Here we find his precritical theses on existence, both negative and positive, transform into a strong ‘peculiarity’ thesis about modal categories in general: “as a determination of the object they do not add to the concept to which they are ascribed in the least, but rather express only the relation to the faculty of cognition” (A219). Each of possibility, actuality, and necessity posits the conceptual representation of an object in a different relation to the background conditions of our empirical cognition of objects. Each such act of positing constitutes a peculiar, i.e. ‘subjective,’ type of synthetic judgment, where the intension of the subject-concept is not at all enlarged, but a relation with a distinct cognitive faculty (i.e. respectively, with understanding, perception, and reason) is added to it.