[PREPRINT] Mind the Machines: Applying Implicit Measures of Mind Perception to Social Robotics

Beyond conscious beliefs and goals, automatic cognitive processes shape our social encounters, and interactions with complex machines like social robots are no exception. With this in mind, it is surprising that research in human-robot interaction (HRI) almost exclusively uses explicit measures, such as subjective ratings and questionnaires, to assess human attitudes towards robots - seemingly ignoring the importance of implicit measures. This is particularly true for research focusing on the question whether or not humans are willing to attribute complex mental states mind perception, such as agency (i.e., the capacity to plan and act) and experience (i.e., the capacity to sense and feel), to robotic agents. In the current study, we (i) created the mind perception implicit association test (MP-IAT) to examine subconscious attributions of mental capacities to agents of different degrees of human-likeness (here: human vs. humanoid robot), and (ii) compared the outcomes of the MP-IAT to explicit mind perception ratings of the same agents.Results indicate that (i) already at the subconscious level, robots are associated with lower levels of agency and experience compared to humans, and that (ii) implicit and explicit measures of mind perception are not significantly correlated. This suggests that mind perception (i) has an implicit component that can be measured using implicit tests like the IAT and (ii) might be difficult to modulate via design or experimental procedures due to its fast-acting, automatic nature.

Acceptance of Medical Treatment Regimens Provided by AI vs. Human

Along with the increasing development of information technology, the interaction between artificial intelligence and humans is becoming even more frequent. In this context, a phenomenon called “medical AI aversion” has emerged, in which the same behaviors of medical AI and humans elicited different responses. Medical AI aversion can be understood in terms of the way that people attribute mind capacities to different targets. It has been demonstrated that when medical professionals dehumanize patients—making fewer mental attributions to patients and, to some extent, not perceiving and treating them as full human—it leads to more painful and effective treatment options. From the patient’s perspective, will painful treatment options be unacceptable when they perceive the doctor as a human but disregard his or her own mental abilities? Is it possible to accept a painful treatment plan because the doctor is artificial intelligence? Based on the above, the current study investigated the above questions and the phenomenon of medical AI aversion in a medical context. Through three experiments it was found that: (1) human doctor was accepted more when patients were faced with the same treatment plan; (2) there was an interactional effect between the treatment subject and the nature of the treatment plan, and, therefore, affected the acceptance of the treatment plan; and (3) experience capacities mediated the relationship between treatment provider (AI vs. human) and treatment plan acceptance. Overall, this study attempted to explain the phenomenon of medical AI aversion from the mind perception theory and the findings are revealing at the applied level for guiding the more rational use of AI and how to persuade patients.

Suspicious Minds: The Link Between Stress and Perceptions of Agency

<p>How do we perceive other minds? Research shows that people intuitively think about other minds in terms of two dimensions: agency (the capacity to think and act) and experience (the capacity to sense and feel). Perceiving a mind in another entity can alter how people interact it because mind perception implies moral status. There is evidence that stress alters the treatment of others, including contributing to dehumanization (the failure to perceive a humanlike mind in another person), but the effect of stress on mind perception is unknown. Based on previous research about the effects of stress on psychological phenomena related to the dimensions of agency and experience, I hypothesized that stress increases perceptions of agency and reduces perceptions of experience. To test these hypotheses, I conducted four studies combining two different measures of mind perception and two different methodological approaches. The results were inconsistent from one study to the next, but a tentative pattern emerged when taking all studies together. Participants who reported high levels of pre-existing stress tended to perceive more agency across a range of different entities, while inducing stress in the laboratory caused participants to attribute agency more readily to inanimate human faces. These results were weak and inconsistent, but they suggest that stress might increase perceptions of agency. The results for experience were inconclusive. I discuss some possible implications of my findings for mind perception and morality.</p>

Suspicious Minds: The Link Between Stress and Perceptions of Agency

<p>How do we perceive other minds? Research shows that people intuitively think about other minds in terms of two dimensions: agency (the capacity to think and act) and experience (the capacity to sense and feel). Perceiving a mind in another entity can alter how people interact it because mind perception implies moral status. There is evidence that stress alters the treatment of others, including contributing to dehumanization (the failure to perceive a humanlike mind in another person), but the effect of stress on mind perception is unknown. Based on previous research about the effects of stress on psychological phenomena related to the dimensions of agency and experience, I hypothesized that stress increases perceptions of agency and reduces perceptions of experience. To test these hypotheses, I conducted four studies combining two different measures of mind perception and two different methodological approaches. The results were inconsistent from one study to the next, but a tentative pattern emerged when taking all studies together. Participants who reported high levels of pre-existing stress tended to perceive more agency across a range of different entities, while inducing stress in the laboratory caused participants to attribute agency more readily to inanimate human faces. These results were weak and inconsistent, but they suggest that stress might increase perceptions of agency. The results for experience were inconclusive. I discuss some possible implications of my findings for mind perception and morality.</p>

Happy = Human: A Feeling of Belonging Modulates the “Expression-to-Mind” Effect

Past research has demonstrated a link between facial expressions and mind perception, yet why expressions, especially happy expressions, influence mind attribution remains unclear. Conducting four studies, we addressed this issue. In Study 1, we investigated whether the valence or behavioral intention (i.e., approach or avoidance) implied by different emotions affected the minds ascribed to expressers. Happy (positive valence and approach intention) targets were ascribed more sophisticated minds than were targets displaying neutral, angry (negative-approach), or fearful (negative-avoidance) expressions, suggesting emotional valence was relevant to mind attribution but apparent behavioral intentions were not. We replicated this effect using both Black and White targets (Study 2) and another face database (Study 3). In Study 4, we conducted path analyses to examine attractiveness and expectations of social acceptance as potential mediators of the effect. Our findings suggest that signals of social acceptance are crucial to the effect emotional expressions have on mind perception.

The Medusa effect reveals levels of mind perception in pictures

Throughout our species history, humans have created pictures. The resulting picture record reveals an overwhelming preference for depicting things with minds. This preference suggests that pictures capture something of the mind that is significant to us, albeit at reduced potency. Here, we show that abstraction dims the perceived mind, even within the same picture. In a series of experiments, people were perceived as more real, and higher in both Agency (ability to do) and Experience (ability to feel), when they were presented as pictures than when they were presented as pictures of pictures. This pattern persisted across different tasks and even when comparators were matched for identity and image size. Viewers spontaneously discriminated between different levels of abstraction during eye tracking and were less willing to share money with a more abstracted person in a dictator game. Given that mind perception underpins moral judgement, our findings suggest that depicted persons will receive greater or lesser ethical consideration, depending on the level of abstraction.

Pay Them No Mind: the Influence of Implicit and Explicit Robot Mind Perception on the Right to be Protected

Mind perception is a fundamental part of anthropomorphism and has recently been suggested to be a dual process. The current research studied the influence of implicit and explicit mind perception on a robot’s right to be protected from abuse, both in terms of participants condemning abuse that befell the robot as well as in terms of participants’ tendency to humiliate the robot themselves. Results indicated that acceptability of robot abuse can be manipulated through explicit mind perception, yet are inconclusive about the influence of implicit mind perception. Interestingly, explicit attribution of mind to the robot did not make people less likely to mistreat the robot. This suggests that the relationship between a robot’s perceived mind and right to protection is far from straightforward, and has implications for researchers and engineers who want to tackle the issue of robot abuse.

Beyond Aesthetic Judgment: Beauty Increases Moral Standing Through Perceptions of Purity

Researchers have tended to focus on mind perception as integral to judgments of moral standing, yet a smaller body of evidence suggests that beauty may also be an important factor (for some people and animals). Across six studies ( N = 1,662), we investigated whether beauty increases moral standing attributions to a wide range of targets, including non-sentient entities, and explored the psychological mechanism through which beauty assigns moral standing to targets. We found that people attribute greater moral standing to beautiful (vs. ugly) animals (Study 1 and Study 5a, preregistered) and humans (Study 2). This effect also extended to non-sentient targets, that is, people perceive beautiful (vs. ugly) landscapes (Study 3) and buildings (Study 4 and Study 5b, preregistered) as possessing greater moral standing. Across all studies, perceptions of purity mediated the effect of beauty on moral standing, suggesting that beauty increases the moral standing individuals place on targets through evoking moral intuitions of purity.