Electoral System Design in Russian Oblasti and Republics: A Four Case Comparison

2003 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRYON J. MORASKI
2002 ◽  
pp. 109-127
Author(s):  
Sarah Birch ◽  
Frances Millard ◽  
Marina Popescu ◽  
Kieran Williams

Author(s):  
Taishi Muraoka

AbstractCognitively demanding electoral systems increase the chance that voters make their choices based on politically irrelevant cues. To illustrate this argument, I analyze the effect of candidate name complexity—a visual cue that contains no politically meaningful information—in Japan, where voters need to write their preferred candidate's name on a blank ballot paper. I find that when electoral systems require voters to weigh a large number of candidates and simultaneously reduce the usefulness of partisan cues, candidates with more complex names tend to receive lower vote shares. By contrast, under less cognitively demanding systems, candidate name complexity has no effect on election outcomes. These findings have important implications for the debate on the “best” electoral system design.


Author(s):  
Sören Holmberg

Institutional learning works. Citizens in older and more mature democracies feel represented to a larger extent than people in new and emerging democracies. And as normatively expected, feelings of being represented are reasonably well spread across different social and political groups. Electoral system design turns out not to be consequential. Majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral systems do about equally well when it comes to how well people feel they are being represented by a party or a party leader. The results are based on data from The Comparative Study of Electoral System’s (CSES) project covering forty-six countries and eighty-six elections between 2001 and 2011.


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen

This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members of the 120-seat Knesset are elected in a single nationwide district under closed party lists. Due to this electoral system design, the geographic location of votes does not matter for a party’s overall seat total, and candidates have almost no incentive to develop a personal vote. The chapter finds strong support for the expertise model in how the Labor Party assigns members to legislative committees, but relatively little support in the Likud Party. Both parties exhibit strong issue ownership tendencies.


Author(s):  
Noel Semple

Abstract When lawyers elect the leaders of their self-regulatory organizations, what sort of people do they vote for? How do the selection processes for elite lawyer sub-groups affect the diversity and efficacy of those groups? This article quantitatively assesses the demographic and professional diversity of leadership in the Law Society of Upper Canada. After many years of underrepresentation, in 2015 visible minority members and women were elected in numbers proportionate to their shares of Ontario lawyers. Regression analysis suggests that being non-white was not a disadvantage in the 2015 election, and being female actually conferred an advantage in attracting lawyers’ votes. The diverse employment contexts of the province’s lawyers were also represented in the elected group. However, early-career lawyers were completely unrepresented. This is largely a consequence of electoral system design choices, and can be remedied through the implementation of career-stage constituencies. The Law Society’s “benchers” are more demographically diverse than other elite lawyer sub-groups, such as judges, and the open and transparent selection process may be part of the reason.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-367
Author(s):  
Piret Ehin ◽  
Liisa Talving

AbstractThis article seeks to enhance our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of populist and anti-European Union (EU) politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives. It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations. Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents. Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often associated with EP elections.


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