Austria

In the Austrian parliament a strict time regime keeps the length of debates at bay. While the government sets most of the agenda, opposition parties can get some proposals debated, and new instruments provide room for debate of topics independent of government legislation and reports. Debates are under tight party control with regard to the speakers’ nomination and the speakers sticking to the party line. Individual MPs do have electoral incentives to seek speaking assignments, but for most this results in low-level satisficing rather than maximizing speaking assignments. Party-size is a crucial factor determining the floor presence: MPs belonging to a small party have better chances to speak. Within parties, individual talent of MPs as speakers and their occupation of key party functions such as parliamentary party leader, or party spokesperson in a specific policy area are crucial for nominations.

Norway

In this chapter, we describe the institutional setting of parliamentary debate in Stortinget and identify correlates of speech participation, drawing on a dataset of more than a quarter of a million speeches from 1998 to 2016. The key correlate of speech participation is committee membership in the committee responsible for preparing the report for the topic under discussion. However, that is not the whole story. Party elites speak more than backbenchers. As speaking time is allocated proportional to party size, MPs from the smaller parties speak more often than their counterparts in the larger parties. While we uncover a gender difference in the overall allocation of speeches, this is only present amongst parties on the right of the political spectrum. We do not find a similar difference in length of speech or allocation of speeches amongst members within the same committee. Hence, we ascribe the gender difference in speeches to gender differences in committee composition.

Determinants of visitors’ expenditure across a portfolio of events

Destinations are increasingly recognising the advantages of managing their calendar of events as a strategic portfolio. Currently, however, there is no accepted, workable and proven technique for identifying the most efficient variable(s) to employ as a basis for strategic intervention. This study develops a spare regression model, based on the LASSO method, to select an efficient subset of determinants of visitor expenditure across five annual events taking place in Madeira, Portugal. The results indicate that event attendees’ income, length of stay and travel party size are significant determinants of total expenditure across all the events. Adopting strategic measures to influence these variables, if duly implemented at the portfolio level, can enable the cross-leveraging of additional expenditure that would be inaccessible to the destination if the Events were acting independently of one another. This could, in turn, enable the destination to use its events efficiently to enhance its overall competitiveness.

Second-order effects or ideational rifts? Explaining outcomes of European elections in an era of populist politics

This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of populist and anti-European Union (EU) politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives. It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations. Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents. Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often associated with EP elections.

Politicians in Newspaper News: Who Attracts Coverage in Kenyan Politics

The present research examines the coverage of 349 Kenyan politicians in four English national newspapers between 2013 and 2017. Within the contexts of media coverage based on news values, and reporting as a mirror of political reality, the study investigates whether gender, tribe, party size, seniority, committee or party leadership, commenting on corruption and devolution, and criticizing the government predicted the visibility of members of parliament (MPs) in newspaper news. Findings show that seniority, committee or party leadership, commenting on devolution and corruption, and criticizing government emerged as the main predictors of the parliamentarians’ coverage in news media. Overall, committee or party leadership, commenting on corruption, and criticizing the government were the strongest determinants of the MPs coverage.

Factionalism in Southeast Asia: Types, Causes, and Effects

In this article we present an overview of the arguments contained in the articles of this special issue. We first catalogue the varieties or types of factionalism present across Southeast Asia—namely, programmatic, clientelistic, and personalist/charismatic. We then explore the question of why the degree and type of factionalism varies across countries, across time, and across parties. We first focus on differences between factionalism in governing and opposition parties, arguing that factionalism across dominant and opposition parties differs in terms of the origin, type, and effect. We find that the more competitive the party system the more likely it is that factional patterns between the parties within a given polity will converge. We then review the relative power of socio-structural and institutional explanations of factionalism, and place the greatest weight on the role of patronage, party size, and the degree of party centralization. Finally, we turn our attention to common strategies for curbing factionalism across our cases and conclude by examining the consequences of factionalism.

Comparing Methods for Assessing Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) Party Size: Observations, Camera Traps, and Bed Counts from a Savanna–Woodland Mosaic in the Issa Valley, Tanzania

Studying animal grouping behavior is important for understanding the causes and consequences of sociality and has implications for conservation. Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) party size is often assessed by counting individuals or extracted indirectly from camera trap footage or the number of nests. Little is known, however, about consistency across methods for estimating party size. We collected party size data for wild chimpanzees in the Issa valley, western Tanzania, using direct observations, camera traps, and nest counts over six years (2012–2018). We compared mean monthly party size estimates calculated using each method and found that estimates derived from direct observations were weakly positively correlated with those derived from camera traps. Estimates from nest counts were not significantly correlated with either direct observations or camera traps. Overall observed party size was significantly larger than that estimated from both camera traps and nest counts. In both the dry and wet seasons, observed party size was significantly larger than camera trap party size, but not significantly larger than nest party size. Finally, overall party size and wet season party size estimated from camera traps were significantly smaller than nest party size, but this was not the case in the dry season. Our results reveal how data collection methods influence party size estimates in unhabituated chimpanzees and have implications for comparative analysis within and across primate communities. Specifically, future work must consider how estimates were calculated before we can reliably investigate environmental influences on primate behavior.

Why do politicians use Facebook and Twitter the way they do? The influence of perceived audience expectations

Politicians’ social media use affects their relationship with citizens. For example, politicians are better evaluated when they communicate interactively. However, they mostly use social media to broadcast information to their audience. This study asks why politicians use Facebook and Twitter the way they do. The study contends that politicians want to satisfy their audiences’ expectations, to get favorable reactions and increase their visibility, and that politicians from different parties have different audiences who have different expectations for how politicians should communicate. Data from two surveys conducted among national (n = 118) and local (n = 859) German politicians show that politicians’ Facebook and Twitter communication is strongly oriented to their perceptions of their audiences’ expectations. The party size did not influence politicians’ Twitter communication, but their Facebook communication: Compared to politicians from major parties, politicians from minor parties communicate in more interactive ways via Facebook. In addition, politicians from minor parties perceive more strongly than their colleagues from major parties that their audience expects them to criticize other politicians or journalists.

The optimal size of a political party based on the Shapley-Shubik Power Index

Shapley-Shubik Power Index per person (SSPIPP) is defined as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in Parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. This model reveals the relationship between the party size and SSPIPP and shows it in a graph. The graph is M-shaped and reveals the optimal party size that maximizes SSPIPP. According to this model, the more votes required to pass bills in Parliament, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. This model also predicts that in countries which require a supermajority vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to last long.