Electoral System Design in New Democracies

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Carey
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies

Electoral System Design in Russian Oblasti and Republics: A Four Case Comparison

2003 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRYON J. MORASKI
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Case Comparison

The Choice for Proportional Representation: Electoral System Design in Peace Agreements

Civil Wars ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (sup1) ◽  
pp. 71-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Peace Agreements

scholarly journals How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (5) ◽  
pp. 2203-2220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Brender ◽  
Allan Drazen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Large Panel

We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively. (JEL D72, E62, H62, O47)

Bulgaria: Engineering Legitimacy through Electoral System Design

2002 ◽  
pp. 109-127
Author(s):  
Sarah Birch ◽  
Frances Millard ◽  
Marina Popescu ◽  
Kieran Williams
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral System

15. Institutional Design in New Democracies

2018 ◽  
pp. 228-238
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Electoral Law

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as an independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages, and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.

The electoral implications of politically irrelevant cues under demanding electoral systems

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Taishi Muraoka
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Visual Cue ◽  
Meaningful Information ◽  
To Receive

AbstractCognitively demanding electoral systems increase the chance that voters make their choices based on politically irrelevant cues. To illustrate this argument, I analyze the effect of candidate name complexity—a visual cue that contains no politically meaningful information—in Japan, where voters need to write their preferred candidate's name on a blank ballot paper. I find that when electoral systems require voters to weigh a large number of candidates and simultaneously reduce the usefulness of partisan cues, candidates with more complex names tend to receive lower vote shares. By contrast, under less cognitively demanding systems, candidate name complexity has no effect on election outcomes. These findings have important implications for the debate on the “best” electoral system design.

Who controls the wealth? Electoral system design and ethnic war in resource-rich countries

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 171-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natascha S. Neudorfer ◽  
Ulrike G. Theuerkauf
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Ethnic War ◽  
Rich Countries

Feeling Represented

2020 ◽  
pp. 412-431
Author(s):  
Sören Holmberg
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
System Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
Institutional Learning ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
The Comparative Study ◽  
Political Groups

Institutional learning works. Citizens in older and more mature democracies feel represented to a larger extent than people in new and emerging democracies. And as normatively expected, feelings of being represented are reasonably well spread across different social and political groups. Electoral system design turns out not to be consequential. Majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral systems do about equally well when it comes to how well people feel they are being represented by a party or a party leader. The results are based on data from The Comparative Study of Electoral System’s (CSES) project covering forty-six countries and eighty-six elections between 2001 and 2011.

Israel

2021 ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Issue Ownership ◽  
Labor Party ◽  
Legislative Committees

This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members of the 120-seat Knesset are elected in a single nationwide district under closed party lists. Due to this electoral system design, the geographic location of votes does not matter for a party’s overall seat total, and candidates have almost no incentive to develop a personal vote. The chapter finds strong support for the expertise model in how the Labor Party assigns members to legislative committees, but relatively little support in the Likud Party. Both parties exhibit strong issue ownership tendencies.

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