scholarly journals Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Raymond Auerback
Keyword(s):  
Testimonial Injustice

Prenatal Genetic Screening, Epistemic Justice, and Reproductive Autonomy

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Amber Knight ◽  
Joshua Miller
Keyword(s):  
Prenatal Testing ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Medical Professionals ◽  
Reproductive Decisions ◽  
Reproductive Autonomy ◽  
Noninvasive Prenatal Testing ◽  
Epistemic Justice ◽  
Reproductive Decision Making ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
And Control

AbstractNoninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) promises to enhance women's reproductive autonomy by providing genetic information about the fetus, especially in the detection of genetic impairments like Down syndrome (DS). In practice, however, NIPT provides opportunities for intensified manipulation and control over women's reproductive decisions. Applying Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice to prenatal screening, this article analyzes how medical professionals impair reproductive decision-making by perpetuating testimonial injustice. They do so by discrediting positive parental testimony about what it is like to raise a child with DS. We argue that this testimonial injustice constitutes a twofold harm: (1) people with DS and their family members who claim that parenting a child with DS may be a rewarding and joyous experience are harmed when they are systematically silenced, disbelieved, and/or denied epistemic credibility by medical professionals, and (2) pregnant women are harmed since they might make poorly informed choices without access to all relevant information. The broader implication of the analysis is that epistemic justice is a precondition of reproductive autonomy. We conclude by calling for federal oversight of the acquisition and dissemination of information that prospective parents receive following a positive diagnosis of DS to ensure that it is comprehensive and up to date.

testimonial injustice ‘out here in the projects’ – misrecognising victimhood in the bed intruder meme

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
M’Balia Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Social Support ◽  
Thematic Analysis ◽  
Stylistic Analysis ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Broadcast News ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Youtube Videos ◽  
Testimonial Injustice

In the wake of ‘Black Lives Matter’, this paper examines the concept of testimonial injustice and the prejudicial stances held towards victims that diminishes the credibility of their claims and the social support they receive from the public. To explore this concept, the following work revisits the widely parodied U.S. originating broadcast news report, The Bed Intruder. In the broadcast, victims of a home invasion and attempted rape deliver a public call that outlines the conditions of their victimhood and the potential threat to the community. A rhetorical stylistic analysis of the victims’ testimonial discourse and a thematic analysis of a sample of YouTube videos that reappropriate and parody their discourse are conducted. The analyses highlight the memetic elements of the video parodies that acknowledge the victimisation and yet strategically misconstrue events in ways that 1) render the victims and their claims less credible and 2) fail to provide them with the moral concern such an acknowledgement deserves.

scholarly journals Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Dular
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Epistemic Communities ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Testimonial Injustice

“Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As these are roles of power and are crucial to our existence and functioning within epistemic communities, the wrong and harms suffered from this injustice are serious and, I argue, distinct from other types already discussed in the literature. I close by considering an alternative model of mansplaining as a form of silencing, as well as briefly diagnosing its general underlying cause and possible solutions.

Testimonial injustice: considering caregivers in paediatric behavioural healthcare

2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (11) ◽  
pp. 738-739
Author(s):  
Michelle Trang Pham ◽  
Eric A Storch ◽  
Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz
Keyword(s):  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Behavioural Healthcare

Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 924-947 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Munroe
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Work ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Psychological Literature ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Important Notion

AbstractIn light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of (1) the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and (2) how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments.

scholarly journals What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but . . . ” Reasoning?

2019 ◽  
pp. 309-325
Author(s):  
Jason Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Disabled People ◽  
Preference Reasoning ◽  
Moral Risk ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Adaptive Preference

Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are happy are worrisome because they threaten everyone’s well-being and are further challenged by an argument from moral risk.

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