Procedural Due Process Rights for Parents Under the IDEA

Author(s):  
Allan G. Osborne
1993 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-52
Author(s):  
Alex Inkeles ◽  
Jon C. Hooper

We here report the results of a content analysis focussed on the due process rights or guarantees which were provided to citizens under all the national constitutions extant in the world at 20 year intervals during the period from 1870 to 1970. Our study had three objectives. First, we sought to test the assumption that the granting of procedural guarantees by national constitutions was. over time, both being expanded within countries and being diffused worldwide across all countries, thus providing additional examples of the tendency for institutional forms to diffuse around the world and consequently for nation states to converge in their institutional structures and practices, tendencies already observed and documented in other realms such as the family, education, and retirement.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tessa McKeown

<p>For over sixty years, lawyers and historians have discussed the credibility and repercussions of the Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946). This paper argues that the defendants’ procedural due process rights were partially protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental due process rights. The Nuremberg Trial at the International Military Tribunal was conducted by the four Allied Powers to try the upper echelon Nazi war criminals following the Second World War. The London Charter, drafted by the Allies, outlined the trial procedure to be adopted, and provided certain guarantees in attempt to secure a fair trial for the twenty-two defendants. This paper examines the history of fundamental due process rights (recognised in both continental Europe and common law jurisdictions) and analyses the extent to which these rights were breached at Nuremberg. This paper further argues that despite the defendants being afforded more rights than they could have expected given the circumstances, such breaches significantly compromised the integrity of the trial.</p>


Author(s):  
Dean J. Kotlowski

Nicholas Rush Smith’s chapter explores collective violence in postapartheid South Africa, where vigilante violence involving an attempt to necklace alleged criminals has been common. That the necklace--placing a gasoline filled tire around the neck of a victim and setting it alight--is frequently deployed is surprising, Smith asserts, because the struggle against apartheid was, in important ways, a struggle for a procedural rights-based legal system, something necklacing undermines. Moreover, necklacing was originally developed as a tool to sanction political threats under apartheid, whereas today it is primarily used as a technique to punish criminals. Why, Smith asks, is necklacing still practiced twenty years after the dawn of democracy given that it was first implemented as part of the struggle against apartheid? Smith’s chapter argues that citizens deploying the necklace challenge the postapartheid state’s-rights-based legal system, which South Africans often argue enables insecurity and immorality, to proliferate; rhetorically and ideologically, this in some ways parallels the criticisms that American lynchers often made of procedural, due process rights. Through its spectacular violence, the necklace dramatizes these critiques of the democratic legal order much like it dramatized critiques of the apartheid state.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tessa McKeown

For over 60 years, lawyers and historians have discussed the credibility and repercussions of the Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946). The Nuremberg Trial at the International Military Tribunal was conducted by the four Allied Powers to try the upper echelon Nazi war criminals following the Second World War. The London Charter, drafted by the Allies, outlined the trial procedure to be adopted, and provided certain guarantees in an attempt to secure a fair trial for the 22 defendants. This article examines the history of fundamental due process rights (recognised in both Continental Europe and Common Law jurisdictions) and analyses the extent to which these rights were breached at Nuremberg. It argues that the defendants' procedural due process rights were partially protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental due process rights. This article further argues that despite the defendants being afforded more rights than they could have expected given the circumstances, such breaches significantly compromised the integrity of the trial.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tessa McKeown

<p>For over sixty years, lawyers and historians have discussed the credibility and repercussions of the Nuremberg Trial (1945–1946). This paper argues that the defendants’ procedural due process rights were partially protected at Nuremberg, although there were gross breaches of particular fundamental due process rights. The Nuremberg Trial at the International Military Tribunal was conducted by the four Allied Powers to try the upper echelon Nazi war criminals following the Second World War. The London Charter, drafted by the Allies, outlined the trial procedure to be adopted, and provided certain guarantees in attempt to secure a fair trial for the twenty-two defendants. This paper examines the history of fundamental due process rights (recognised in both continental Europe and common law jurisdictions) and analyses the extent to which these rights were breached at Nuremberg. This paper further argues that despite the defendants being afforded more rights than they could have expected given the circumstances, such breaches significantly compromised the integrity of the trial.</p>


Author(s):  
Nicholas Rush Smith

Nicholas Rush Smith’s chapter explores collective violence in postapartheid South Africa, where vigilante violence involving an attempt to necklace alleged criminals has been common. That the necklace--placing a gasoline filled tire around the neck of a victim and setting it alight--is frequently deployed is surprising, Smith asserts, because the struggle against apartheid was, in important ways, a struggle for a procedural rights-based legal system, something necklacing undermines. Moreover, necklacing was originally developed as a tool to sanction political threats under apartheid, whereas today it is primarily used as a technique to punish criminals. Why, Smith asks, is necklacing still practiced twenty years after the dawn of democracy given that it was first implemented as part of the struggle against apartheid? Smith’s chapter argues that citizens deploying the necklace challenge the postapartheid state’s-rights-based legal system, which South Africans often argue enables insecurity and immorality, to proliferate; rhetorically and ideologically, this in some ways parallels the criticisms that American lynchers often made of procedural, due process rights. Through its spectacular violence, the necklace dramatizes these critiques of the democratic legal order much like it dramatized critiques of the apartheid state.


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