This chapter evaluates the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom, revealing a disturbing new settlement of State power. In particular, it hones in on the ‘Westminster Model’ of government which advertises a strict separation of powers supposedly insulating judges from direct executive influence. An altogether different reality emanating from the archival trove of intergovernmental files is found; one which challenges the grundnorm of judicial independence embedded within the Westminster model of governance. Although Executive dominance of the judiciary runs contrary to basic texts and beliefs, this chapter lays out an alternative perspective which implicates the senior judiciary in subterranean policymaking that has led to the steady erosion of procedural due process. It examines where the Civil Service fits into this picture, and draws attention to its servants’ inherent shortcomings as ‘bureaucrats of the law’ having assumed responsibility in large part for the body of sub-standard work distributed under the misnomer: ‘Judges’’ Rules. It explains how, on the critical issue of an individual’s vulnerability when confronted by police power, civil servants, tasked with furthering the ‘public interest’, were far more adept at bolstering ‘police interests’, with backing from the then Head of the Judiciary (Lord Chancellor) and his Law Officers (the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General). By documenting key historical events that impacted upon the criminally suspected or accused, awareness of which has been muted or unknown, this Chapter explains how the doctrine of the Separation of Powers is contravened and the principle of judicial independence muddied to the point of non-recognition.