The euro and political union: do economic spillovers from monetary integration affect the legitimacy of EMU?

2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 1133-1146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Enderlein
Equilibrium ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kundera

The main goal of this article is to find the answer for the question about the necessary reform to be undertaken in the EU to save the euro as a common currency. The author envisages three scenarios of the euro area’s future development. In his opinion, the most probable one are the institutional reforms in the euro area. The essential element of the reform is to establish a proper mix between the ECB’ monetary policy and fiscal policies in the member states. All proposed steps against the euro crisis are mutually correlated: monetary integration requires stricter fiscal integration, fiscal integration requires banking union, but banking union is going to require some form of a political union. This way the debt crisis in the euro area may present an opportunity to renew the strength of the European institutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 396-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Verovšek

The Eurozone crisis revealed fundamental flaws in the institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its lack of political steering capacity has demonstrated the need for a broad but seemingly unachievable political union with shared economic governance and a common treasury. Agreement on further measures has been difficult to achieve, as different actors have imposed divergent external criteria for the success of the Eurozone. As part of their heritage in Western Marxism, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School sought to overcome such problems by identifying internal standards for social criticism. Building on their understanding of immanent critique, I argue that the Eurozone already contains the normative principles necessary to support greater political integration. While the citizens of Europe must provide the democratic legitimation necessary to realize this latent potential, the flaws revealed by the crisis are already pushing Europe towards greater transnational solidarity.


Author(s):  
Peter B. Kenen ◽  
Ellen E. Meade
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Ihor Soroka

The question of whether or not to adopt the euro is a very important one, not only for the 13 European Union members that do not share the same currency, but also for future EU candidates. Current literature on the effect of the euro on trade is scarce since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was officially created in 1999, and up until recently there has not been enough data to analyze this issue. This paper aims to estimate the effect of the euro on trade between member countries using the standard gravity model of trade. Using data from current 25 EU members over the period from 1997 to 2004, I show that higher trade volumes between EMU members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. I find evidence that the euro adoption has had a short-run effect on bilateral trade and that this effect is eliminated over a short period of time. My findings suggest that members of the EMU trade on average from 8.8% to 47% more compared to non-members depending on the type of regression used, while members of the Free Trade Agreement trade 61.3% more. The effect of the euro on trade is eliminated as soon as I control for country-pair specific effects that include the FTA effect as well as history of trade relations between two countries. I conclude that the adoption of the euro should be seen as a final step in the European economic and monetary integration for countries that already benefit from relatively high volumes of bilateral trade. Full text availale at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i1.166


Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter discusses how Gerhard Schröder, leader of Germany's Social Democratic Party, proposed to delay the euro's birth rather than start with members who had not achieved the required fiscal discipline. Campaigning to replace Helmut Kohl as chancellor in March 1998, Schröder observed that some countries would struggle to survive the rigors of the monetary union. However, once Schröder was elected chancellor in October, his hands were tied. In April 1998, the Bundestag had already authorized Germany's shift from the deutsche mark to the euro, Germany had made commitments to its European partners, and preparation for launch of the euro was in full swing. Ultimately, the euro was born uneventfully on January 1, 1999. Schröder continued the narrative of Europe's eventual political awakening; he even called for greater European “political union.” To the contrary, Schröder quickly developed a confrontational relationship with European institutions.


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