scholarly journals The Immanent Potential of Economic and Monetary Integration: A Critical Reading of the Eurozone Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 396-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Verovšek
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Political Union ◽  
Internal Standards ◽  
Immanent Critique ◽  
Latent Potential ◽  
Transnational Solidarity ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Political Steering ◽  
Western Marxism

The Eurozone crisis revealed fundamental flaws in the institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its lack of political steering capacity has demonstrated the need for a broad but seemingly unachievable political union with shared economic governance and a common treasury. Agreement on further measures has been difficult to achieve, as different actors have imposed divergent external criteria for the success of the Eurozone. As part of their heritage in Western Marxism, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School sought to overcome such problems by identifying internal standards for social criticism. Building on their understanding of immanent critique, I argue that the Eurozone already contains the normative principles necessary to support greater political integration. While the citizens of Europe must provide the democratic legitimation necessary to realize this latent potential, the flaws revealed by the crisis are already pushing Europe towards greater transnational solidarity.

scholarly journals Out of the comfort zone? The ECB, financial assistance, independence and accountability

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-121
Author(s):  
Paul Dermine
Keyword(s):  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Financial Assistance ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Comfort Zone ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Core ◽  
Policy Fields ◽  
Redistributive Effects ◽  
Institutional Architecture

The European debt crisis (Eurozone crisis) precipitated an unprecedented reconfiguration of the institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. At the core of such overhaul was the establishment of a financial assistance function specific to the Eurozone. From the outset, there has been a clear will to closely involve the European Central Bank (ECB) at all stages of the operation of this new function. The ECB, an institution endowed with a monetary mandate, has thus entered the field of economic policy. Against that background, this paper intends to investigate the legal and political accountability arrangements the ECB is subject to in that new context. Both the texts organizing the intervention of the ECB and its subsequent practice reveal, so the paper will show, that the ECB’s action in that particular context is mainly conceived as falling under its monetary mandate, and thus as being covered by its independence. The paper will argue that this situation is legally problematic, especially in view of the deep interpenetration between the economic and the monetary policy fields and the redistributive effects of the choices made. It will also claim that the ECB’s independence in that particular context, and the accountability structures it is subject to, should be adjusted.

Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone Crisis

2020 ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Vivien A. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
History Of ◽  
Run Up ◽  
The Stability

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Eurozone crisis, to serve as a background for the subsequent four chapters which discuss in turn each of the four EU actors’ particular pathways to legitimacy, including their sources of power and grounds for throughput legitimacy, along with the Janus-faced public perceptions of their Eurozone governance. The chapter begins with a brief review of the history of European Monetary Union (EMU), describing the trials and tribulations in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty and member states’ very different ideas and discourse related to monetary integration, as illustrated by the differences in German, French, and Italian views. It then considers what happened at the time of the introduction of the single currency. The chapter follows with the initial responses to the Eurozone crisis during its fast-burning phase, characterized by a doubling down on the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. It elaborates on the trials and tribulations at the inception of the crisis, on EU actors’ initial actions and reactions, and on institutional innovations such as banking union. It also provides further details on legislation and treaty agreements, as well as on the ideas underpinning the policy responses. The chapter ends by considering the benefits and drawbacks of EU actors’ subsequent reinterpretation of the rules by stealth during the Eurozone crisis’ slow-burning phase, arguing that although rules reinterpretation may have improved policy responses (output), not admitting this raised questions of accountability and transparency (throughput), while failing to address problems of political legitimacy (input).

scholarly journals Euro Crisis and the EMU Institutional Reforms

Equilibrium ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kundera
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Political Union ◽  
The Eu

The main goal of this article is to find the answer for the question about the necessary reform to be undertaken in the EU to save the euro as a common currency. The author envisages three scenarios of the euro area’s future development. In his opinion, the most probable one are the institutional reforms in the euro area. The essential element of the reform is to establish a proper mix between the ECB’ monetary policy and fiscal policies in the member states. All proposed steps against the euro crisis are mutually correlated: monetary integration requires stricter fiscal integration, fiscal integration requires banking union, but banking union is going to require some form of a political union. This way the debt crisis in the euro area may present an opportunity to renew the strength of the European institutions.

Managing the Eurozone Crisis

2020 ◽  
pp. 223-238
Author(s):  
Manuela Moschella
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Management Competencies ◽  
Advanced Economies ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
And Control ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Imf

In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, some of the most advanced economies in the world turned to the IMF for financial assistance. Not only did the Eurozone countries ask for the Fund’s help; they also incorporated the IMF into the institutional architecture for handling crises in the European Monetary Union. This chapter uses competence–control theory to shed light on the puzzles raised by the decision to enlist the IMF in Eurozone crisis management. Firstly, the chapter argues that the Eurozone’s motivation for enlisting the IMF can be found in the competence deficit its governors confronted in managing the crisis. In particular, Eurozone countries lacked sufficient competence (including expertise, money, and credibility) to formulate and enforce adjustment in crisis-hit countries. By enlisting the IMF, Eurozone countries acquired the necessary competence but had to share control. Secondly, the chapter shows that the tradeoff between competence and control shifted over time: even after creating their own crisis management competencies, member states continued to enlist the IMF as a way to reduce the control problems that creditor states confronted in enforcing adjustment in debtor countries.

The Logic of the Euro, Its Institutional Architecture and the Related Implications

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Savona
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Exchange Market ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Political Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Currency Area ◽  
Institutional Architecture

<p><em>The Euro is the logical consequences of the European common market according to the principle ‘one market, one money’, to avoid unfair competitionchanging internal monetary parities. Anyhow it is a necessary but insufficient condition being the institutional architecture weak. The European Central Bank cannot perform as the other main central banks: cannot act as lender of last resort or intervene on the exchange market to counteract speculation; the risks on national exchange rates has been transferred to member-countries sovereign debts withouta non-deflationary solution to reenter the excesses in theagreed ratio on GDP. The Eurozone is a non-optimal currency area without a policy Mundell’s type. The suggested solutionsby the Europeans are to reform national labor markets and public bureaucracies, and by the idealists to create a political union.</em></p>

The Logic of the Euro, Its Institutional Architecture and the Related Implications

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Savona
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Exchange Market ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Political Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Currency Area ◽  
Institutional Architecture

<p><em>The Euro is the logical consequences of the European common market according to the principle ‘one market, one money’, to avoid unfair competitionchanging internal monetary parities. Anyhow it is a necessary but insufficient condition being the institutional architecture weak. The European Central Bank cannot perform as the other main central banks: cannot act as lender of last resort or intervene on the exchange market to counteract speculation; the risks on national exchange rates has been transferred to member-countries sovereign debts withouta non-deflationary solution to reenter the excesses in theagreed ratio on GDP. The Eurozone is a non-optimal currency area without a policy Mundell’s type. The suggested solutionsby the Europeans are to reform national labor markets and public bureaucracies, and by the idealists to create a political union.</em></p>

From Classical Toward Experimental Federalism: Different Pathways for a More Inclusive and Balanced European Union

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matjaz Nahtigal
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Face ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Practical Feasibility ◽  
The Ideal

A growing number of scholars, academics and policy-makers advocate substantial reforms of the existing European institutional architecture. Advocates of deepening the European integration recommend that the optimal development of the European Union (EU) would be to establish a fully developed banking union, an advanced form of fiscal union and to ultimately achieve a political union based on common economic governance. Accordingly, the ideal scenario for European integration would be to adopt, to the largest possible extent, a path toward the classical federal model. Leaving aside the practical feasibility of such a development, the purpose of this article is to explore whether a direction toward the model of classical federalism is the only possible way forward for European integration. Comparative constitutionalism has developed several substantially different models of federalism. Therefore, this article explores other possible trajectories for European integration while pointing to the limitations of classical federalism. In the face of the protracted social and economic crises in many European member states and their regions, article also examines the possibilities of establishing cooperative or even experimental federalism as a new model for European integration.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document