scholarly journals The moral psychology of value sensitive design: the methodological issues of moral intuitions for responsible innovation

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Umbrello
Author(s):  
Geerten van de Kaa

This chapter discusses the notion of “responsible innovation” and “value sensitive design”. It applies these notions to standardization and more specifically to standard selection. Based on earlier research (Van de Kaa, 2013; Van den Ende, Van de Kaa, Den Uyl, & De Vries, 2012), it is proposed that standards should be flexible to facilitate changes related to ethical and societal values. An acceptable standard can be achieved by involving users in the standard development process. The understanding of standardization and standard selection in particular can be improved by incorporating concepts and theories from the discipline of philosophy. This chapter discusses three conceptualizations of standard selection: market dominance, socio-political acceptance, and acceptability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-267
Author(s):  
Mark de Reuver ◽  
Aimee van Wynsberghe ◽  
Marijn Janssen ◽  
Ibo van de Poel

Abstract In this paper, we argue that the characteristics of digital platforms challenge the fundamental assumptions of value sensitive design (VSD). Traditionally, VSD methods assume that we can identify relevant values during the design phase of new technologies. The underlying assumption is that there is only epistemic uncertainty about which values will be impacted by a technology. VSD methods suggest that one can predict which values will be affected by new technologies by increasing knowledge about how values are interpreted or understood in context. In contrast, digital platforms exhibit a novel form of uncertainty, namely, ontological uncertainty: even with full information and overview, it cannot be foreseen what users or developers will do with digital platforms. Hence, predictions about which values are affected might not hold. In this paper, we suggest expanding VSD methods to account for value dynamism resulting from ontological uncertainty. Our expansions involve (1) extending VSD to the entire lifecycle of a platform, (2) broadening VSD through the addition of reflexivity, i.e. second-order learning about what values to aim at, and (3) adding specific tools of moral sandboxing and moral prototyping to enhance such reflexivity. While we illustrate our approach with a short case study about ride-sharing platforms such as Uber, our approach is relevant for other technologies exhibiting ontological uncertainty as well, such as machine learning, robotics and artificial intelligence.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Hanno Sauer

The field of moral psychology has become increasingly popular in recent years. In this chapter, we focus on two interrelated questions. First, how do peoplemake moral judgments? We address this question by reviewing the most prominent theories in moral psychology that aim to characterize, explain and predict people’s moral judgments. Second, how should people’s moral judgments be evaluated in terms of their rationality? This question is approached by reviewing the debate on the rationality of moral judgments and moral intuitions, which has been strongly influenced by findings in moral psychology but also by recent advances in learning theory. To appear in: Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (in press). The Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


Author(s):  
Caner Turan

This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving “up close and personal” harm back to our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene’s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous (gene-independent) moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 088626052110501
Author(s):  
Eric Silver ◽  
Stacy Silver

Drawing on insights from moral psychology, we examine the influence of moral intuitions on Americans’ divergent reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment. We hypothesize that Americans whose moral intuitions emphasize care and protection of the vulnerable will show a greater willingness to believe reports of sexual assault and harassment, while those whose moral intuitions emphasize social order and cohesion will show greater skepticism toward such reports. Using data from a nationally representative sample of USA adults ( N =1050), we find strong support for both hypotheses. We also find that the influence of moral intuitions on reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment is partially mediated by respondents’ willingness to attribute responsibility to victims of sex crimes. Our results hold when females and males are examined separately. The study provides compelling evidence that a moral intuitionist approach is useful for understanding Americans’ divergent reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment.


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