scholarly journals Does autonomous moral reasoning favor consequentialism?

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caner Turan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Innocent People ◽  
Normative Power ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Joshua Greene ◽  
Personal Harm

This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving “up close and personal” harm back to our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene’s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous (gene-independent) moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism.

scholarly journals Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Paulo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Case Based Reasoning ◽  
Use Case ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Abstract Form ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Consistency ◽  
Case Based

Abstract Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar’s naturalistic model for the resolution of inconsistencies between the content of intuitions about particular cases. I argue that reasons similar to those that motivate their model also support a more abstract form of moral reasoning that goes beyond mere resolutions of inconsistencies between case judgments and demands the formulation of more abstract moral norms. Consistency Reasoning Casuistry, it is argued, is a good candidate for a methodology for case-based moral reasoning that is in harmony with paradigms of contemporary moral psychology and that can accommodate the methodology implicit in the work of many contemporary ethicists.

scholarly journals The Asymmetry of population ethics: experimental social choice and dual-process moral reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-454
Author(s):  
Dean Spears
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Population Ethics ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
The Asymmetry

AbstractPopulation ethics is widely considered to be exceptionally important and exceptionally difficult. One key source of difficulty is the conflict between certain moral intuitions and analytical results identifying requirements for rational (in the sense of complete and transitive) social choice over possible populations. One prominent such intuition is the Asymmetry, which jointly proposes that the fact that a possible child’s quality of life would be bad is a normative reason not to create the child, but the fact that a child’s quality of life would be good is not a reason to create the child. This paper reports a set of questionnaire experiments about the Asymmetry in the spirit of economists’ empirical social choice. Few survey respondents show support for the Asymmetry; instead respondents report that expectations of a good quality of life are relevant. Each experiment shows evidence (among at least some participants) of dual-process moral reasoning, in which cognitive reflection is statistically associated with reporting expected good quality of life to be normatively relevant. The paper discusses possible implications of these results for the economics of population-sensitive social welfare and for the conflict between moral mathematics and population intuition.

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

invisible fences of the moral domain

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 552-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
jonathan haidt
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Moral Domain

crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own intuitions. sunstein's argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to resist.

Conflicts of interest in finance

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-350
Author(s):  
Morten Kinander
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Relying on research from social psychology and business ethics, this paper aims to argue that the current massive regulatory regime surrounding the attempts to curb what is perceived to be damaging conflicts of interests in the financial industry is based on misguided assumptions, and that the trend of increasingly detailed rule-making, supervision and sanctioning in this area might be counter-effective. This should cause financial services legislators and regulators to be cautious when proposing more detailed rules as solutions to perceived problems. The paper argues that disclosure is no remedy for a harmful conflict of interest, and that such an obligation can only be based on the client’s right to know about the conflict. This right, however, does not, in itself, justify all the extensive and detailed regulation in the area. The paper ends with a recommendation for more research into the moral reasoning ability of financial services professionals, as well as the interplay between judgment and rules in the finance industry. Design/methodology/approach The paper relies on research within behavioural moral psychology, and applies it to business ethics with the aim of discussing the impact of regulation on moral reasoning within the finance industry. Findings Regulation might lead to a decrease in moral reasoning, which is the premise of proper handling of conflicts of interest. Additionally, disclosure of unavoidable conflicts of interest might even strengthen the negative consequences of such conflicts. Research limitations/implications More research should be conducted within the financial services sector about the effect of regulation on individual judgment. Practical implications The paper proposes that care should be exercised when proposing increased and complex regulation to avoid unintended and adverse consequences for the financial services industry. Originality/value The paper synthesises existing research within different fields – such as moral psychology and analytic business ethics – and applies it to financial regulation.

Risky Killing

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Subjective Probabilities ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Innocent People

I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. I argue that the salient probabilities are the agent’s sincere, sane, subjective probabilities, and that this thesis is relevant whether your risk-taking pertains to the probability of killing a person or to the probability that the person you kill is not liable to be killed. I then defend the view’s relevance to intentional killing; show how it differs from an account of blameworthiness; and explain its significance for all-things-considered justification and justification under uncertainty.

Prosocial Television, Preschool Children’s Moral Judgments, and Moral Reasoning: The Role of Social Moral Intuitions and Perspective-Taking

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew P. Cingel ◽  
Marina Krcmar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Television Shows ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Intuitionist Model ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Parent Presence

Children’s prosocial television shows include moral lessons in their narratives, but research suggests that children struggle to comprehend and transfer these lessons to other situations. The social intuitionist model of moral judgment, however, argues that dimensions of morality can be made more salient through environmental exposure. Using data collected from 101 parent-child dyads (children ages 4.5-6.5), we explore if children’s existing moral intuitions about fairness and care may be made salient following exposure to moral lessons in a children’s television show, and if parent presence and mediation aid this process. Results demonstrate that, compared with children in the control group, children who viewed the moral message either alone or with a parent experienced improvements in perspective-taking, which in turn influenced their moral judgments and moral reasoning. Thus, children’s morality can be positively influenced by prosocial television exposure via promoting perspective-taking, fairness, and care.

scholarly journals The psychology and rationality of moral judgment

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Hanno Sauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Learning Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Recent Advances

The field of moral psychology has become increasingly popular in recent years. In this chapter, we focus on two interrelated questions. First, how do peoplemake moral judgments? We address this question by reviewing the most prominent theories in moral psychology that aim to characterize, explain and predict people’s moral judgments. Second, how should people’s moral judgments be evaluated in terms of their rationality? This question is approached by reviewing the debate on the rationality of moral judgments and moral intuitions, which has been strongly influenced by findings in moral psychology but also by recent advances in learning theory. To appear in: Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (in press). The Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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