John H. Morrow, Jr. German Air Power in World War I. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 267. $21.50

In this chapter, to support the assertion that air power is inherently offensive, Kenneth Walker, in “Driving Home the Bombardment Attack,” argues that in the air, offense dominates defense, and a well-armed and well-flown massed bomber formation can defend against any air-to-air attack. In “Tactical Offense and Tactical Defense,” Frederick Hopkins takes an inductive approach to the question of whether the bomber will always get through. In World War I, only when German defenders concentrated their fighters to British bombers at a ratio of 1.5 to 1 did British attrition rates become too great for sustained operations. Hopkins considers it unlikely such ratios would be achieved in the future given the defender’s dilemma of having to defend everywhere yet also mass forces against an offensive force that could choose the time and location of attack.


This introduction describes the strategic bombing mission of the US Army Air Forces’ Eighth Air Force against the Fock-Wulfe plant at Bremen, Germany, on April 17, 1943, assessing the use of high-altitude daylight precision bombing,. The introduction then reviews American strategic bombing theory from its origins in World War I to the thinking of three great interwar air power theorists―the Italian Giulio Douhet, the Briton Hugh Trenchard, and the American Billy Mitchell―to the founding of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), the development of the Norden bombsight and B-17 bomber, and the genesis of HADPB theory at the Air Corps Tactical School.


1984 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 663
Author(s):  
Richard P. Hallion ◽  
John H. Morrow
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-230
Author(s):  
Pavel NEČAS ◽  
Martina VACKOVÁ ◽  
Peter LOŠONCZI

The aim of our work was to identify the role and the potential of the Air Power in modern warfare as a security factor. The Air Power itself is a concept, which had initially materialized almost one hundred years ago over the battlefields of the World War I. Since then we could witness a staging development in the field of technology and the Art of War, which momentum and scope has no precedence in history. In other words, it has taken less than one hundred years for human to move from fragile and underpowered biplanes to supersonic jet fighters and stealth bombers, which represent a state of art technology of mankind. Such speed in development had no precedence in any other operational domain, except maybe of cyberspace.


1983 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 605
Author(s):  
Carl Boyd ◽  
John H. Morrow
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
David J. Betz

The evolution of conceptions of insurgency and counterinsurgency can be traced across three periods: pre-Maoist, Maoist, and post-Maoist insurgency. The first and, arguably, the most influential theorist of insurgency was T.E. Lawrence, whose insights stemmed from his almost certainly exaggerated exploits in the Middle East in World War I. Lawrence described insurgency as a moral contest and not a physical one. Presaging later theorists of insurgency, he spoke of the necessity of a cause to motivate the insurgents. When analysts speak of “classical” insurgency they are referring to Maoist insurgency, whose strategic essence was the substitution “of propaganda for guns, subversion for air power, men for machines, space for mechanization, political for industrial mobilization.” Post-Maoist insurgency focuses on the “War on Terror” and its major campaigns. Three themes have emerged in insurgency research, which have gained more theoretical prominence and empirical grounding. The first is the notion that sound counterinsurgency depends upon good cultural understanding of the society in conflict. The second is the issue of reconstruction and development which is increasingly seen as the sine qua non of counterinsurgency. The third is the evolution of insurgency into the “virtual territories of the mind” caused by the advent of humanity in general into the Information Age.


Author(s):  
Robert Gerald Hughes

Strategic air power is one of the means by which a military strategy employs aerial platforms to bypass the battlefield to achieve decisive political results in conflict. Most obviously, this has involved the coercion of an enemy nation-state by seeking to destroy its economic ability to wage war (as opposed to eliminating its armed forces). In Clauzwitzian terms, this represents a fundamental shift in identifying the enemy’s “center of gravity.” Debates over whether air power can achieve strategic goals date from the very first applications of it. The use of strategic air power requires systematic organization (e.g., RAF Bomber Command; the US Strategic Air Command) and, in addition to the use of strategic bomber aircraft, can be used in conjunction with missiles or tactical aircraft against targets selected to diminish the war-making capacity of the enemy. One of the aims for using strategic air power is enemy demoralization—that is, the racking up of punishment to the extent that the will of the enemy to resist is broken. The theory of strategic heavy bombing began to be developed during the aftermath of World War I. By the time of World War II, opponents of strategic air power made frequent reference to “terror bombing” as shorthand for its use. Of course, this term is dismissed by proponents of the use of strategic air power for the manner in which it delineates between other aspects of war (often equally unpleasant) and the targeting of civilians/war-making capacity. The use of strategic air power has been limited since World War II for a number of reasons. Not least among these is the relative scarcity of major wars as well as the inability of the vast majority of modern nation-states to devote sufficient resources to seek any decision in conflict via strategic air power. The United States is a notable exception here and it employed strategic air power in Vietnam in 1972, against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and in Kosovo in 1999.


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