scholarly journals Simulation and Analysis on the Optimal Tax Rate of Water Resources in Yunnan Province

Author(s):  
Min Li ◽  
Chunxue Liu ◽  
Shuang Xu
Water Policy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-liang Tian ◽  
Zheng Wu ◽  
Yu-can Hu

Abstract The determination of the optimal tax rate of water resources is one of the core as well as the key economic and technological issue in the ‘fee to tax’ work of water resources in China. Therefore, based on the introduction of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of water resources tax, using production parameters and consumption parameters of Hebei province in 2008–2017, the optimal tax rate of water resources is simulated and calculated, and the impact of the optimal tax rate on social welfare is analyzed. The results show that the reference of the best water resources tax rate in Hebei Province is 18%, and taxation on water resources effectively promotes the water use structure and water resources utilization efficiency in Hebei, which is beneficial to its water resources protection. The effective calculation of the optimal tax rate of water resources tax in Hebei Province proves the effectiveness of the CGE model in the formulation of water resources tax rate, which provides an important reference for the nationwide popularization of water resources ‘fee to tax reform’ in China and the formulation of water resources tax rate in other regions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-262
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar ◽  
Khadijah Isa ◽  
Salihu Aramide Ibrahim ◽  
Sakiru Adsebola Solarin

Purpose The present study aims to investigate the impact of the reduction of the corporate tax rate on corporate tax revenue. The study adopts the theory of taxation by Ibn Khaldun, depicted as the Laffer curve. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyses time series data for the period 1996 to 2014 using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. Findings The paper finds that the corporate tax rate has a dual effect on corporate tax revenue over the study period. It shows an inverted U-shape relationship between the corporate tax rate and corporate tax revenue and reveals that the optimal tax rate is 25.5156 per cent. Inferentially, a positive relationship exists between the two variables prior to the optimal tax rate, and a negative relationship prevails afterwards. A further test of causality shows a long-run unidirectional causality between corporate tax rate and corporate tax revenue. Research limitations/implications First, it should be noted that the policy was not implemented in isolation. Several other tax incentives were given to corporate tax payers, and therefore, such incentives should be controlled for to have a more insightful evaluation of the policy. Second and most important, there is a need to investigate whether the increased cash flow available to firms as a result of the reduction in the corporate tax rate adds value to firms. It is also necessary to investigate whether firms’ stakeholders benefited from the increased cash flow or was there managerial diversion of firms’ resources. Practical implications The policy of gradual reduction of the corporate tax rate in Malaysia is suspected to have a positive impact on the productivity of Malaysian companies, which has contributed to an increase in corporate tax revenue. It also has a positive impact on the economic growth of the country. It means that the lower corporate tax rate has actually reduced the cost of doing business in the country. Originality/value The benefit of increased corporate tax revenue needs to be investigated empirically for insightful policy evaluation. In Malaysia, however, such investigation is close to non-existent to the best knowledge of the researchers. Thus, the present study aims at investigating the impact of the policy of gradual reduction of the corporate tax rate on corporate tax revenue over an 18-year period from 1996 to 2014.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-Rui Chen ◽  
Yuan Yuan ◽  
Xu Xiao

The Resource Tax Law was officially implemented on September 1, 2020, in China. This law presents the “Fee-to-Tax” reform of water resources. This article compares the effects of the “Fee-to-Tax” reform under asymmetric duopoly conditions with perfect information. The mechanisms of the two policies are different when all firms simultaneously respond to water resources: the water resource fee affects output by reducing market size, while the water resource tax reduces output by amplifying the weighted cost difference effects between companies. Water resource taxes work better than fees for eliminating backward production capacity. A comparison of the situation when companies respond sequentially is also carried out. When a low-cost firm is in the leading position, the collection of fees actually reduces the output difference, whereas the tax improves it. When a high-cost firm acts as a leader, the effects depend on the cost difference. When the cost difference between firms is small, the first-move advantage of high-cost firms dominates the cost advantages of low-cost firms. Therefore, a higher tax rate yields a smaller output difference. When cost differences are relatively larger, the cost advantage of low-cost firms dominates the first-move advantage of high-cost firms. As the operational cost for reducing water consumption increases, the reduced water consumption first increases and then decreases.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-rui Chen ◽  
Pu-yan Nie

Abstract Background: The Resource Tax Law has been officially implemented on September 1, 2020 in China. This law presents the “Fee-to-Tax” reform of water resources. Methods: This article compares the effects of the “Fee-to-Tax” reform under an asymmetric duopoly with perfect information. Results: First, an analysis when all firms simultaneously respond to the water resource policy is conducted. The mechanisms of the two policies are different: the water resource fee affects output by reducing market size, while the water resource tax reduces output by amplifying the weighted cost difference effects between companies. It is shown that the tax works better than the fee for eliminating backward production capacity. Then, a comparison of the situation when companies respond sequentially is carried out. When a low-cost firm is in the leading position, the collection of fees actually reduces the output difference, whereas the tax improves it. When a high-cost firm acts as a leader, the effects depend on the cost difference. When the cost difference between firms is small, the first-move advantage of high-cost firms dominates the cost advantages of low-cost firms. Therefore, a higher tax rate yields a smaller output difference. Conclusions: When cost differences are relatively larger, the cost advantage of low-cost firms dominates the first-move advantage of high-cost firms. Therefore, the “Fee-to-Tax” reform provides some benefits to maintain the environmental development of some water-mining or related industries.


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aude Pommeret ◽  
Katheline Schubert

New technology has been credited with solving environmental problems by mitigating the effects of pollutants. We construct a general equilibrium model in which abatement technology is a real option and pollution's (negative) amenity value alters both risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We derive the tax scheme such that in a decentralized economy agents adopt the abatement technology at the time that is socially optimal. We show that the higher the greenness of preferences, the earlier the adoption and the higher the optimal tax rate. We also obtain that adoption is fostered by uncertainty if the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution is large enough, but is not affected by uncertainty if this elasticity is low. Moreover, the optimal tax rate, which only exists if the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high, is an increasing function of uncertainty.


2007 ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Fernando Cabrales ◽  
Ana Fernández ◽  
Fritz Grafe

This note presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation in Chile, adopting Roemer’s equality of opportunities as the evaluation criterion. The equality of opportunities optimal tax rules seek to equalize income differentials arising from factors beyond the control of the individual. Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunities (Roemer, 1998) has been employed to compute the extent to which tax-andtransfer regimes in some OECD countries equalize opportunities among citizens for income acquisition. In this note we apply this approach to Chile, a developing economy, and compare the results to those reported in Roemer, Aaberge, Colombino, Fritzell, Jenkins, Marx, Page, Pommer, Ruiz-Castillo, Segundo, Tranaes, Wagner and Zubiri (2003). We find that the optimal tax rate in Chile according to Roemer’s equalopportunities approach should be zero.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Fogarty

The 2010 Australian government tax review suggested Australia move to a uniform excise tax rate for all alcoholic beverages. Here, a model is presented and calibrated that shows the optimal per litre of pure alcohol (LAL) tax rates for beer, wine, spirits, and ready-to-drink spirits are substantially different to both current alcohol tax rates and the uniform tax rate recommended by the tax review. Specifically, given an individual consumer utility model, the best estimate values of the welfare maximising LAL tax rates are: $37 for beer, $11 for wine, $50 for spirits, and $77 for ready-to-drink spirits. The variation in the optimal tax rate across beverage types flows from differences in the externality costs associated with the consumption of each beverage type, and differences in the proportion of moderate consumption and abusive consumption associated with each beverage type. In addition, it is shown that the optimal tax rates are influenced by the range of costs that are considered to be externality costs, and the relative price responsiveness of abusers and moderate consumers.


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