scholarly journals Influence of committed volunteers on helping behavior in emergency evacuations

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaeyoung Kwak ◽  
Mike H Lees ◽  
Wentong Cai ◽  
Ahmad Reza Pourghaderi ◽  
Marcus E H Ong
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Emergency Evacuation ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Movement Model ◽  
Emergency Evacuations ◽  
Minimum Number ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Abstract We study how the presence of committed volunteers influences the collective helping behavior in emergency evacuation scenarios. In this study, committed volunteers do not change their decision to help injured persons, implying that other evacuees may adapt their helping behavior through strategic interactions. An evolutionary game theoretic model is developed which is then coupled to a pedestrian movement model to examine the collective helping behavior in evacuations. By systematically controlling the number of committed volunteers and payoff parameters, we have characterized and summarized various collective helping behaviors in phase diagrams. From our numerical simulations, we observe that the existence of committed volunteers can promote cooperation but adding additional committed volunteers is effective only above a minimum number of committed volunteers. This study also highlights that the evolution of collective helping behavior is strongly affected by the evacuation process.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

scholarly journals Critical transitions in a game theoretic model of tumour metabolism

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Kianercy ◽  
Robert Veltri ◽  
Kenneth J. Pienta
Keyword(s):  
Stromal Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tumour Cells ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Hybrid Energy ◽  
Critical Transitions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Strategies

Tumour proliferation is promoted by an intratumoral metabolic symbiosis in which lactate from stromal cells fuels energy generation in the oxygenated domain of the tumour. Furthermore, empirical data show that tumour cells adopt an intermediate metabolic state between lactate respiration and glycolysis. This study models the metabolic symbiosis in the tumour through the formalism of evolutionary game theory. Our game model of metabolic symbiosis in cancer considers two types of tumour cells, hypoxic and oxygenated, while glucose and lactate are considered as the two main sources of energy within the tumour. The model confirms the presence of multiple intermediate stable states and hybrid energy strategies in the tumour. It predicts that nonlinear interaction between two subpopulations leads to tumour metabolic critical transitions and that tumours can obtain different intermediate states between glycolysis and respiration which can be regulated by the genomic mutation rate. The model can apply in the epithelial–stromal metabolic decoupling therapy.

Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention

2011 ◽  
Vol 105 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIBERIU DRAGU
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Privacy And Security ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, and more important, the antiterrorist agency will always want less privacy. The very agency whose expertise affords it disproportionate influence on policy making will prefer a reduction in privacy protections even when that reduction harms security from terrorism. The analysis has implications for understanding the relationship between government powers and civil liberties in the context of terrorism prevention and times of emergencies more generally.

AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF CANNIBALISM

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. CUSHING ◽  
SHANDELLE M. HENSON ◽  
JAMES L. HAYWARD
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
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