scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

The Problem of Clean Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Eric Barnes ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Elections

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292091120
Author(s):  
Muhammet A. Bas ◽  
Elena V. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Commitment Problems

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research, which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict.

Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1042-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

Corporate communication in the emerging network economy

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss ◽  
Tore Kristensen ◽  
Ricky Wilke
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Corporate Communication ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Network Economy ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Knowledge Requirements ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a new theory of marketing in the emerging network economy. The paper argues that in a network economy, firms and consumers will confront “coordination problems”. With the emerging network economy all this becomes urgent because the availability and cost of information decreases. Also, timing issues become urgent as millions of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explains why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the same events become so important. The paper introduces a simple game theoretic model and discusses marketing applications and possible strategies. These strategies imply considerable use of communication resources in order to fulfil the common knowledge requirements.

scholarly journals Critical transitions in a game theoretic model of tumour metabolism

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Kianercy ◽  
Robert Veltri ◽  
Kenneth J. Pienta
Keyword(s):  
Stromal Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tumour Cells ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Hybrid Energy ◽  
Critical Transitions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Strategies

Tumour proliferation is promoted by an intratumoral metabolic symbiosis in which lactate from stromal cells fuels energy generation in the oxygenated domain of the tumour. Furthermore, empirical data show that tumour cells adopt an intermediate metabolic state between lactate respiration and glycolysis. This study models the metabolic symbiosis in the tumour through the formalism of evolutionary game theory. Our game model of metabolic symbiosis in cancer considers two types of tumour cells, hypoxic and oxygenated, while glucose and lactate are considered as the two main sources of energy within the tumour. The model confirms the presence of multiple intermediate stable states and hybrid energy strategies in the tumour. It predicts that nonlinear interaction between two subpopulations leads to tumour metabolic critical transitions and that tumours can obtain different intermediate states between glycolysis and respiration which can be regulated by the genomic mutation rate. The model can apply in the epithelial–stromal metabolic decoupling therapy.

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