Equilibrium attainment vs. equilibrium necessities

Author(s):  
Lawrence A. Boland

This chapter is about Kenneth Arrow’s 1959 article about price adjustment. This chapter uses that article to explain the logical requirements of any equilibrium model that purports to explain, say, equilibrium prices. Arrow explains why just assuming maximization on the part of both demanders and supplier in a market is not enough to assure equilibrium attainment. Arrow rejects the usual textbooks’ addition of an additional assumption that the markets are already at equilibrium. He instead argues that explicitly assumptions about the dynamics of equilibrium attainment must be included in any equilibrium model. The chapter thus discusses price adjustment in formal models; equilibrium attainment as an explicit process. It recognizes that Arrow equilibrium attainment also need something like imperfect competition to deal with any disequilibrium state that would necessarily exist prior to equilibrium attainment.

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie J. Reinhorn

AbstractThis paper studies optimal linear taxation in a general equilibrium model with Cournot oligopoly. The main result is the following. With imperfect competition the tendency toward "inverse elasticities" tax rules will be weakened and may even be reversed. That is, an upward sloping relationship may exist between an industry's optimal tax rate and its own-price elasticity of demand, unlike the perfectly competitive case.


2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
OZGE SENAY

This paper analyzes exchange-rate dynamics following a money-based disinflation under different degrees of exchange-rate pass-through. Using a microfounded dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, it is shown that a monetary slowdown causes an appreciation of the exchange rate and a short-run fall in employment. Varying the degree of pass-through, however, significantly alters the magnitudes of these effects. As the degree of pass-through is reduced, the extent of the short-run appreciation of the exchange rate increases and the short-run impact of the disinflation on employment falls.


2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (02) ◽  
pp. 141-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
GERARD VAN DER LAAN ◽  
HAROLD HOUBA

In this paper the one-seller/two-buyer problem with buyer externalities is investigated under the assumption that the two buyers have legal opportunities to cooperate. It is shown that the Competitive equilibrium and the Core are robust with respect to negligible externalities and that the range of market prices in the Core belongs to range of Competitive equilibrium prices. However, these concepts yield no prediction for relatively severe externalities. Therefore, in order to provide a prediction the Bargaining set and the Multilateral Nash (MN) solution are also investigated. Surprisingly, in case of an empty Core the Bargaining set predicts a unique tuple of payoffs which are independent of the externalities and each pair of participants is equally likely. Markets with market imperfections are captured by the MN solution concept. The MN solution yields the paradox that the seller's price can be higher under imperfect competition than under perfect competition.


2022 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-212
Author(s):  
Thibaut Lamadon ◽  
Magne Mogstad ◽  
Bradley Setzler

We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US labor market by estimating the size of labor market rents earned by American firms and workers. We construct a matched employer-employee panel dataset by combining the universe of US business and worker tax records for the period 2001–2015. Using this panel data, we identify and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor market with two-sided heterogeneity where workers view firms as imperfect substitutes because of heterogeneous preferences over nonwage job characteristics. The model allows us to draw inference about imperfect competition, worker sorting, compensating differentials, and rent sharing. (JEL D24, H24, H25, J22, J24, J31, J42)


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