Moral Progress and Moral Enhancement

2016 ◽  
pp. 133-145
Author(s):  
John Harris
Bioethics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (7) ◽  
pp. 814-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson ◽  
Julian Savulescu

Bioethics ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 285-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN HARRIS

Studia Humana ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Konrad Szocik

Abstract Biomedical moral enhancement is an idea which states that human moral intuitions and patterns may be artificially improved by biomedical means. The rationale which lies behind moral bioenhancement is rooted in the idea that humans – in a moral and behavioral sense – are not evolutionally adapted to current ecological challenges. This idea is discussed in the paper in relation to human space missions to Mars and beyond. Because the space environment is a hazardous environment, there are some reasons to consider the idea of moral bioenhancement for the purposes of mission success and the safety of astronauts/space settlers. This paper discusses that idea in the context of a broader discussion on moral enhancement, moral bioenhancement related to earthly issues, and the idea of moral progress.


Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter critically examines a different and highly provocative response to the thesis that evolved human moral psychology poses severe and inflexible limitations on moral progress: the “evoliberal” proposal to re-engineer human moral psychology through biomedical technologies in order to solve some of our most pressing moral problems: war, terrorism, genocide, and climate change. It shows that the evoliberal position is premised on the same problematic evolutionary assumptions that underpin the evoconservative view. Once our world’s great moral problems are recast in terms of failures of moral inclusivity, it becomes clear that biomedical moral enhancement technology is unlikely to be necessary or effective in addressing them. To the contrary, the evolutionary model of moral psychological development sketched in Part II suggests that cultural moral innovations that deploy our best understanding of the evolutionary development of human morality stand the best chance of driving moral progress and preventing moral regression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 405-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joao Fabiano

A new argument has been made against moral enhancement by authors who are otherwise in favour of human enhancement. Additionally, they share the same evolutionary toolkit for analysing human traits as well as the belief that our current morality is unfit to deal with modern problems, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The argument is put forward by Buchanan and Powell and states that other paths to moral progress are enough to deal with these problems. Given the likely costs and risks involved with developing moral enhancement, this argument implies moral enhancement is an unpromising enterprise. After mentioning proposed solutions to such modern problems, I will argue that moral enhancement would help implement any of them. I will then detail Buchanan and Powell’s new argument disfavouring moral enhancement and argue that it makes too bold assumptions about the efficacy of traditional moral progress. For instance, it overlooks how that progress was to achieve even in relatively successful cases such as the abolition of slavery. Traditional moral progress is likely to require assistance from non-traditional means in order to face new challenges.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-164
Author(s):  
Allan Buchanan ◽  
Russel Powell
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter proposes a theory of moral regression, arguing that inclusivist gains can be eroded not only if certain harsh biological and social conditions indicative of out-group threat actually reappear but also if significant numbers of people come to believe that such harsh conditions exist even when they do not. It argues that normal cognitive biases in conjunction with defective social-epistemic practices can cause people wrongly to believe that such harsh conditions exist, thus triggering the development and evolution of exclusivist moralities and the dismantling of inclusivist ones. Armed with detailed knowledge of the biological and social environments in which progressive moralities emerge and are sustained, as well as the conditions under which they are likely to be dismantled, human beings can take significant steps toward transforming the classic liberal faith in moral progress into a practical, empirically grounded hope.


Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter identifies a number of developments that are candidates for moral progress: abolition of the Atlantic chattel slavery, improvements in civil rights for minorities, equal rights for women, better treatment of (some) non-human animals, and abolition of the cruellest punishments in most parts of the world. This bottom-up approach is then used to construct a typology of moral progress, including improvements in moral reasoning, recognition of the moral standing or equal basic moral status of beings formerly thought to lack them, improvements in understandings of the domain of justice, the recognition that some behaviors formerly thought to be morally impermissible (such as premarital sex, masturbation, lending money at interest, and refusal to die “for king and country”) can be morally permissible, and improvements in understandings of morality itself. Finally, a distinction is made between improvements from a moral point of view and moral progress in the fullest sense.


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