A Typology of Moral Progress

Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter identifies a number of developments that are candidates for moral progress: abolition of the Atlantic chattel slavery, improvements in civil rights for minorities, equal rights for women, better treatment of (some) non-human animals, and abolition of the cruellest punishments in most parts of the world. This bottom-up approach is then used to construct a typology of moral progress, including improvements in moral reasoning, recognition of the moral standing or equal basic moral status of beings formerly thought to lack them, improvements in understandings of the domain of justice, the recognition that some behaviors formerly thought to be morally impermissible (such as premarital sex, masturbation, lending money at interest, and refusal to die “for king and country”) can be morally permissible, and improvements in understandings of morality itself. Finally, a distinction is made between improvements from a moral point of view and moral progress in the fullest sense.

Author(s):  
Daniel Statman

The recent development of unmanned technology—drones and robots of various types—is transforming the nature of warfare. Instead of fighting against other human beings, combatants will soon be fighting against machines. At present, these machines are operated by human beings, but they are becoming increasingly autonomous. Some people believe that, from a moral point of view, this development is worrisome, especially insofar as fully autonomous offensive systems (‘killer robots’) are concerned. I claim that the arguments that support this belief are pretty weak. Compared with the grand battles of the past, with their shockingly high toll of casualties, drone-centered campaigns seem much more humane. They also enable a better fit between moral responsibility and vulnerability to defensive action. Drones and robots may well be recorded in the annals of warfare as offering real promise for moral progress.


1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia H. Werhane

Readers of Business Ethics Quarterly will be grateful to Professor Hartman for this very fine paper. He has, at last, advanced the dialogue on organizations. Instead of the usual attack on Peter French, et al., Hartman has introduced the notion of the commons as a heuristic device to get at the moral dimension (or lack thereof) or organizations. And unlike much of what goes on in business ethics, he has avoided the usual utilitarian/deontology/Rawlsian approaches. Instead he has depended on work of Frankfurt and Aristotle to introduce the notions of second-order desires, virtue, and community, all of which, at the very least, enriches the notion of an organization and the scope of its moral point of view.I cannot respond to all the arguments in the paper, and I found myself surprisingly in agreement with much of it. However, agreement is not one of the virtues of a commentator. So I shall comment on two points: first on what I shall label Hartman’s communitarian approach, and second, on the notions of exit, voice, and loyalty.In response to what is sometimes called “individualism” in ethics which, Hartman alleges, takes “time-honored moral principles as foundational and try[s] to figure out what communal or organizational arrangements best encourage people to treat one another according to them,” Hartman argues that a more propitious approach in organizational ethics is to “try to say something about what a good community looks like, and then see how a good community requires people to treat each other.” It turns out that a good community is, minimally, one in which “the commons is preserved, and [where] there is enough consensus that people are able to have extended conversations about morality from which moral progress may emerge.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-63
Author(s):  
Saiful Bahri

The world of adolescents faces various problems as a result of advances in science and technology which also have a negative impact on various problems, for example the value of mutual assistance, the value of politeness. affection, mutual respect and others that have been lost in adolescents and even in public life in general, the consequences of this current are very influential on the psychology of the development of adolescents today, actually if we observe together a necessity that must be developed by the government, parents, schools and communities must jointly embrace this lost culture so that they realize that the values ​​of politeness, morals, behavior and others are so important in this case, value education plays an important role. Value education is education that considers objects from a moral and non-moral point of view, which includes aesthetics of assessing objects from the point of view of personal beauty and taste, and ethics that assesses right or wrong in interpersonal relationships, education plays a very important value in the endeavor. to reach a whole human. The value of guidance as an integral part of education can be a powerful tool in warding off negative influences, influences both from within the country and abroad.


Author(s):  
Walter B. Gulick

In this essay, I sketch five complementary arenas of concern are set forth as candidates for a cogent contemporary theory of paideia. First, a searching, goal setting form of reflection is central to paideia today even as it was in Hellenistic times. A second contributor to paideia is critical reflection. But, third, reasoning is also connected to embodied activity through feeling. Thus, sensitivity to existential meaning helps people determine what they really want and believe, and it also joins them to the persons, things, and events that matter most to them. Fourth, use of the moral point of view safeguards individuals against wallowing in mere self-indulgence heedless of the welfare of others or of the world as a whole. Finally, only by being open to the complex challenges of the world can a person be receptive to the mysterious dimension of life and discern ultimate priorities. I claim that persons guiding themselves by the five-leveled notion of paideia articulated here will again experience the power of philosophy to confer well-being upon themselves and the world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Derpmann

AbstractA philosophical inquiry into the ethics or the morals of distress has to address a distinction regarding its very own scope. On the one hand, situations of distress can be understood to involve particular moral considerations. On the other hand, distress can be understood as the presence of specific characteristics that may allow for a divergence from what is obliged from the moral point of view. The article reflects on the idea of distress as setting limits to moral reflection and obligation, considering particular examples that illustrate the meaning of integrity and personal ties and their practical relevance in situations of distress. In the light of these reflections it seems inadequate to claim that distress exempts one from relying on moral reasoning altogether, but rather that situations of distress engender specific moral considerations.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-188
Author(s):  
Adi Ophir

Among those who know Yehuda's work, the term “two-tier thinking” is usually associated with a problematic relativist position (Elkana 1978). But “two-tier thinking” is not a name for a philosophical argument; it is best understood, I think, as a term designating certain conditions of knowledge: universal, or modern, or perhaps only postmodern conditions, but in any case, they are generalizations derived from anthropological and psychological observations on matters of facts. This is how things actually work in the sphere of knowledge: Western intellectuals and scientists tend to acknowledge that their truth claims and certainly their normative claims are incompatible with other claims that stem from other belief systems, frameworks of thought or genres of discourses, and there is no final, impartial instance of judgment to adjudicate between the incompatible claims and the conflicting systems. Lack of “final,” impartial judgment does not hinder people from taking their truth claims seriously and acting as realists within the world constituted by their particular belief systems — tier 1. But when they come to reflect upon it, as some of them do, sometimes, they acknowledge the context-dependence of this realism and the fact that there is no way to make good on its claim to universality; theirs, they know, is but one particular “belief system,” or “genre of discourse,” among many.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Syamsul Anwar

Having been commonly practiced, in vitro fertilization (fertilization in a tube/baby tube program) is one of the controversial medical practices both for religious reasons and for ethical and moral reasons. From the ethical/moral point of view, the problem lies in the fact that the implication of such a practice may result in the destruction of the remaining unused embryos. In this article, the writer argues from the point of view of maqāṣid asy-syarī‘ah that the practice of in vitro fertilization is much needed by the infertile couples who want to have children. The embryo's moral status starts from the implantation of the blastocyst in the women’s uterine wall, so that the zygote of fertilization in the pre-implantation tubes does not have a moral status yet.[Walaupun telah jamak dilakukan, fertilisasi in vitro (pembuahan dalam tabung/bayi tabung) merupakan salah satu praktis medis yang konroversial baik karena alasan agama maupun karena alasan etika dan moral. Dari segi etika/moral, permasalahannya adalah implikasi dari praktik itu yang berakibat pada pemusnahan sisa embrio yang tidak digunakan. Dalam tulisan ini penulis berargumerntasi dari sudut pandang maqāṣid asy-syarī‘ah bahwa praktik fertilisasi dalam tabung sangat dibutuhkan oleh pasangan tidak subur yang mendambakan keturunan. Status moral embrio dimulai sejak implantasi sehingga zigot hasil fertilisasi dalam tabung praimplantasi belum memiliki status moral].


Author(s):  
John Basl

Chapter 1 articulates the commitments of biocentrism vis-à-vis explaining the form of moral status that advocates of the view take living things to have, moral considerability, as well as the strategies these advocates employ both for arguing that all living things are morally considerable, and for excluding certain things, such as artifacts and ecosystems, from being morally considerable. The foundation of biocentrism is a commitment to the importance of welfare in grounding moral status and delineating the boundaries of moral status. For the biocentrist, welfare or well-being is necessary for having moral status; anything that lacks a welfare or that can’t be benefitted or harmed, can only matter from the moral point of view in some indirect or derivative way. And, biocentrists argue, it is because nonsentient organisms have a welfare and because artifacts and ecosystems do not that the boundaries of moral status can be neatly drawn.


Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 6-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Berrigan

We are faced, I think, in spite of all hopes to the contrary, with a very long haul. From a moral point of view, good men are being required to grow the organs and resources needed to survive in the wilderness of the world.I am convinced, in fact, that things are going to worsen unutterably before they grow perceptibly better. So the political import, in the deepest spiritual sense, of a thing like Catonsville, it seems to me, remains very much a matter of continuing debate, a debate which, I suppose and hope, would bo one of love and fraternity rather than one of suspicion or enmity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Abranches

This paper examines the moral status of hypocrisy in the moral andpolitical philosophy of David Hume. Its aim will be to try to determine whether,according to Hume, hypocrisy has any positive moral value, or whether, not havingany, Hume should therefore be placed in the same category of political realists suchas Machiavelli, with his sharp distinction between moral and political values. If thelatter is the case, then hypocrisy can be described as an absolute moral vice. But ifthe former is the case, that is, if hypocrisy has any moral value, then Hume doesnot support the sharp separation between what is right from a political and froma moral point of view, which means that there may even be, then, some relationbetween hypocrisy and moral obligation. In other words, hypocrisy may very wellbe virtuous.


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