The Right to Life in Times of War or Armed Conflict

Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wicks
Author(s):  
Ian Park

There is a difference between a State’s substantive and procedural right to life obligations. This chapter explores what amount to a state’s substantive right to life obligations with reference to Article 2, ECHR and Article 6, ICCPR. The respective provisions are analysed to determine the extent of a state’s substantive right to life obligations during armed conflict and then a comparison between the two international law instruments is undertaken. In order to undertake such a comparison, the exceptions to the right to life in both the ECHR and ICCPR are examined. Once determined, the planning and conduct of a military operation are considered, to assess the extent to which, in general terms, right to life obligations are considered in these areas.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 831-853
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Hoffberger

If thinking about weapons, one generally thinks about lethal technology. However, an abundance of so-called non-lethal weapons, a technology not aimed at killing but merely incapacitating the human target or military objective, is also being deployed both within and outside the ambit of armed conflict. Since non-lethal weapons do not necessarily implicate a zero chance of mortality, but often lead to severe wounds and tremendous suffering, the use and deployment of such weapons raise strong humanitarian and human rights concerns. The prohibition to cause superfluous injuries and unnecessary suffering, as well as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks are, amongst others, one of the most relevant provisions potentially having an influence on the deployment of nonlethal technology in armed conflict. However, the invocation of the principle of proportionality may lead to the justification of the use of non-lethal weapons on the grounds that the military advantage anticipated was greater than the human suffering caused. Insofar, one must ask whether there is a “red-line”; where the almost inflationary invocation of the principle of proportionality may defeat the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and therefore render the deployment and use of non-lethal technology illegal. Apart from the battlefield, non-lethal weapons are also being deployed in lawenforcement scenarios, where human rights law plays a pivotal role. In this regard, one must not look merely at the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading suffering and the right to life but also at the right to health, a presumably underestimated principle curbing and shaping the use of non-lethal technology outside the ambit of armed conflict.


2013 ◽  
pp. 54-64
Author(s):  
Saurav Ghimire

If one is born in the right part of the world and in right social class, the problem of being hungry has its solution in the nearest refrigerator. However, if the situation is reverse, one may go hungry throughout one’s short life, as 800million born in the wrong place and in wrong social class are doing as we discuss the concern. Peace cannot exist where the hunger prevails as the former signifies not merely the absence of armed conflict but the establishment of human rights for all people, and no human right is worth anything to a starving person. That is why the freedom from hunger is fundamental to live as human being and is a necessary part of right to life.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

The controversy surrounding the applicability of the right to life during armed conflict makes it arguably one of the most divisive and topical issues at the junction of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Recent litigation has, among other things, prompted the UK government to signal an intention to derogate from Article 2, ECHR, subject to certain caveats, in future armed conflicts. The litigation pursuant to Article 2 is also set to continue as the UK, and many other States with right to life obligations, will continue to use lethal force overseas; thus the significance of the issue will remain unabated. The scope and application of the right to life in armed conflict not only concerns parties to the ECHR; the predominance of coalition military operations in recent years has necessitated that it is essential for all troop-contributing States to understand the legal limitations of those States bound by the ECHR. It is equally important that the UN, NATO, NGOs, and other governments not directly involved in the armed conflict are aware of any States’ right to life obligations. Notwithstanding this, the applicability of the right to life in armed conflict is yet to be fully considered in academic literature. This book aims to close this lacuna and address the issue of the right to life in armed conflict by identifying and analysing the applicable law, citing recent examples of State practice, and offering concrete proposals to ensure that States comply with their right to life obligations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosuke Onishi

This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (885) ◽  
pp. 267-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Watkin

AbstractThis article explores the law governing the maintenance of public order and safety during belligerent occupation. Given the potential for widespread violence associated with international armed conflict, such as occurred in 2003–2004 in Iraq, it is inevitable that military and police forces will be engaged in activities that interface and overlap. Human-rights-based norms governing law enforcement, such as the right to life, are found in humanitarian law, permitting an application of both law enforcement and conduct of hostilities norms under that body of law. This results in the simultaneous application of these norms through both humanitarian and human rights law, which ultimately enhances the protection of inhabitants of the occupied territory.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


rahatulquloob ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2(2)) ◽  
pp. 52-74
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sohail ◽  
Saqib Jawad

The right to life is often said to be mother right and most important fundamen-tal right of all rights. The application and criteria of protection of the right to life differs under international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL). As a general conception, IHL is applicable only during armed conflict and HRL is applicable in all other situations excepting armed conflict. This conception though has been proved to be wrong, however, the primary concern regarding the protection of the right to life during armed conflict is that of IHL. However, it does not mean that HRL has nothing to do with an armed conflict or IHL is having no concern about the protection of the right to life beyond armed conflict, rather it means that standard and criteria of protection of the right to life during armed conflict differs in both these branches of internatio-nal. When the question arises with regard to the protection of the right to life during armed conflict, different answers are found in both these disciplines. The substantive law as well as case law of both the branches differ in this regard to such an extent that a person may lose the protection of his right to life under IHL on the one hand, while still holding such protection under HRL on the other. While Islamic Law does not differentiate between humanitarian law and human rights law, rather in Islam, protection of the right to lie has been ensured on equal footings in and outside an armed conflict. The paper focuses the main causes of differences between IHL and HRL. Consequently, sorting out the best possible manner in which such differences can be removed and resultantly by recommending the standard and criteria as to how the right to life can be best protected.


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