scholarly journals Collective Skill Systems, Wage Bargaining, and Labor Market Stratification

Author(s):  
Marius R. Busemeyer ◽  
Torben Iversen
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Paolo Merlino

This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt. At equilibrium, there is perfect segmentation across sectors, which is determined by a unique threshold of workers' productivity. This threshold is inefficient because of participation and composition externalities. The Pigouvian tax scheme that decentralizes optimal sorting shows that these externalities have opposite signs. Furthermore, their relative strength depends on the distribution of workers' skills, so that when there are many (few) skilled workers, too many (few) high-technology jobs are created.


2004 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabela Mares

OECD economies were able to reconcile the pursuit of welfare state expansion and full employment during the first decades of the postwar period. Yet the trade-off between these two policy objectives widened in recent decades. To explore the question ofwhy this change occurred, this article extends familiar models of wage determination by adding a number of parameters that capture cross-national differences among welfare states. The model identifies the conditions under which unions deliver wage moderation in exchange for social policy benefits and transfers and explores how different labor-market institutions magnify or decrease the impact of wage choices on the equilibrium level of employment. Next, the author examines the impact of changes in the composition of social policy expenditures and in the level of the tax burden on. unions' wage choices. She shows that mature welfare states, characterized by high tax burdens and a high share of transfers devoted to labor-market outsiders, reduce the effectiveness ofwage moderation in lowering unemployment. The author tests the main propositions using OECD panel data for the period 1960–95.


Author(s):  
Bernd Fitzenberger

SummaryBuilding on a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework with factor price rigidities, this paper provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between trade, technical progress, and the labor market in West Germany for the period from 1970 until 1990. The analysis builds on relative product prices as the major transmission channel of trade effects on the labor market and allows for three skill types of labor. The major findings are that, relative to skilled labor, wages were increasing disproportionately both for low- and high-skilled labor whereas employment trends were favoring higher skill levels monotonically. Import competition as well as total factor productivity were increasing disproportionately in those industries using low- or high-skilled labor intensively. These results are consistent with trade effects dominating for low-skilled labor and technology effects for high-skilled labor while wage bargaining institutions were holding up relative wages of low-skilled labor. The combined effect accounts for the disproportionate increase of unemployment for low-skilled workers.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tim Hagenhoff

What are the implications of simple deviations from rational expectations for macroeconomic dynamics, monetary policy, consumption decisions and labor markets? Which biases underly even sophisticated survey expectations? I aim to answer these questions by building upon simple mathematical models of expectations that are boundedly rational and generate some disagreement across expectations. While monetary policy should be extraordinarily hawkish if it wants to control inflation under such expectations, it also generates substantial dispersion in consumption and wealth. Further, the sluggishness of labor market variables may be explained by sluggish expectations that affect, for instance, wage bargaining. Finally, expectations of professional forecasters are intrinsically persistent, depend on the last observed consensus forecast and also extrapolate current news more than would be rational.


2015 ◽  
Vol 235 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 403-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Sachs ◽  
Werner Smolny

Summary This paper analyzes the role of labor market institutions for youth unemployment, as contrasted to total unemployment. The empirical results are basically consistent with an insider view of labor market institutions. Labor market institutions tend to protect (older) employees but might harm (young) entrants. Remarkable is especially the significant and very high effect of employment protection for regular jobs on youth unemployment. In addition, the combined effects of powerful unions and a coordinated wage bargaining system are beneficial for older people and detrimental to youth. Finally, the paper identifies a significant link between a demographic as well as an educational factor and both youth and total unemployment.


Author(s):  
Hartmut Egger ◽  
Simone Habermeyer

AbstractWe set up a trade model with two countries, two sectors, and one production factor, which features a home-market effect due to the existence of trade costs. We consider search frictions and firm-level wage bargaining in the sector producing differentiated goods and a perfectly competitive labor market in the sector producing a homogeneous good. Consumers have price-independent generalized-linear preferences over the two types of goods, covering homothetic and quasi-homothetic preferences as two limiting cases. Due to the specific functional forms of indirect utility, homothetic preferences lead to risk aversion, while quasi-homothetic preferences lead to risk neutrality in our model. We show that trade between two countries that differ in their population size leads to an expansion of the differentiated goods sector and a contraction of the homogeneous good sector in the larger economy. This induces the larger country to net-export differentiated goods at the cost of a higher economy-wide rate of unemployment in the open economy (with the effects reversed for the smaller country). The welfare effects of trade depend on the preference structure. Looking at the two limiting cases, we show that the larger country is likely to benefit from trade if preferences are homothetic, whereas losses from trade are possible if preferences are quasi-homothetic. The opposite is true in the smaller country. This reveals an important role of preferences for the welfare effects of trade in the presence of labor market imperfection, a result we further elaborate on by considering more general preferences as well as differences of countries in their per-capita income levels.


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