Inter-institutional ‘Rights Dialogue’ under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

Author(s):  
Andrew Geddis
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Annie O'Connor

<p>Harmful Digital Communications have become a pervasive and serious problem in New Zealand. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to address this problem in a number of ways. This paper focuses on the civil enforcement regime and the criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication established by the Bill. It considers these aspects of the Bill in light of the right to freedom of expression, and analyses whether they constitute a justified limitation on that right. By applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 5 analysis from Hansen v R, the paper discovers that the civil enforcement regime is a justified limitation, but the new criminal offence is not. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a public interest defence in the offence would allow it to effectively ameliorate the harm caused by online abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is reasonably necessary.</p>


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-499
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bamforth

IN the past five years, the conceptual ambiguities of Parliamentary privilege have come to haunt the courts with a vengeance. Ancient constitutional questions such as what constitutes a “proceeding” in Parliament and what counts as “questioning” a proceeding–encapsulated in colourful nineteenth-century cases like Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 9 Ad.&E. 1, the Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex (1840) 11 Ad.&E. 273, and Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271–have been at the forefront of a clutch of recent decisions. In Prebble v. Television New Zealand [1995] 1 A.C. 321, the Privy Council gave new bite to Parliamentary privilege by ruling (in relation to the New Zealand Parliament) that it would be an abuse of both Article 9 of the 1689 Bill of Rights–which prohibits courts from questioning the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament–and of a broader principle of mutuality of respect between Parliament and the judiciary, to allow any party to litigation to “bring into question anything said or done in the House by suggesting (whether by direct evidence, cross-examination, inference or submission) that the actions or words were inspired by improper motives or were untrue or misleading” (above, at 337). As a result, domestic courts stayed two libel actions brought by Members of Parliament, on the basis that the claims and defences involved raised issues whose investigation would infringe Parliamentary privilege (see, e.g., Allason v. Haines, The Times, 25 July 1995). Parliament responded by enacting section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996, allowing individual MPs to waive Parliamentary privilege in order to bring defamation actions. But in an apparent reassertion of the spirit of Prebble, the Court of Appeal expressly approved–albeit outside the context of defamation–the Privy Council's wide definition of privilege as a matter of domestic law (R. v. Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, ex p. Fayed [1998] 1 W.L.R. 669, noted [1998] C.L.J. 6).


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Geringer

This article explores recent case law touching on the suggestion that the New Zealand courts have an implied power to formally declare that legislation is inconsistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The article concludes from this case law that the prospects for the development of a formal declaratory jurisdiction of this kind in New Zealand are, if anything, receding. Further, although the Supreme Court's decision in R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 affirms the power of the New Zealand courts to informally "indicate" the existence of such legislative inconsistencies, early indications suggest that it is unlikely that this power will be exercised on a routine basis. In the absence of legislative reform, any "dialogue" over human rights between the New Zealand courts and the political branches of government is likely to continue to be far more sporadic and sotto voce than in those countries that have legislated for an express declaration of inconsistency power.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Malisa Mulholland

<p>This paper aims to form a starting point for a discussion of the regulation of paid clinical research volunteers (professional volunteers) in New Zealand. It will argue that professional volunteers, who are currently unregulated as a class of research participants, present unique issues which are not addressed by existing regulation. The major arguments will be that: by restricting the value of financial compensation that can be provided for volunteering in a clinical trial, existing regulation allows professional volunteers to be exploited; professional volunteers are exposed to unregulated compounded risks and it is unlikely that they are properly informed of these risks; and in failing to recognise the existence of professional volunteers, current regulation fails to address their commodification and dehumanisation. Proposals to address these issues will be evaluated through a human rights lens for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996. Recommendations for reform will be put forward on the basis of this analysis.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Asher Gabriel Emanuel

<p>The use of comparator groups has to date been central to establishing a breach of s 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The New Zealand courts’ approach to the formulation of comparator groups admits a lack of a clear methodology. This paper argues that, in the absence of a framework guiding the formulation of the comparator, the methodology permits arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making. The flexibility of the approach risks premature exclusion of claims in reliance on intuitive rather than analytical reasoning, limiting the transformative potential of nondiscrimination provisions. Of particular concern is the involvement of matters of justification at the comparator stage. The High Court judgment in B v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development is emblematic of these concerns. Recent developments at the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Health v Atkinson and Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General have provided some guidance, but have not gone far enough. This paper recommends that the courts depart from requiring a comparator for claims under s 19. Where comparators are necessary, it is proposed that the courts defer to the claimant’s choice of comparator, and decouple the identification of differential treatment from questions of causation.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rose Louise Goss

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Harriet Bush

This article examines the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act 2011 which was passed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the case Hamed v R. This Act provided that a search was not unlawful simply because video surveillance was used. The article explores the previous court decisions on the lawfulness of police use of covert video surveillance in order to ascertain whether the premise upon which the Act was based, that video surveillance was lawful before Hamed v R, was correct. It then looks at the ratio decidendi of Hamed v R and the potential wider implications of this judgment. Finally, it assesses the state of the law under the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act and whether this Act limited the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure which is contained in s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.


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