Collective Knowledge for Industrial Disaster Prevention

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Maslen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Gas Production ◽  
Accident Risk ◽  
Disaster Prevention ◽  
Information And Communications Technologies ◽  
Industrial Disaster ◽  
Major Accident

Since the 1990s there has been an increasing interest in knowledge, knowledge management, and the knowledge economy due to recognition of its economic value. Processes of globalization and developments in information and communications technologies have triggered transformations in the ways in which knowledge is shared, produced, and used to the extent that the 21st century was forecasted to be the knowledge century. Organizational learning has also been accepted as critical for organizational performance. A key question that has emerged is how knowledge can be “captured” by organizations. This focus on knowledge and learning demands an engagement with what knowledge means, where it comes from, and how it is affected by and used in different contexts. An inclusive definition is to say that knowledge is acquired theoretical, practical, embodied, and intuitive understandings of a situation. Knowledge is also located socially, geographically, organizationally, and it is specialized; so it is important to examine knowledge in less abstract terms. The specific case engaged with in this article is knowledge in hazardous industry and its role in industrial disaster prevention. In hazardous industries such as oil and gas production, learning and expertise are identified as critical ingredients for disaster prevention. Conversely, a lack of expertise or failure to learn has been implicated in disaster causation. The knowledge needs for major accident risk management are unique. Trial-and-error learning is dangerously inefficient because disasters must be prevented before they occur. The temporal, geographical, and social scale of decisions in complex sociotechnical systems means that this cannot only be a question of an individual’s expertise, but major accident risk management requires that knowledge is shared across a much larger group of people. Put another way, in this context knowledge needs to be collective. Incident reporting systems are a common solution, and organizations and industries as a whole put substantial effort into gathering information about past small failures and their causes in an attempt to learn how to prevent more serious events. However, these systems often fall short of their stated goals. This is because knowledge is not collective by virtue of being collected and stored. Rather, collective knowing is done in the context of social groups and it relies on processes of sensemaking.

What Hit and Miss in Indonesia CBM Project : Empirical Study Slowing Down Factors CBM Development and Propose Suitable Action for CBM Development in Indonesia by Using Analytical Hierarch Process.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
I.A. Firdaus
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Gas Production ◽  
Coal Bed ◽  
Production Sharing ◽  
High Investment ◽  
The Government ◽  
Exploration Period ◽  
Production Areas ◽  
Testing Standards

In 2008, the first Coal Bed Methane (CBM) PSC was signed in Indonesia. To date, 54 CBM PSCs have been awarded to explore and develop CBM Block in Indonesia. Twelve years later, only one PSC has submitted a Plan of Development but has not yet produced gas commercially. Most CBM PSCs have been struggling during the 10 years’ exploration period and some may receive extensions for 3 years under specific conditions. The lack of integrated authorities’ approval in the overlay of coal mining and natural gas production areas has become a great obstacle for CBM Development. Besides that, the government regulations in CBM activities have defects in PSC contract terms that may lead marginal economic value for contractors, especially due to high investment during the early development (C. Irawan, 2017). On the other hand, drilling regulations, Pipe Classing standards and Testing Standards following the Oil and Gas standards are too expensive for CBM Investment. According to our observations, CBM Regulations in Indonesia should be modified starting from the Exploration period, Production Sharing Contract Terms and Standard Operating Procedures to suit Indonesian CBM characteristics. Good coordination within government departments is a must for the success of CBM Exploration and Development.

Self-Verification Program in bp: Success Story of Major Accident Risk Management via Bowtie Barrier Model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Roman Bulgachev ◽  
Michael Cromarty ◽  
Lee Milburn ◽  
Kevan Davies
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Risk Function ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Accident Risk ◽  
Component Level ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
Operational Risks ◽  
Program Evolution ◽  
Major Accident

Summary bp’s (“the company’s”) wells organization manages its operational risks through what is known as the “three lines of defense” model. This is a three-tiered approach; the first line of defense is self-verification, which wells assets apply to prevent or mitigate operational risks. The second line of defense is conducted by the safety and operational risk function using deep technical expertise. The third line of defense is provided by group audit. In this paper, we discuss the wells self-verification program evolution from its first implementation and share case studies, results, impact, lessons learned, and further steps planned as part of the continuous improvement cycle. The company’s wells organization identified nine major accident risks that have the potential to result in significant health, safety, and environment (HSE) impacts. Examples include loss of well control (LoWC), offshore vessel collision, and dropped objects. The central risk team developed bowties for these risks, with prevention barriers on cause legs and mitigation barriers on consequence legs. Detailed risk bowties are fundamental to wells self-verification, adding technical depth to allow more focused verification to be performed when compared with the original bowties, because verification is now conducted using checklists targeting barriers at their component level, defined as critical tasks and equipment. Barriers are underpinned by barrier enablers (underlying supporting systems and processes) such as control of work, safe operating limits, inspection and maintenance, etc. Checklists are standardized and are available through a single, global digital application. This permits the verifiers, typically wellsite leaders, to conduct meaningful verification conversations, record the resulting actions, track them to closure within the application, and gain a better understanding of any cumulative impacts, ineffective barriers, and areas to focus on. Self-verification results are reviewed at rig, region, wells, and upstream levels. Rigs and regions analyze barrier effectiveness and gaps and implement corrective actions with contractors at the rig or region level. Global insights are collated monthly and presented centrally to wells leadership. Common themes and valuable learnings are then addressed at the functional level, shared across the organization, or escalated by the leadership. The self-verification program at the barrier component level proved to be an effective risk management tool for the company’s wells organization. It helps to continuously identify risks, address gaps, and learn from them. Recorded assessments not only provide the wells organization with barrier performance data but also highlight opportunities to improve. Leadership uses the results from barrier verification to gain a holistic view of how major accident risks are managed. Program evolution has also eliminated duplicate reviews, improved clarity of barrier components, and improved sustainability through applying a systematic approach, standardization, digitization, and procedural discipline.

Self-Verification Programme – A Success Story of Major Accident Risk Management via Bowtie Barrier Model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Bulgachev ◽  
Michael Cromarty ◽  
Lee Milburn ◽  
Kevan Davies
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Risk Function ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Accident Risk ◽  
Component Level ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
Operational Risks ◽  
Major Accident ◽  
Third Line

Abstract bp's Wells Organization manages its operational risks through what is known as the ‘Three Lines of Defense’ model. This is a three-tiered approach that starts with self-verification as the first line of defense which Wells assets apply to prevent or mitigate operational risks. The second line is conducted by its Safety and Operational Risk function using deep technical expertise. The third line of defense is provided by Group Audit. This paper will discuss the Wells self-verification programme evolution from its first implementation; results, lessons learned, and further steps planned as part of the continuous improvement cycle will be also shared. The company's Wells organization identified nine major accident risks which have the potential to result in significant HSE impacts. Examples include loss of well control, offshore vessel collision and dropped objects. The central Risk team developed bowties for these risks, with prevention barriers on cause legs and mitigation barriers on consequence legs. Detailed risk bowties are fundamental to Wells self-verification, adding technical depth to allow more focused verification to be performed when compared with the original bowties, as verification is now conducted using checklists targeting barriers at their component level – defined as critical tasks and equipment. Barriers are underpinned by barrier enablers – underlying supporting systems and processes such as control of work, safe operating limits, inspection and maintenance and others. Checklists are standardized and are available through a single, global digital application. This permits the verifiers, typically wellsite leaders, to conduct meaningful verification conversations, record the resulting actions, track them to closure within the application and gain a better understanding of any cumulative impacts, ineffective barriers and areas to focus on. Self-verification (SV) results are reviewed at rig, region, Wells and Upstream levels. Rigs and regions analyze barrier effectiveness and gaps and implement corrective actions with contractors at the rig or region level. Global insights are collated monthly and presented centrally to Wells leadership. Common themes and valuable learnings are then addressed at functional level, shared across the organization or escalated by the leadership. The self-verification programme at the barrier component level proved to be an effective risk management tool for the company's Wells organization. It helps to continuously identify risks, address gaps and learn from them. Recorded assessments not only provide the Wells organization with barrier performance data, but also highlight opportunities to improve. Leadership uses the results from barrier verification to gain a holistic view of how major accident risks are managed. Programme evolution has also eliminated duplicate reviews, improved clarity of barrier components, and improved sustainability through applying systematic approach, standardization, digitization and procedural discipline.

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