scholarly journals Assessing the accuracy of tobacco Industry data on the illicit tobacco trade

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (suppl_1) ◽  
Author(s):  
A GIlmore ◽  
A Rowell ◽  
S Gallus ◽  
A Lugo ◽  
L Joossens ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Industry Data ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade

Content analysis of tobacco industry data on the illicit tobacco trade in UK newspapers during the standardised packaging debate

The Lancet ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 388 ◽  
pp. S6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen A Evans-Reeves ◽  
Jenny L Hatchard ◽  
Andrew Rowell ◽  
Anna B Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Industry Data ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade

scholarly journals Tobacco industry data on illicit tobacco trade: a systematic review of existing assessments

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen W A Gallagher ◽  
Karen A Evans-Reeves ◽  
Jenny L Hatchard ◽  
Anna B Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
English Language ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Data Extraction ◽  
Industry Data ◽  
High Quality Research ◽  
Study Selection ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade

ObjectiveTo examine the quality of tobacco industry-funded data on the illicit tobacco trade (ITT) through a systematic review of existing assessments of industry-funded data on ITT.Data sourcesPapers and reports assessing tobacco industry-funded data on ITT were obtained via searches of 8 academic databases, Google searches and correspondence with ITT experts.Study selectionInclusion criteria identified 35 English-language papers containing an original assessment of tobacco industry-funded data.Data extractionUsing a coding framework, information was extracted from the assessments regarding the quality of tobacco industry data. Documents were second-coded, achieving 94% intercoder reliability with all disagreements resolved.Data synthesisOf the 35 assessments reviewed, 31 argued that tobacco industry estimates were higher than independent estimates. Criticisms identified problems with data collection (29), analytical methods (22) and presentation of results (21), which resulted in inflated ITT estimates or data on ITT that were presented in a misleading manner. Lack of transparency from data collection right through to presentation of findings was a key issue with insufficient information to allow replication of the findings frequently cited.ConclusionsTobacco industry data on ITT are not reliable. At present, the tobacco industry continues to fund and disseminate ITT research through initiatives such as PMI IMPACT. If industry data on ITT cannot meet the standards of accuracy and transparency set by high-quality research publications, a solution may be to tax tobacco companies and administer the resulting funds to experts, independent of the tobacco industry, who use previously developed reliable models for measuring ITT.

scholarly journals Tobacco industry strategies to keep tobacco prices low: evidence from industry data

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gilmore ◽  
Rosemary Hiscock ◽  
Rob Branston ◽  
Timea Partos ◽  
Sara Hitchman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Industry Data

Illicit Cigarette Trade in Five South American Countries: A Gap Analysis for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 1079-1086 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Paraje
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Gap Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
South American ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Latin American Countries

Abstract Introduction Because of its nature, it is very hard to measure illicit tobacco trade in any product. In the case of Latin American countries, there is scant information on the magnitude and characteristics of this cigarette trade. The goal of this article is to provide estimates on the evolution of the illicit cigarette trade in five South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Methods Gap analysis estimates for cigarette tax evasion/avoidance (a comparison on the evolution of the difference between registered cigarette sales and measured population consumption) are developed for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Nationally representative surveys, conducted regularly, are used to measure population consumption. Confidence intervals constructed by bootstrapping sample estimates are generated to statistically evaluate the evolution of the gap. Results Illicit cigarette trade has increased as a percentage of total sales in Brazil in recent years. In the case of Argentina, after a relative decrease between 2005 and 2009, it seems to have stabilized. There is no statistical evidence to argue that there has been an increase of illicit cigarette trade in Chile, Colombia, and Peru, despite substantial price increases in Chile and tax increase in both Colombia and Peru. Conclusions Using simple statistical methods, it is possible to assess the trend in illicit tobacco trade over time to better inform policy makers. Getting reliable and regular population consumption surveys can also help to track illicit tobacco trade. Claims by tobacco industry of a positive association between price/tax changes and illicit trade are unsubstantiated. Implications Evolution of illicit cigarette trade in five Latin American countries shows different trajectories, not in line with tobacco industry estimates, which highlight the importance of producing solid, independent estimates. There are inexpensive methodologies that can provide estimates of the evolution of the relative importance of illicit trade and can be used to inform policy makers.

scholarly journals Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e110-e118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Crosbie ◽  
Stella Bialous ◽  
Stanton A Glantz
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Tobacco Products ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Accountability System ◽  
Philip Morris ◽  
The Media ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility Reports

ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments’ law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs’ claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

scholarly journals Illicit tobacco trade is ‘booming’: UK newspaper coverage of data funded by transnational tobacco companies

2020 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2018-054902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Evans-Reeves ◽  
Jenny Hatchard ◽  
Andy Rowell ◽  
Anna B Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Media Coverage ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Industry Funding ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies

BackgroundTransnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have heavily publicised their argument that standardised tobacco packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade. Leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents suggest that the company may have intended to use third parties to promulgate this argument in the UK.MethodsWe examined articles in UK newspapers (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2015) from LexisNexis for presence and nature of tobacco industry data. We also examined documents released by Freedom of Information requests made to Scottish Councils for evidence of how PMI operationalised its third-party strategy.FindingsTwo-thirds of newspaper articles (63%, 99/157) mentioned a PMI consultant; 36% of which did not disclose this industry funding. Most articles mentioned counterfeit tobacco, illicit whites or both (72%, 113/157), while few (4%, 7/157) specifically mentioned tobacco industry illicit tobacco and none explained that the latter can include tobacco-company involvement. Freedom of Information documents revealed that the PMI consultant sought to build relationships with Trading Standards officers, conducted undercover test purchases (UTPs) in illicit tobacco ‘hotspots’ and may have promoted unrepresentative findings in the media. While the data set featured PMI data predominantly, other TTCs also engaged in third-party techniques to promulgate messages on illicit tobacco.InterpretationPMI engaged a third party, seemingly with the aim of securing media coverage on illicit tobacco positing that standardised packaging would worsen the problem. The predominant focus of articles which featured industry-funded data and information was on counterfeit tobacco despite official data showing tobacco-industry illicit tobacco as the most prevalent. Other jurisdictions considering the policy should anticipate that third parties will promote the illicit-trade argument.

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