16. Trespass to land and nuisance

2021 ◽  
pp. 453-487
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Direct Invasion ◽  
Primary Function ◽  
Statutory Authority ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers two ‘land torts’: trespass to land and private nuisance. Trespass to land protects a person in possession of land against direct invasion of his property. The right to sue includes not only those with a proprietorial interest in the land, such as owners and tenants, but also those who have exclusive occupation such as squatters. The fact that any invasion of land, however minute and whether it causes damage or not, is a trespass, indicates that the primary function of this tort is to protect rights in property, rather than simply to provide compensation. The chapter continues by distinguishing between public and private nuisance. It then discusses the interests protected in private nuisance; the standard of reasonable user; the person(s) liable for nuisance; remoteness of damage; statutory authority and planning permission; and the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on nuisance claims.

16. Trespass to land and nuisance

2019 ◽  
pp. 441-475
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Direct Invasion ◽  
Primary Function ◽  
Statutory Authority ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers two ‘land torts’: trespass to land and private nuisance. Trespass to land protects a person in possession of land against direct invasion of his property. The right to sue includes not only those with a proprietorial interest in the land, such as owners and tenants, but also those who have exclusive occupation such as squatters. The fact that any invasion of land, however minute and whether it causes damage or not, is a trespass, indicates that the primary function of this tort is to protect rights in property, rather than simply to provide compensation. The chapter continues by distinguishing between public and private nuisance. It then discusses the interests protected in private nuisance; the standard of reasonable user; the person(s) liable for nuisance; remoteness of damage; statutory authority and planning permission; and the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on nuisance claims.

16. Trespass to land and nuisance

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Direct Invasion ◽  
Primary Function ◽  
Statutory Authority ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers two ‘land torts’: trespass to land and private nuisance. Trespass to land protects a person in possession of land against direct invasion of his property. The right to sue includes not only those with a proprietorial interest in the land, such as owners and tenants, but also those who have exclusive occupation such as squatters. The fact that any invasion of land, however minute and whether it causes damage or not, is a trespass, indicates that the primary function of this tort is to protect rights in property, rather than simply to provide compensation. The chapter continues by distinguishing between public and private nuisance. It then discusses the interests protected in private nuisance; the standard of reasonable user; the person(s) liable for nuisance; remoteness of damage; statutory authority and planning permission; and the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on nuisance claims.

14. Privacy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Invasion Of Privacy ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right

The right of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998, but English law as yet recognises no tort of invasion of privacy as such. Admittedly, a number of specific torts protect particular aspects of privacy, but this protection may be regarded as haphazard, incidental, and incomplete. Recent decisions, however, have seen substantial developments in the protection given to particular privacy interests, above all by adapting the law of breach of confidence to provide a remedy against the unauthorised disclosure of personal information. These issues are discussed in this chapter.

17. Remedies and limitation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera Bermingham ◽  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Committee Report ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
English Law ◽  
Developing Area ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. The Calcutt Committee Report on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) defines privacy as ‘the right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or by publication of information’. While a number of different torts indirectly address wrongful intrusion into another’s privacy, English law has not directly protected privacy in its own right. It was the Human Rights Act 1998 that has made it possible to use breach of confidence in regulating the publication of private information. This chapter looks at the history of the protection of privacy in English law, discusses the current legal approaches to privacy, examines the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on this developing area of law, and evaluates English law on privacy in an international context.

Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-58
Author(s):  
Amanda McSorley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Right ◽  
Restrictive Measures ◽  
Article 5 ◽  
Safe Care

Article 5 of the Human Rights Act, 1998 states that: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No-one shall be deprived of his or her liberty unless in accordance with a procedure prescribed in law.’ However, there are occasions when it is necessary and appropriate to deprive a person of their liberty in order to keep them safe from harm. Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards are the legal framework introduced in 2009 to ensure that this occurs only when absolutely necessary and no alternative, less restrictive measures can be utilised to ensure safe care. This article outlines the key points relating to DOLS, considering how they relate to GPs during their training and careers.

scholarly journals Deprivation of liberty and intensive care: an update post Ferreira

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behrad Baharlo ◽  
Daniele Bryden ◽  
Stephen J Brett
Keyword(s):  
Intensive Care Unit ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Intensive Care ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Life Saving ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Right ◽  
Acid Test ◽  
Article 5

The right to liberty and security of the person is protected by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights which has been incorporated into the Human Rights Act 1998. The 2014 Supreme Court judgment in the case commonly known as Cheshire West provided for an ‘acid test’ to be employed in establishing a deprivation of liberty. This ‘acid test’ of ‘continuous supervision and not free to leave’ led to concerns that patients lacking capacity being treated on an Intensive Care Unit could be at risk of a ‘deprivation of liberty’, if this authority was applicable to this setting. This article revisits the aftermath of Cheshire West before describing the recent legal developments around deprivation of liberty pertaining to intensive care by summarising the recent Ferreira judgments which appear for now to answer the question as to the applicability of Cheshire West in life-saving treatment.

scholarly journals After the Honeymoon: The Uneasy Marriage of Human Rights and the Environment Under the European Convention on Human Rights and in UK Law Under the Human Rights Act 1998

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 317-368
Author(s):  
Karen Morrow
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (ECHR) regime has, in the absence of specific coverage of environmental rights, developed a “creative” approach in its jurisprudence in this area, pressing a variety of other rights, notably: Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing); Article 8 (the right to privacy and family life); and Article 1 to the First Protocol of the ECHR (the right to enjoyment of property) into service. This creativity has achieved much in according indirect protection to individuals in this regard, but has also placed additional pressure on the already congested Convention system. The entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) made long-held rights under the ECHR directly accessible in domestic law in the United Kingdom. This naturally spawned a wave of litigation. One of the most prominently litigated areas concerned the pursuit of a variety of environment-based rights claims. In the intervening decade, the application of the ECHR to environmental claims in the UK courts has generated somewhat mixed results. This is in part a result of the “patchwork” approach that has developed toward environmental claims within the Convention regime itself, but it is also a product of the nature of the relationship between the ECHR and domestic law and the content and ethos of both regimes. This article will conclude by briefly considering the on-going role of the ECHR regime in environmental cases in light of subsequent developments in this area of law, notably under the Aarhus Convention.

scholarly journals Detained patients and the right to refuse treatment

2014 ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Paul Bowen
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Interested Party ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Right To Refuse Treatment ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Right To Refuse

<p>R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor RMO (1) Mental Health Act Commission (2) Secretary of State for Health (Interested party) [2001] EWCA Civ 1545<br />Court of Appeal (22nd October 2001) Simon Brown LJ, Brooke LJ and Hale LJ</p><p>A detained patient’s right to refuse treatment to which he or she objects has been greatly strengthened by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal, applying the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, although in reaching its decision the Court of Appeal has posed as many questions for the future of the law in this area as it has answered.</p>

The extent to which a conviction can be regarded as ‘safe’, notwithstanding unfairness in the trial process, has had to be re-considered following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in R v Condron [2000] Crim LR 679. The result is that the Court of Appeal should not disengage the issue of the fairness of the trial from the issue of whether or not the conviction is safe. In essence significant violations of the right to a fair trial provided by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights are, of themselves, likely to render a conviction unsafe; see further R v Francom (2000) The Times, 24 October. In R v Togher and Others (2000) The Times, 21 November, Lord Woolf CJ went so far as observe that the approach of the Court of Appeal should be in step with that of the European Court of Human Rights with the result that the denial of a fair trial contrary to Art 6 would now inevitably lead to a finding that the resulting conviction was unsafe. Such a conclusion is a direct result of the obligation created by s3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that domestic legislation, such as the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, should be read, so far as possible, in a manner that gave effect to Convention rights. R v Davis (2000) The Times, 25 July, whilst not departing from this broad proposition, emphasises that it may still be necessary to look at the circumstances of a particular case before concluding that a violation of Art 6 has rendered a conviction unsafe – it will be a matter of fact and degree. Even if an appeal against conviction succeeds the accused may still face a retrial. The Court of Appeal has the discretion to order a retrial under s 7 of the 1968 Act if it appears to the court that the interests of justice so require. If there has been a total mistrial the Court of Appeal can issue a writ of venire de novo – setting events back to where they were before the irregularity that rendered the trial a mistrial occurred. Some appeals against conviction will be partially successful in that the Court of Appeal can allow the appeal but substitute a conviction for a lesser-included offence – an obvious example being the quashing of a murder conviction and the substitution of a conviction for manslaughter. Appeal by the prosecution: against over lenient sentences

1996 ◽  
pp. 72-73
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
De Novo ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
European Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Times ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document