The extent to which a conviction can be regarded as ‘safe’, notwithstanding unfairness in the trial process, has had to be re-considered following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in R v Condron [2000] Crim LR 679. The result is that the Court of Appeal should not disengage the issue of the fairness of the trial from the issue of whether or not the conviction is safe. In essence significant violations of the right to a fair trial provided by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights are, of themselves, likely to render a conviction unsafe; see further R v Francom (2000) The Times, 24 October. In R v Togher and Others (2000) The Times, 21 November, Lord Woolf CJ went so far as observe that the approach of the Court of Appeal should be in step with that of the European Court of Human Rights with the result that the denial of a fair trial contrary to Art 6 would now inevitably lead to a finding that the resulting conviction was unsafe. Such a conclusion is a direct result of the obligation created by s3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that domestic legislation, such as the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, should be read, so far as possible, in a manner that gave effect to Convention rights. R v Davis (2000) The Times, 25 July, whilst not departing from this broad proposition, emphasises that it may still be necessary to look at the circumstances of a particular case before concluding that a violation of Art 6 has rendered a conviction unsafe – it will be a matter of fact and degree. Even if an appeal against conviction succeeds the accused may still face a retrial. The Court of Appeal has the discretion to order a retrial under s 7 of the 1968 Act if it appears to the court that the interests of justice so require. If there has been a total mistrial the Court of Appeal can issue a writ of venire de novo – setting events back to where they were before the irregularity that rendered the trial a mistrial occurred. Some appeals against conviction will be partially successful in that the Court of Appeal can allow the appeal but substitute a conviction for a lesser-included offence – an obvious example being the quashing of a murder conviction and the substitution of a conviction for manslaughter. Appeal by the prosecution: against over lenient sentences

1996 ◽  
pp. 72-73
Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter focuses on the right to liberty and fair trial, which are not qualified rights but can be derogated from in times of war and emergency, and provides an overview of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR) Articles 5 and 6, the most commonly argued rights before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Article 5 on the right to liberty and security of person protects individuals from unlawful and arbitrary detention, whereas Article 6 protects the rights to fair trial in both criminal and civil cases (with added protection in criminal cases). The ECtHR has expanded protection of Article 6 through its interpretation of ‘fair’ hearing and ‘civil’ rights and obligations. The chapter examines due process rights as part of UK law, including the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).


Author(s):  
Paul Bowen

<p>R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor RMO (1) Mental Health Act Commission (2) Secretary of State for Health (Interested party) [2001] EWCA Civ 1545<br />Court of Appeal (22nd October 2001) Simon Brown LJ, Brooke LJ and Hale LJ</p><p>A detained patient’s right to refuse treatment to which he or she objects has been greatly strengthened by a recent decision of the Court of Appeal, applying the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, although in reaching its decision the Court of Appeal has posed as many questions for the future of the law in this area as it has answered.</p>


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 106-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Lee

Lord Denning’s assessment of Magna Carta at its 750th anniversary has stood the test of half a century: “the greatest constitutional document of all times—the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot”. His longer, but still succinct, article for The Times for the same anniversary has not been bettered. Yet at the time of Magna Carta’s 800th anniversary we have lost sight of two other works of Lord Denning which could make a distinctive contribution to our current constitutional debates. Whereas Lord Neuberger has linked the real Magna Carta to the fictitious Holy Grail in an entertaining lecture on law and myth, for legal scholars the Holy Grail is a long lost text or case. An earlier essay identified the links between the opening clause of Magna Carta 1215 and s 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as worthy of rediscovery. This article presents two further candidates: a neglected lecture on Borrowing from Scotland by Lord Denning in 1961 and a neglected Court of Appeal decision in 1975 applying Magna Carta, in which Lord Denning presided as Master of the Rolls, R v Secretary of State for the Home Office, ex p Phansopkar.[6Between them, they can offer refreshing insights into contemporary constitutional controversies.  


2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-492
Author(s):  
J.R. Spencer

INR. v. A (No. 2) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546 the House of Lords knocked a dent in the controversial “rape shield” provision, section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA). They did so wielding Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given direct effect by another piece of “flagship” legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998. The decision is important for constitutional law as well as for criminal evidence.


Legal Studies ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Dawson ◽  
Alison Dunn

Chancel liability is an ancient property right, enforced by a Parochial Church Council, attaching to certain former rectorial lands. It requires a landowner to bear the cost of repair of the parish church chancel. The right poses particular problems for a purchaser, not least because it is hard to discover and is not limited to the value of the land. A recent decision of the Court of Appeal has found that a Parochial Church Council falls within section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as a public authority, and that chancel liability infringes article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. This paper will dispute the rationale used by the Court of Appeal, and in so doing will argue that whilst chancel liability is outmoded, widely regarded as incongruous and does not bear scrutiny in its modern context, it should nevertheless be removed on a principled basis, avoiding unwanted repercussions elsewhere in the law.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosamund Scott

AbstractFollowing the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in English law, there was speculation as to whether the English legal position that the fetus has no right to life is compatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Vo v. France provides an opportunity to reflect on the current English and ECtHR approaches to the fetus. The problems of finding a fetal right to life, which Vo sidesteps, are noted. At the same time, the "all or nothingness" of rights language is not without difficulties and troubled the judges in Vo. In particular, the idea that the fetus has no right to life gives the impression that neither English nor ECHR law values the fetus. In this light, we find English and ECtHR judges trying to express a concern for the fetus which does not undermine a pregnant woman's legal interests. This article considers these issues and highlights the importance, in a highly genetic age, of developing ways of valuing the fetus without invoking the language of rights and thus without affecting the current legal balance of interests in the maternal-fetal relationship. The idea of valuing the fetus in this way is briefly explored with particular reference to aspects of selective abortion.


Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

The following chapter examines claims that can be brought under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The HRA makes it unlawful for a ‘public authority’ to breach the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). The HRA accords to the victims of a breach of the Convention the right to pursue a claim against the offending public authority in the UK courts, when previously they were required to apply to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to vindicate their Convention rights.


coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.

2012 ◽  
pp. 415-419

Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter introduces the principles and key concepts underlying the law of evidence, with an emphasis on criminal evidence. It first explains the distinction between the law of evidence and evidence itself before turning to a discussion of fair trial by looking at Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), now part of English law as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998. The chapter then considers the main provisions related to evidence, including the presumption of innocence; privilege against self-incrimination; the right to examine witnesses; and admissibility of evidence obtained through covert surveillance, entrapment, or disclosure. It concludes by highlighting the importance of analysis of the relevance of the facts in a trial.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender

DEFAMATION law protects reputation while affording a significant measure of protection to freedom of expression. Valuable expressive activity is protected by, inter alia, a number of defences, including qualified privilege. In order successfully to invoke this defence, defendants who honestly believe their–factually false–statements to be true must meet two requirements. First, they must establish “an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral”, to communicate the relevant material to another (or others). Secondly, the recipient of the material must be shown to have “a corresponding interest or duty to receive it”. (See Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309, p. 334, per Lord Atkinson.) The requirements of the qualified privilege defence have recently been glossed by the Court of Appeal in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers and Others [1998] 3 W.L.R. 862 (which is on appeal to the House of Lords). While the Court can be regarded as having extended the defence's scope, the position it has staked out is not, in all respects, clear. As a result the qualified privilege defence may fail to meet the requirements of the right to freedom of expression enunciated in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.). (When the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, the E.C.H.R. will be an element of domestic law.)


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