7. Corporate governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Comply Or Explain

EachConcentraterevision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more.Concentratesshow you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses corporate governance in the UK, beginning with a discussion of the development of the UK’s corporate governance system. The chapter then discusses the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. It then discusses a number of key corporate governance mechanisms, namely institutional investors, non-executive directors, and directors’ remuneration.

6. Corporate governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-126
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Comply Or Explain

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the UK corporate governance system and some of the key corporate governance topics. It begins by looking at what corporate governance is and how the UK’s corporate governance system has evolved. The chapter then discusses the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. It also discusses a number of key corporate governance mechanisms, namely institutional investors, non-executive directors, and directors’ remuneration.

6. Corporate governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Comply Or Explain

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the UK corporate governance system and some of the key corporate governance topics. It begins by looking at what corporate governance is and how the UK’s corporate governance system has evolved. The chapter then discusses the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. It then discusses a number of key corporate governance mechanisms, namely institutional investors, non-executive directors, and directors’ remuneration.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

scholarly journals The role of government in corporate governance: Perspectives from the UK

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Adegbite ◽  
Philip Shrives ◽  
Timothy Nichol
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

Incessant corporate failures have led to increasing governmental participation in the governance of the modern corporation. In this conceptual paper, we examine and propose that the role of government in the UK corporate governance system is four fold, namely: to enhance competitive advantage; to compensate for the failure of self-regulation; to prevent corporate scandals and restore investors’ confidence; and owing to significant public pressures and associated political undertones, to suggest to the public the government is still an effective overseer in the existing prominence of self-regulation. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance, politics, policy making and regulatory institutions, whilst raising important issues that are of practice and policy relevance.

Divergence or convergence: paradoxes in corporate governance?

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 693-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Palka Chhillar ◽  
Ramana Venkata Lellapalli
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Cultural Economic ◽  
Content Type ◽  
German Model ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Stakeholder Model ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – This review paper aims to compare the various dimensions in the finance literature pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon Model (Stockholder Model) prevalent in the USA and the UK with the German Model (Stakeholder Model) of corporate governance prevalent in Germany and continental Europe. The present study identifies different strands of research on the various dimensions of these models, along with aspects of governance in emerging economies and the phenomenon of the convergence of these governance mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach – The literature review on corporate governance models has been carried out on the themes of internal and external governance mechanisms. The review considers agency theory along with principal–principal (PP) conflicts as the fundamental blocks explaining the need for governance structures. Findings – The traditional models of governance, along with the incorporation of PP conflicts, will result in a hybrid model inculcating the best of both the traditional models. However, convergence in the true sense may not be possible owing to fundamental differences pertaining to cultural, economic, legal and socio-economic aspects of the firm. Originality/value – This paper proposes a framework incorporating the interplay of managerial talent and controlling shareholders to understand the governance system that may be applicable for firms in emerging economies.

Changes in ownership forms and role of institutional investors in governing public companies in Malaysia

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Investment Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Different Types

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether different types of institutional investor in Malaysia are involved in the corporate governance of their investee companies, and, if yes, to what extent is the level of the involvement. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative approach, consisting of a series of interviews with 18 senior investment managers of different types of institutional investor, was chosen. Findings – The findings suggest that lessons learnt from the fallout of the Asian crisis has made Malaysian institutional investors not only to be more prudent in managing their total funds and in making equities investment decisions, but has resulted in a more active participation in their “core” investee companies apart from merely discharging their voting rights. Interview analysis revealed that government-linked investment companies are championing the cause and could possibly affect the overall level of institutional investors’ involvement, which bode well for the future of the corporate governance system of the country. Research limitations/implications – Generalisations may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. Also, the sample is not random, as access to many managers depended on recommendations. In addition, respondents were consciously selected to obtain different types of institutional investors that included government and non-government linked. Originality/value – There is a lack of work on studying the involvement of institutional investors in developing countries, whereby previous work and literature review were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.

Current Practices of Saudi Shareholder’s Rights: A Case for Reform

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-257
Author(s):  
Faleh Salem al-Kahtani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Oecd Principles ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Current Practices

Abstract This article will analyse Saudi shareholder’s rights, in particular by focusing on the legitimate articles of the Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter CGC), Company Law (hereinafter CL) and law cases related to shareholder’s rights. Analytical and comparative approaches are employed, examining the OECD principles of corporate governance and the UK Companies Act provisions with a view to reforming shareholder’s rights in the Saudi corporate governance system. In addition, shareholder’s rights are divided into financial and administrative rights. Thereafter, a number of recommendations are made regarding shareholder’s rights in the Saudi context.

scholarly journals Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Shabeeb Ali ◽  
Hazem Ramadan Ismael ◽  
Ahmed H. Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship

Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures

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