25. EU criminal law

Author(s):  
John R Spencer

This chapter examines what EU criminal law consists of; the reasons for its existence; and the mechanism by which it is created. It then describes the more important of its practical manifestations. It shows that Member States are torn between the practical necessity for certain problems in the area of criminal law to be dealt with at an EU level, and a deep-seated ideological resistance to this happening. A consequence of this is that the bulk of the EU instruments of which EU criminal law is composed are designed to help and encourage the criminal justice systems of the various Member States to work together, rather than to impose upon them uniform rules of criminal law or criminal procedure devised by EU law-making institutions.

2020 ◽  
pp. 792-825
Author(s):  
John R Spencer ◽  
András Csúri

This chapter examines what EU criminal law consists of; the reasons for its existence; and the mechanism by which it is created. It then describes the more important of its practical manifestations. It shows that Member States are torn between the practical necessity for certain problems in the area of criminal law to be dealt with at an EU level, and a deep-seated ideological resistance to this happening. A consequence of this is that the bulk of the EU instruments of which EU criminal law is composed are designed to help and encourage the criminal justice systems of the various Member States to work together, rather than to impose upon them uniform rules of criminal law or criminal procedure devised by EU law-making institutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-302
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The three articles offered in this forum on the early history of criminal appeals do us the great service of adding much of interest on this important but neglected issue in the development of Anglo–North American criminal procedure. The opaqueness of the legal history of criminal appeals stands in stark contrast to their centrality and apparent naturalness in contemporary criminal justice systems in England, Canada, and the United States. These three papers look at the period leading up to and immediately following the creation of the first formalized system of what we might call criminal appeals, the establishment of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved (CCCR) in 1848. This key period in the development of the adversary criminal trial was marked by both a concerted political effort to codify and rationalize the criminal law and by profound structural changes in the management of criminal justice.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Vogel

This article discusses the concept of the integrated European criminal justice system and its constitutional framework (as it stands now and as laid down in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome on 29 October 2004). It argues that European integration does not stop short of criminal justice. Integration does not mean that Member States and their legal systems, including their criminal justice systems, are being abolished or centralised or unified. Rather, they are being integrated through co-operation, co-ordination and harmonisation; centralisation, respectively unification, is a means of integration only in specific sectors such as the protection of the European Communities' financial interests. The article further argues that the integrated European criminal justice system is in need of a constitutional framework. The present framework suffers from major deficiencies. However, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe will introduce a far better, all in all satisfactory, ‘criminal law constitution’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-319
Author(s):  
Alejandro Sánchez Frías

The threat of foreign terrorist fighters has led to the development of preventive criminal law on an international and European level. The EU Directive on combating terrorism can have two impacts on the free movement of EU citizens. It directly calls upon Member States to criminalise the act of travelling, as well as other conduct that may be connected to a terrorist offence. In addition, ecj case law accepts EU criminal law as a basis for public security derogations against free movement. Therefore, the commission of any of the acts criminalised in the EU Directive on combating terrorism could be used as a reason to restrict the exercise of free movement by EU citizens. When Member States begin to adopt these measures, litigation on the balance between preventive criminal justice and free movement of EU citizens will increase.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-39
Author(s):  
Kimmo Nuotio

European Union (EU) law is known for its strong emphasis on effectivity and more generally for its instrumental character. This is not foreign even to European criminal law, a feature which creates some tension between the EU criminal law and criminal law in the national setting. EU Framework Decisions and Directives often require the Member States to criminalize certain forms of conduct with sanctions that are ‘Effective, Dissuasive and Proportionate’. In this article, I try to show that it would be timely to look at EU criminal law from an alternative point of view, as a more mature law. I call this a legitimacy-based approach. Such a reading would ease some of these tensions. It would also be helpful in developing a criminal policy for the EU, a policy which would be realistic and pragmatic. And it would be easier to look at EU criminal law from the point of view of justice. In order to get there, we need to see where the (current) narrow deterrence argument gets is wrong or one-sided. Some social theory is needed in order to make the point.


2020 ◽  
pp. 53-88
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the lawmaking powers of the European Union (EU) in the context of its Treaties. It explains that the EU has the competence to make law of various types (including secondary legislation, soft law, delegated acts and implementing acts) in a broad range of areas and that the amendments to the lawmaking procedures have affected the institutional balance, giving an increased role to the European Parliament. It discusses the changes made to improve the level of democracy at EU level, to address concerns that EU law-making has a ‘democratic deficit’ and lacks transparency and proportionality. The chapter also considers the different aspects of EU competence, describes the lawmaking process and sources of EU law and also addresses questions concerning the determination of exclusive, shared and concurrent competence, particularly in the context of subsidiarity. Furthermore, it examines the rules on the EU adopting legislation without all Member States participating (closer cooperation).


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

Chapter 4 discusses the constitutional consequences of the choice of legal basis in the context of external relations. The Union and its Member States are interlocked in a tight embrace, which leads to a far more complicated power division than may appear from a straightforward reading of the Treaty provisions on competences. The choice of the appropriate legal basis is the legal emanation of political power struggles between the Member States and the Union and among the EU institutions. The chapter identifies situations, in which the fact that law-making moves from the internal EU sphere to the external (i.e. international) sphere places more far-reaching restrictions on the Member States’ exercise of powers than would apply internally. It also argues that clarity in attributing responsibilities is a foundational requirement for bonding structures in a divided representative democracy, in which individuals are represented as EU citizens and national citizens. An adequate level of clarity on who is responsible for what is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for feeling represented and for limiting the ability of representatives to deny responsibilities. Finally, the chapter illustrates how the international obligations of the Member States are vested with the particular bite (i.e. effectiveness) of EU law when the question of who should take action, which is at the centre of the choice of legal basis, is avoided by concluding a mixed agreement. This limits the scope of manoeuvre of Member States as international actors.


2015 ◽  
pp. 171-174
Author(s):  
Brian O’Reilly

The European Union has traditionally had a limited role in the area of criminal justice enforcement. Many other areas of EU law involve detailed legislation and direct involvement, but in relation to criminal law the EU has thus far been limited to a coordinating and harmonising role. There are, for example, certain minimum standards set on the national definitions of some serious criminal offences, and an attempt has been made to harmonise the types and level of sanctions applicable to certain offences, but when it comes to actually prosecuting these crimes the Member States still reign supreme. In Ireland, the job of prosecuting criminal offences in the Courts falls ultimately on the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). This could be set to change, however, as a regulation is currently (slowly) working its way through the EU legislature that would set up a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which could effectively ...


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203195252199115
Author(s):  
Matthijs van Schadewijk

The growth in multilateral working relationships (e.g. agency work, chains of sub-contracting and corporate groups) is causing Member States to increasingly scrutinise their traditional, contractual approach to the notion of ‘employer’. So far, little attention has been paid to the boundaries and limits that EU law sets when defining the employer. The lack of attention may have come to an end with the recent AFMB judgment, in which the Court ruled, for the first time, that the concept of employer in a provision of EU law had to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. Starting from the AFMB judgment, the author analyses the concept of employer in EU law. The author finds that the concept of employer in EU law can be described as ‘uniform in its functionality’: in EU law, the national concept of the employer is never absolute, but the circumstances and the way in which the national concept must be set aside depend on the context and the objective of the European legislation in question. Through this functional approach, EU law partly harmonises the various national approaches to the concept of the employer. Nevertheless, a lack of specific reasoning on the part of the Court may grant the Member States considerable leeway to uphold their own views on the concept.


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