5. The Supremacy of EU Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 140-167
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the supremacy of EU law from both the point of view of the Union, as understood by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the point of view of member states. A consensus seems to be emerging from the national and constitutional courts that EU law supremacy is accepted only insofar as it does not infringe the individual rights protection of the national constitutions, in which case the constitutional courts will exercise their reserved rights over national constitutions to uphold them over inconsistent EU law or to review EU law in light of their own constitutions. The changing position of the UK and the EU is also considered including the Brexit referendum result and possible consequences of that.

Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the supremacy of EU law from both the point of view of the Union as understood by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the point of view of member states. A consensus seems to be emerging from the national and constitutional courts that EU law supremacy is accepted only insofar as it does not infringe the individual rights protection of the national constitutions, in which case the constitutional courts will exercise their reserved rights over national constitutions to uphold them over inconsistent EU law or to review EU law in light of their own constitutions. The changing position of the UK and the EU is also considered including the Brexit referendum result and possible consequences of that.


2021 ◽  
pp. 141-165
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the supremacy of EU law from both the point of view of the Union, as understood by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the point of view of member states. A consensus seems to be emerging from the national and constitutional courts that EU law supremacy is accepted only in so far as it does not infringe the individual rights protection of the national constitutions, in which case the constitutional courts will exercise their reserved rights over national constitutions to uphold them over inconsistent EU law or to review EU law in light of their own constitutions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the Treaty framework and sources of EU law as well as the institutions of the EU. It covers the legal background to the UK’s departure from the EU, the legal process through which the UK left the EU, the key provisions of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. This chapter also discusses the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on the status of the sources of EU law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as failure to transpose a Directive into national law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Francovich principle.


Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.


Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 355-396
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Robert Thomas

This chapter focuses on the constitutional implications of the UK’s membership of the European Union and the constitutional implications of its exit from the EU (or ‘Brexit’). The chapter examines how EU law was accommodated within the UK legal system during the period of the UK’s membership of the EU, and in particular considers the consequences of the primacy of EU law for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter also considers the extent to which lessons learned about the UK constitution as a result of EU membership will remain relevant now that the UK has left the EU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Peers

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of Dano (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358) clarified some important points as regards access to social welfare benefits by EU citizens who move to another Member State. Furthermore, the judgment could have broad implications for any attempts by the UK Government to renegotiate the UK's membership of the EU, which is likely to focus on benefits for EU citizens coming to the UK. This note is an updated and expanded version of my analysis on the EU Law Analysis blog: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/benefit-tourism-by-eu-citizens-cjeu.html.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-52
Author(s):  
Marco Galimberti

Twenty years after its drafting and more than one decade after its entry into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has ceased to be part of British law as a consequence of Brexit. Looking into this issue raised by the UK withdrawal from the European Union, the essay sheds some light on the legal status and impact of the EU Bill of Rights in the British legal order. Against this background, the article detects a connection between the UK Supreme Court’s case law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the direct effect of the Charter. From this perspective, the analysis highlights the implications of the UK departure from the Charter and disentanglement from the Luxembourg case law, thus arguing that they may weaken the standards of fundamental rights protection.


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