Binding Armed Opposition Groups

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

AbstractThis article considers how armed opposition groups fighting in an internal armed conflict are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law despite not being party to the relevant treaties. It assesses a number of explanations—customary international law, general principles of international humanitarian law, rules governing treaties and third parties and claims to succession—and argues that each has limited value. The ability of the state to legislate on behalf of all its individuals is considered the best explanation. This principle is explored and objections to it are countered. This article also examines the expressed commitment of armed opposition groups to the rules of international humanitarian law.

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
VAIOS KOUTROULIS

AbstractThe equal application of international humanitarian law (jus in bello) to all parties to an international armed conflict is a cornerstone principle of jus in bello. In his article, Professor Mandel casts doubt on the legal basis of this principle. Reacting to this claim, this contribution demonstrates that the ‘equality of belligerents’ is a principle firmly grounded in both conventional and customary international law. Moreover, its legal force withstands the test of international jurisprudence, including the International Court of Justice's controversial Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes

Most of the present rules of international law regulate the behavior of States. Within States, however, there are other entities such as corporations, non–governmental organizations, individuals, international governmental organizations and armed opposition groups that are regulated by different national and international regimes. In this regard, non–State armed opposition groups present particular challenges to international law due to their dominant presence and participation in armed conflicts. Armed opposition groups are one of the most important actors in international humanitarian law today. Yet, taking into consideration that they a priori have certain international humanitarian obligations to fulfill, it remains unclear what the implications are when they, as a group, commit violations. Among these uncertainties, is that there is no formally recognized mechanism to attribute such breaches to the relevant non – state armed opposition group as such. In fact, unlike States, they have no organs. Similarly, there is also no consensus on circumstance that could preclude the wrongfulness of these breaches for armed opposition groups. By challenging the State–centric system of public international law, this article analyses the possible application of certain rules contained in the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) to violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups.


2020 ◽  
pp. 137-153
Author(s):  
Julia Kapelańska-Pręgowska

23 years after the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, a general treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has been adopted. It may be anticipated that the TPNW will probably not enter into force very soon, and when it does, it will neither be universally accepted, nor will it significantly influence thepractice of the nuclear weapon States. It is therefore justified to analyse the problem under consideration, not from a State-oriented perspective, but from a human and environmentally centred one. The article argues not only that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, but it would also violate international human rights law. The article further dwells upon the customary international law aspects of the problem under consideration.


Author(s):  
Espinosa Manuel José Cepeda ◽  
Landau David

Because of the scope and duration of Colombia’s internal armed conflict, that conflict has produced much suffering in the civilian population. This chapter focuses on the Court’s jurisprudence protecting the rights of victims, especially of the internal armed conflict. In this area, the incorporation of international law has been particularly important. Drawing on this jurisprudence, the Court has insisted that victims be given rights to truth, justice, and reparations. The contours of this right have proven particularly important in processes in which the government has sought to give amnesties or sentence reductions in return for participation in the peace process by illegal armed groups, first with paramilitaries and now with guerrilla groups. In reviewing these frameworks, the Court has sought to create criteria that are flexible while retaining the core restrictions of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Iradhati Zahra ◽  
Diajeng Wulan Christianti

ABSTRACTTechnological development has given rise to new means and methods of warfare such as cyber-attack and can potentially have devastating humanitarian consequences. In times of armed conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) limits certain use of weapons, however, it is questionable whether an armed conflict exists in the situation where cyber-attack is employed alone. In 2007, Estonia suffered severe damages due to cyber-attacks that were equal to the damages caused by kinetic weapons. Yet, there is a debate whether IHL applies in the Estonia case due to the shortage of a kinetic weapon. The Estonia case has generated NATO and other states to draft a cyber-warfare manual (Tallinn Manual 1.0) that, in its Rule 30, affirms the IHL applicability in the case of only cyber-attack. Due to the importance of this Rule, this article argues that Rule 30 shall be considered as a legally binding provision in the form of customary international law. This Rule has satisfied widely practiced and opinio juris elements although it is not as ideal as other customary norms. Taking into consideration the rapid development of technology, it is not necessary for Rule 30 to meet the ideal condition of customary law since, according to Grotian Moment Theory, the formation of a new customary international law can be accelerated in times of fundamental change as can be seen in the practice of customary air and space law. Keywords: Customary International Law, Cyber-Attack, Grotian Moment Theory, IHL, Tallinn Manual 1.0 ABSTRAKPerkembangan teknologi telah melahirkan cara dan metode berperang yang baru seperti serangan siber dan dapat berpotensi menimbulkan kehancuran umat manusia. Hukum Humaniter Internasional (HHI) membatasi penggunaan senjata tertentu saat perang, sayangnya penerapan hukum ini masih dipertanyakan dalam kasus yang hanya melibatkan serangan siber. Tahun 2007 Estonia menderita kerugian akibat dari serangan siber yang tingkat keparahannya dapat disamakan dengan serangan kinetis. Namun, fakta bahwa serangan tersebut tidak melibatkan senjata kinetis melahirkan perdebatan perihal penerapan HHI. Kasus Estonia telah mendorong NATO dan negara-negara lainya untuk merumuskan Manual tentang Perang Siber (Tallinn Manual 1.0) yang mengkonfirmasi penerapan HHI untuk kasus yang hanya melibatkan serangan siber. Pentingnya pengaturan dalam Pasal 30, artikel ini berpendapat bahwa pasal tersebut harus memiliki kekuatan hukum yang mengikat dalam bentuk aturan hukum kebiasaan internasional. Pasal 30 telah memenuhi unsur hukum kebiasaan internasional yakni praktek negara yang luas serta opinio juris. Sekalipun tidak dipenuhi secara sempurna seperti layaknya aturan hukum kebiasaan internasional yang lain. Dengan mempertimbangkan perkembangan teknologi yang pesat, Pasal 30 tidak perlu secara ideal memenuhi unsur norma hukum kebiasaan internasional, karena menurut Grotian Moment Theory pembentukan norma hukum kebiasaan internasional baru dapat dipercepat karena adanya perubahan yang fundamental. Hal ini dapat terlihat dari praktek hukum kebiasaan ruang angkasa. Kata Kunci: Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional, Hukum Humaniter Internasional, Serangan Siber, Tallinn Manual 1.0, Teori Grotian Moment


2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (879) ◽  
pp. 569-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bothe ◽  
Carl Bruch ◽  
Jordan Diamond ◽  
David Jensen

AbstractThere are three key deficiencies in the existing body of international humanitarian law (IHL) relating to protection of the environment during armed conflict. First, the definition of impermissible environmental damage is both too restrictive and unclear; second, there are legal uncertainties regarding the protection of elements of the environment as civilian objects; and third, the application of the principle of proportionality where harm to the environment constitutes ‘collateral damage’ is also problematic. These gaps present specific opportunities for clarifying and developing the existing framework. One approach to addressing some of the inadequacies of IHL could be application of international environmental law during armed conflict. The detailed norms, standards, approaches, and mechanisms found in international environmental law might also help to clarify and extend basic principles of IHL to prevent, address, or assess liability for environmental damage incurred during armed conflict.


2015 ◽  
pp. 88-103
Author(s):  
Joanna Szymoniczek

Resting places of fallen soldiers – war cemeteries – are monuments to soldiers’ heroism, and thus are of special significance not only for those who have lost their loved ones, but also for entire nations, countries and communities. Therefore, such cemeteries are created under the provisions of relevant authorities, and then put under the special protection of the public. These issues are closely regulated by international law established throughout the twentieth century. Cemeteries are protected by the state on whose territory individual objects are placed. However, the problem of cemeteries is more and more often the responsibility of social organizations. According to the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, specific tasks in this respect are assigned to the tracing services of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, who deal with the registry of exhumation, inhumation and body transfer, hold deposits, establish the fate of victims of war and issue death certificates. Institutions that deal with exploration, keeping records, exhumation of remains and the construction or revaluation of the graves of fallen citizens buried outside the borders of their own countries include the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites, the German People’s Union for the Care of War Graves, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, the Austrian Red Cross (Österreichisches Schwarzes Kreuz), the American Battle Monuments Commission, the US Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad and the Italian Commissariat General for the Memory of Killed in War (Commissariato Generale per le Onoranze Caduti in Guerra). For political reasons, tasks related to war cemeteries are assigned to social organizations, because their actions are believed to be more effective and less bureaucratic than those of states.


Author(s):  
Paul David Mora

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.


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