Rebel Group Attrition and Reversion to Violence: Micro-Level Evidence from Syria

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova ◽  
Karam Alhamad ◽  
Sam Whitt
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Scholarly Community ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Rapid Ascent ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Rebel Group

Abstract Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).

scholarly journals Shabbiha: Paramilitary groups, mass violence and social polarization in Homs

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Uğur Ümit Üngör
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Mass Violence ◽  
Video Clips ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Social Polarization ◽  
Research Interviews ◽  
The City

Within a year, the Syrian uprising in March 2011 developed into a civil war that gradually escalated and within 9 years killed over half a million people, displaced half the country’s prewar population, devastated the economy, and destabilized the entire region, and even the world. The Syrian civil war split the country into four factions that were continuously at war with each other with intermittent, unstable ceasefires: the Assad regime, the various rebel groups, the Kurds, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Assad regime was responsible for the bulk of the violence against civilians, qualitatively and quantitatively. Its violent crackdown on the mass protests in Syria became more extensive and intensive throughout the first years of the conflict. A key aspect of the regime’s repression against the population was its use of paramilitary forces, the so-called “ Shabbiha,” a catch-all category for irregular, pro-government militias dressed in (semi-)civilian gear and linked organically to the regime. From 2012 onward, they gradually became formalized, first in the Popular Committees (اللجان الشعبيه), and then in the National Defense Forces (قوات الدفاع الوطني) (NDF). Their violence strongly polarized sectarian relations in Syria, and therefore the Shabbiha are vital to understanding the broader conflict. This article will look at the mobilization and violence of the Shabbiha in the city of Homs. It is based on a combination of sources including ethnographic research, interviews with Shabbiha members, social media content, video clips, leaked documents, and testimonies of victims and other eye witnesses.

Re-enacting the international order, or: why the Syrian state did not disappear

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Janis Grzybowski
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
International Order ◽  
The State ◽  
Nation State ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
New States ◽  
Regime Support ◽  
Rare Opportunity ◽  
State Form

Abstract At the height of the Syrian civil war, many observers argued that the Syrian state was collapsing, fragmenting, or dissolving. Yet, it never actually vanished. Revisiting the rising challenges to the Syrian state since 2011 – from internal collapse through external fragmentation to its looming dissolution by the ‘Islamic State’ – provides a rare opportunity to investigate the re-enactment of both statehood and international order in crisis. Indeed, what distinguishes the challenges posed to Syria, and Iraq, from others in the region and beyond is that their potential dissolution was regarded as a threat not merely to a – despised – dictatorial regime, or a particular state, but to the state-based international order itself. Regimes fall and states ‘collapse’ internally or are replaced by new states, but the international order is fundamentally questioned only where the territorially delineated state form is contested by an alternative. The article argues that the Syrian state survived not simply due to its legal sovereignty or foreign regime support, but also because states that backed the rebellion, fearing the vanishing of the Syrian nation-state in a transnational jihadist ‘caliphate’, came to prefer its persistence under Assad. The re-enactment of states and of the international order are thus ultimately linked.

scholarly journals Weakened by the storm

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Walch
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Tropical Storms ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Group Recruitment ◽  
Rebel Group

How do natural disasters affect rebel group recruitment? Some influential research to date suggests that natural disasters – by lowering the opportunity cost of joining an armed movement – are likely to facilitate rebel group recruitment. In contrast, this study argues that natural disasters can negatively affect rebel organization and their recruitment efforts. It posits that natural disasters may weaken rebel groups in two main interrelated ways: (1) by leading to acute scarcity for rebel combatants and supporters, weakening the rebel group’s organizational structure and supply lines, and (2) by increasing government and international presence in areas where the insurgents operate. Empirically, this article explores these suggested mechanisms in two cases of natural disasters in the Philippines (typhoons Bopha in 2012 and Haiyan in 2013), which affected regions partially controlled by the communist rebel group, the New People’s Army (NPA). Based on data from extensive fieldwork, there is no evidence suggesting a boom in rebel recruitment in the wake of the typhoons. Rather, the NPA was temporarily weakened following the tropical storms, significantly impacting the civil war dynamics in the Philippines.

Kuwait faces rising threat from Islamic State group

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Political Freedoms ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Group

Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.

Rebel Fragmentation and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M Faulkner ◽  
Austin C Doctor
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Recruitment Strategies ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
Cross National

Abstract The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict remains a prevalent feature of modern civil war. But which conflict actors are more likely to recruit children? We argue that the process by which rebel groups form shapes their recruitment strategies. Specifically, we contend that rebels that form as splinter factions from the ranks of pre-existing rebel organizations are more likely to recruit child soldiers than other rebel groups. Splinter groups face unique constraints as they materialize in the midst of an active conflict environment, necessitating that they mobilize a sufficient force to contend with existing competitors. As a result, rebel factions are more likely to pursue recruitment strategies that are low cost vis-à-vis alternatives, focusing on their immediate survival. Under such conditions, children become especially attractive recruits. Leveraging the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset, our cross-national investigation of 237 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2011 provides robust support for our hypothesis that splinter factions are strongly associated with the recruitment of children.

Advocacy Coalitions and Foreign Policy Change: Understanding US Responses to the Syrian Civil War

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S Lantis
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Civil War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Advocacy Coalitions ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
The Government ◽  
Traditional Approaches

Abstract Insights from the public policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) may offer richer explanations of the scope and timing of US foreign policy changes toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present) than traditional approaches in foreign policy analysis (FPA). This article surveys the existing FPA literature and then probes the plausibility of a new ACF model of change through case studies of the reluctant engagement of the United States in Syria. Cases shed light on how, despite pronouncements of restraint by Presidents Obama and Trump, the government has armed and trained rebel fighters, deployed thousands of troops to the country, conducted airstrikes against the Islamic State, and moved to counterbalance Iranian influence in the region. This study helps draw connections between competition among rival advocacy coalitions and strategic drift in US foreign policy, including patterns of change and “purposive non-change.” The article concludes with a discussion of the added value of the ACF model and details its promise for application in other comparative cross-national contexts.

The Politics of Tribalization in Syria

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-506
Author(s):  
Haian Dukhan
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
International Media ◽  
Protest Movement ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
Tribal Affiliation

International media outlets have covered the news of Syrian tribes since the beginning of the protest movement that erupted in the country in 2011. This started with the “Friday of Tribes,” when Syrian tribes participating in protests against the Syrian regime in the Syrian city of Dar‘a began chanting “faz‘a” (chanting for support), which meant that they were seeking solidarity from other tribes for defense against the regime's aggression. As the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war that involved many players, some media outlets focused on the scenes of tribal leaders pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or of others being summoned to Geneva, Switzerland, to hold talks with Western powers about the possibility of mobilizing against ISIS militants. One could only wonder exactly why tribal loyalties continued to play such a significant role in the everyday events of the Syrian civil war when many civil society advocates had argued that tribal affiliation in Syria had diminished.

The Crumbling of Armies in Contemporary Syria

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 163-188
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Syrian Civil War

This chapter talks about the Syrian Civil War that has been ongoing since 2011, comparing the regime's Syrian Arab Army, the Free Syrian Army umbrella, Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the Kurdish People's and Women's Protection Units. It discusses how the forces of the Syrian Civil War was able to maintain their cohesion like their counterparts in Spain's militias that grew out of long-standing armed networks and maintained tight standards for recruitment. It also uses the Syrian case to demonstrate the ambiguous effects of threats of punishment to keep soldiers fighting. The chapter argues that problems of fighting desertion while fighting a civil war are neither particularly new nor particularly old. It reframes an important debate about why soldiers keep on fighting against the odds.

Making a Rebel Group Work

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Labor Force ◽  
Human Resource ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Group Work ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
Good Organization

Popularity can cause problems for an armed group’s human resource wing. On one hand, the group’s ranks swell. But the group also has to ensure that such an influx does not decrease the overall quality of its labor force, because a good organization with good benefits attracts more than just dedicated fighters. To do this, armed groups impose additional unproductive costs on fighters in return for membership in the group. To ensure they get only the most trustworthy and loyal fighters, the most organized and successful groups present prospective fighters with a condition: adherence to a strict set of requirements that have no direct effect on fighting. Groups need to at least try to explain the rationale behind those restrictions to their members. Ideology—in the case of the Syrian civil war, Islamist ideology—comes in handy for that purpose.

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