The Crumbling of Armies in Contemporary Syria

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 163-188
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin

This chapter talks about the Syrian Civil War that has been ongoing since 2011, comparing the regime's Syrian Arab Army, the Free Syrian Army umbrella, Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the Kurdish People's and Women's Protection Units. It discusses how the forces of the Syrian Civil War was able to maintain their cohesion like their counterparts in Spain's militias that grew out of long-standing armed networks and maintained tight standards for recruitment. It also uses the Syrian case to demonstrate the ambiguous effects of threats of punishment to keep soldiers fighting. The chapter argues that problems of fighting desertion while fighting a civil war are neither particularly new nor particularly old. It reframes an important debate about why soldiers keep on fighting against the odds.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Janis Grzybowski

Abstract At the height of the Syrian civil war, many observers argued that the Syrian state was collapsing, fragmenting, or dissolving. Yet, it never actually vanished. Revisiting the rising challenges to the Syrian state since 2011 – from internal collapse through external fragmentation to its looming dissolution by the ‘Islamic State’ – provides a rare opportunity to investigate the re-enactment of both statehood and international order in crisis. Indeed, what distinguishes the challenges posed to Syria, and Iraq, from others in the region and beyond is that their potential dissolution was regarded as a threat not merely to a – despised – dictatorial regime, or a particular state, but to the state-based international order itself. Regimes fall and states ‘collapse’ internally or are replaced by new states, but the international order is fundamentally questioned only where the territorially delineated state form is contested by an alternative. The article argues that the Syrian state survived not simply due to its legal sovereignty or foreign regime support, but also because states that backed the rebellion, fearing the vanishing of the Syrian nation-state in a transnational jihadist ‘caliphate’, came to prefer its persistence under Assad. The re-enactment of states and of the international order are thus ultimately linked.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Uğur Ümit Üngör

Within a year, the Syrian uprising in March 2011 developed into a civil war that gradually escalated and within 9 years killed over half a million people, displaced half the country’s prewar population, devastated the economy, and destabilized the entire region, and even the world. The Syrian civil war split the country into four factions that were continuously at war with each other with intermittent, unstable ceasefires: the Assad regime, the various rebel groups, the Kurds, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Assad regime was responsible for the bulk of the violence against civilians, qualitatively and quantitatively. Its violent crackdown on the mass protests in Syria became more extensive and intensive throughout the first years of the conflict. A key aspect of the regime’s repression against the population was its use of paramilitary forces, the so-called “ Shabbiha,” a catch-all category for irregular, pro-government militias dressed in (semi-)civilian gear and linked organically to the regime. From 2012 onward, they gradually became formalized, first in the Popular Committees (اللجان الشعبيه), and then in the National Defense Forces (قوات الدفاع الوطني) (NDF). Their violence strongly polarized sectarian relations in Syria, and therefore the Shabbiha are vital to understanding the broader conflict. This article will look at the mobilization and violence of the Shabbiha in the city of Homs. It is based on a combination of sources including ethnographic research, interviews with Shabbiha members, social media content, video clips, leaked documents, and testimonies of victims and other eye witnesses.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey S Lantis

Abstract Insights from the public policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) may offer richer explanations of the scope and timing of US foreign policy changes toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present) than traditional approaches in foreign policy analysis (FPA). This article surveys the existing FPA literature and then probes the plausibility of a new ACF model of change through case studies of the reluctant engagement of the United States in Syria. Cases shed light on how, despite pronouncements of restraint by Presidents Obama and Trump, the government has armed and trained rebel fighters, deployed thousands of troops to the country, conducted airstrikes against the Islamic State, and moved to counterbalance Iranian influence in the region. This study helps draw connections between competition among rival advocacy coalitions and strategic drift in US foreign policy, including patterns of change and “purposive non-change.” The article concludes with a discussion of the added value of the ACF model and details its promise for application in other comparative cross-national contexts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-506
Author(s):  
Haian Dukhan

International media outlets have covered the news of Syrian tribes since the beginning of the protest movement that erupted in the country in 2011. This started with the “Friday of Tribes,” when Syrian tribes participating in protests against the Syrian regime in the Syrian city of Dar‘a began chanting “faz‘a” (chanting for support), which meant that they were seeking solidarity from other tribes for defense against the regime's aggression. As the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war that involved many players, some media outlets focused on the scenes of tribal leaders pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or of others being summoned to Geneva, Switzerland, to hold talks with Western powers about the possibility of mobilizing against ISIS militants. One could only wonder exactly why tribal loyalties continued to play such a significant role in the everyday events of the Syrian civil war when many civil society advocates had argued that tribal affiliation in Syria had diminished.


Significance Zamili's remarks appear to signal Iraqi government concerns that the US-led international air campaign against the group is not going well. The effectiveness of airstrikes has been constrained by poor intelligence and strict rules of engagement; efforts to support local ground forces are at a standstill; and Iraqi offensive operations have virtually ground to a halt. Impacts Russia's strong intervention into Syria will not break the stalemate in either the fight against ISG or the Syrian civil war. The huge costs of a protracted campaign against ISG will further weaken Iraq's medium-term fiscal outlook. ISG's survival will limit Syrian Kurdish ambitions to establish a contiguous territory across northern Syria. It will also contain Syrian rebel forces, ensuring that the stalemate in the Syrian civil war continues. Continued flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria will ensure international terrorism threat persist over the long term.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova ◽  
Karam Alhamad ◽  
Sam Whitt

Abstract Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 408-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ora Szekely

AbstractThis article seeks to map and explain the sudden increase in the appearance of female combatants in the propaganda distributed by various parties to the Syrian civil war. Based on interviews and the analysis of online propaganda, the article argues that the importance of ideologies of gender to two of the four main participants in the Syrian civil war (specifically, the Kurdish Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD, and the Islamic State, or ISIS) has rendered gender ideology an unusually salient point of ideological cleavage in the Syrian context. This has meant that other parties to the conflict, for whom gender ideology is less important, are able to easily signal their position in relation to other conflict participants by means of policies or actions relating to women's participation in the conflict.


Author(s):  
A. Yashlavskii

Since 2012 one can speak about a real civil war in Syria with participation of different political forces. Extremist Islamist jihadist groups like “Front al-Nusra” and “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL) play very active role among them. Relations between ruling elites and Islamists have been very complex in Syria during the past decades. On the one hand, Syrian Alawite regime is secular and nationalist. On the other hand, official Damascus used to be one of the sponsors of the militant Islamist anti-Israeli and anti-Western groups in the Middle East. Besides, Syria is a close ally of Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Shi'ite Hizbullah. From our point of view, the union between Assad's Syria and Islamist groups was rather tactical than strategic one. Syria always played very important role for Sunni Islam, e.g., “the Land of Sham” had a big importance in eschatological beliefs of Sunni Muslims as a place of the final battle between Believers and Dajjal (Anti-Christ). Many foreign Islamist militant involved in Syrian War are inspired by this belief. Additionally, although a big majority of Syrians are Sunni, a dominance of Alawite sect in the political and social and economic life of the country disaffects of many Syrians with an escalation of Syrian conflict. Islamization of “Syrian revolution” is connected with cruel oppression of opposition by Assad's forces and powerless position of the West. At the same time, islamisation is a common feature of the Arab Spring. Arab Spring extremist Islamists have appeared along with relatively moderate Islamist and secular pro-Western groups. Foreign militant Jihadists play an important role in radicalisation of Islamist factor in the conflict. While Shi'ite groups (like pro-Iranian Hizbullah) regards Syria as a crucial part of Shi'ite belt from Mediterranean to Iran, Sunni extremists are not going to lose ground in the face of Shiite 'heretics'. The involvement of Arab Wahhabi monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) in the current turbulence must be also noted. ISIL is now the key actor of Syrian civil war. It is active not only in Syria but also in Iraq, the homeland of the organization. Initially, this Sunni militant group was closely connected to Al Qaeda. Now the relationships between them are rather tense because of ISIL’s efforts to overmaster another Jihadist group, “Front al Nusra”. The strategic aim of the ISIL is an establishment of an Islamic State (in Iraq and later in Syria) and the restoration of Caliphate. The tactics of the ISIL include guerrilla warfare and cruel terrorist attacks against military and civil people. In Syria ISIL fights against Assad's forces as armed opposition (both secular and Islamist) for control over territories and power. “Front al Nusra” (Front of Support of the Land of Sham People, FN) is genetically connected to ISIL. In terms of ideology there are no divergences between two groups, but they are rivals when it concerns the issues of popular support and political influence. Some Syrian people consider FN as a local group in contrast to foreign militants dominated ISIL. Activities of Jihadist groups is a real danger not only for Syria, but for the whole region and even worldwide.


2018 ◽  
pp. 401-409
Author(s):  
Sheldon Anderson ◽  
Mark Allen Peterson ◽  
Stanley W. Toops

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document