Why Does Aid Not Target the Poorest?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan C Briggs
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Team Leaders ◽  
Donor Side ◽  
Local Effects ◽  
Remote Areas ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Task Team

Abstract Foreign-aid projects typically have local effects, so they need to be placed close to the poor if they are to reduce poverty. I show that, conditional on local population levels, World Bank (WB) project aid targets richer parts of countries. This relationship holds over time and across world regions. I test five donor-side explanations for pro-rich targeting using a pre-registered conjoint experiment on WB Task Team Leaders (TTLs). TTLs perceive aid-receiving governments as most interested in targeting aid politically and controlling implementation. They also believe that aid works better in poorer or more remote areas, but that implementation in these areas is uniquely difficult. These results speak to debates in distributive politics, international bargaining over aid, and principal-agent issues in international organizations. The results also suggest that tweaks to WB incentive structures to make ease of project implementation less important may encourage aid to flow to poorer parts of countries.

scholarly journals Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko Heinzel ◽  
Andrea Liese
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Recipient Country ◽  
Team Leaders ◽  
Substantial Evidence ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Bank Staff ◽  
Task Team

AbstractWorld Bank evaluations show that recipient performance varies substantially between different projects. Extant research has focused on country-level variables when explaining these variations. This article goes beyond country-level explanations and highlights the role of World Bank staff. We extend established arguments in the literature on compliance with the demands of International Organizations (IOs) and hypothesize that IO staff can shape recipient performance in three ways. First, recipient performance may be influenced by the quality of IO staff monitoring and supervision. Second, the leniency and stringency with which IO staff apply the aid agreement could improve recipient performance. Third, recipient performance may depend on whether IO staff can identify and mobilize supportive interlocutors through their networks in the recipient country. We test these arguments by linking a novel database on the tenure of World Bank task team leaders to projects evaluated between 1986 and 2020. The findings are consistent with the expectation that World Bank staff play an important role, but only in investment projects. There is substantial evidence that World Bank staff supervisory ability and country experience are linked to recipient performance in those projects. Less consistent evidence indicates that leniency could matter. These findings imply that World Bank staff play an important role in facilitating implementation of investment projects.

Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Multilateral Development Banks ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Identification Strategy

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.

The autonomy of international organizations? The analysis of major powers’ influence over the World Bank’s aid policies

2021 ◽  
pp. 223386592110248
Author(s):  
Yooneui Kim ◽  
Youngwan Kim
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Development Assistance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Official Development Assistance ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World

Are international organizations autonomous actors in global politics? This paper investigates whether and how major powers influence the World Bank’s official development assistance policies. Despite the World Bank’s attempts to maintain independence from its member states, we argue that major powers are still influential. Testing this expectation with the data of official development assistance provisions between 1981 and 2017, we find that the World Bank provides a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipient countries that receive a higher amount of such assistance from the major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. In addition, the World Bank is prone to provide a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipients that have a similar preference to the major powers. This study sheds light on the relations between major powers and international organizations.

Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 717-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS POGGE
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
The World

Various human rights are widely recognized in codified and customary international law. These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet international law also establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to violations of these human rights: fundamental components of international law systematically obstruct the aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, are designed so that they systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty.

Problematizing the Privatization of Water

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Gamero
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Safe Drinking Water ◽  
Human Right ◽  
The World ◽  
Precious Resource ◽  
The Cost

This presentation will focus on the issue of the privatization of water. The privatization of water is currently being facilitated by the growth of trade liberalization and the free trade policies of international organizations like the IMF and World Bank. It is also growing due to the neoliberal policies of states and because of the increasing power of the private sector (including well- funded lobby and special interest groups) over the policies of governments. The principal arguments and viewpoints of those who both support and oppose the privatization of water will be examined and evaluated. In particular, arguments concerning the cost and accessibility of water for people will be studied. The effects and implications of privatization in highly diverse communities in both developed and developing countries will be discussed. An example from the community of Cochabamba in Bolivia will be analyzed, showing many of the drawbacks that can come with the privatization of water. This presentation will argue that water is a precious resource which ought not to be treated as a commodity. Instead, it should be treated as a human right that no individual or corporation should make a monetary profit from. Governments ought to provide safe drinking water for their citizens, rather than leaving this duty to the private sector as is happening in many parts of the world.

scholarly journals The Macro Economic Management Challenges of Foreign Aid in Developing Countries

1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-170
Author(s):  
U Arabi ◽  
Nagendra
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Poor People ◽  
Global Integration ◽  
Economic Management ◽  
International Consensus

Foreign aid is one of the most powerful weapons in the war against poverty.  Many people equate aid with charity as one way act of generosity directed from high income countries to their low income counterparts. Foreign aid is indispensable for the development of less developed countries. It flows in the form of loans, assistance outright grants from various governmental and international organizations. It spreads the benefits of global integration and shared prosperity by enabling poor people and countries to overcome the health, education and economic resources barriers that keep them in poverty. There is an international consensus that human development should be the primary objective. Hence aid budgets are raising despite the several fiscal and public debt problems facing some of the donor countries.

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