Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory

Author(s):  
Abbas Farasoo

Abstract This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors’ motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict.

2021 ◽  
pp. 109634802098857
Author(s):  
Zvi Schwartz ◽  
Timothy Webb

Index scores and competitive sets (compsets) play a critical role in the performance and evaluation of hotels. The reliance on these metrics has drawn skepticism in recent years as competitive sets may be opportunistically chosen, creating bias in performance evaluation. Drawing from the principal–agent theory and the theory of incentives, we explore whether the distance of the competitors chosen for a hotel’s compset influences revenue per available room (RevPAR) index scores. Based on the concepts of resource similarity and market commonality, we develop a novel mathematical model through which we empirically analyze a large dataset of 10,000 compsets. We find evidence that competitor distance influences index performance and that this relationship is bidirectional. Results show that hotels that outperform the competition may use distance to inflate RevPAR indices, while those that underperform may use distance to further reduce scores. These conflicting results may be reflected from the reverse motivations of the stakeholders.


2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Wiese

AbstractEconomic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (11) ◽  
pp. 3381-3387
Author(s):  
Benjiang Ma ◽  
Hongwei Chen ◽  
Beiling Ma ◽  
Xiaohong Chen

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