A note on the system GRW with the intensional contraction rule

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirjana Ilić ◽  
Branislav Boričić

Abstract In Ilić and Boričić (2014, Log. J. IGPL, 22, 673–695), the right-handed cut-free sequent calculus $GRW$ for the contraction-less relevant logic $RW$ is defined. In this paper, we show that the enlargement of the system $GRW$ with the structural rule of intensional contraction (WI) presents the sequent system for the principal relevant logic $R$ but the rule of cut cannot be eliminated in $GRW+$(WI).

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan von Plato

AbstractGentzen writes in the published version of his doctoral thesis Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen (Investigations into logical reasoning) that he was able to prove the normalization theorem only for intuitionistic natural deduction, but not for classical. To cover the latter, he developed classical sequent calculus and proved a corresponding theorem, the famous cut elimination result. Its proof was organized so that a cut elimination result for an intuitionistic sequent calculus came out as a special case, namely the one in which the sequents have at most one formula in the right, succedent part. Thus, there was no need for a direct proof of normalization for intuitionistic natural deduction. The only traces of such a proof in the published thesis are some convertibilities, such as when an implication introduction is followed by an implication elimination [1934–35, II.5.13]. It remained to Dag Prawitz in 1965 to work out a proof of normalization. Another, less known proof was given also in 1965 by Andres Raggio.We found in February 2005 an early handwritten version of Gentzen's thesis, with exactly the above title, but with rather different contents: Most remarkably, it contains a detailed proof of normalization for what became the standard system of natural deduction. The manuscript is located in the Paul Bernays collection at the ETH-Zurichwith the signum Hs. 974: 271. Bernays must have gotten it well before the time of his being expelled from Göttingen on the basis of the racial laws in April 1933.


1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Tennant

Relevance logic began in an attempt to avoid the so-called fallacies of relevance. These fallacies can be in implicational form or in deductive form. For example, Lewis's first paradox can beset a system in implicational form, in that the system contains as a theorem the formula (A & ∼A) → B; or it can beset it in deductive form, in that the system allows one to deduce B from the premisses A, ∼A.Relevance logic in the tradition of Anderson and Belnap has been almost exclusively concerned with characterizing a relevant conditional. Thus it has attacked the problem of relevance in its implicational form. Accordingly for a relevant conditional → one would not have as a theorem the formula (A & ∼A) → B. Other theorems even of minimal logic would also be lacking. Perhaps most important among these is the formula (A → (B → A)). It is also a well-known feature of their system R that it lacks the intuitionistically valid formula ((A ∨ B) & ∼A) → B (disjunctive syllogism).But it is not the case that any relevance logic worth the title even has to concern itself with the conditional, and hence with the problem in its implicational form. The problem arises even for a system without the conditional primitive. It would still be an exercise in relevance logic, broadly construed, to formulate a deductive system free of the fallacies of relevance in deductive form even if this were done in a language whose only connectives were, say, &, ∨ and ∼. Solving the problem of relevance in this more basic deductive form is arguably a precondition for solving it for the conditional, if we suppose (as is reasonable) that the relevant conditional is to be governed by anything like the rule of conditional proof.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Peter Verdée ◽  
Inge De Bal ◽  
Aleksandra Samonek

In this paper we first develop a logic independent account of relevant implication. We propose a stipulative denition of what it means for a multiset of premises to relevantly L-imply a multiset of conclusions, where L is a Tarskian consequence relation: the premises relevantly imply the conclusions iff there is an abstraction of the pair <premises, conclusions> such that the abstracted premises L-imply the abstracted conclusions and none of the abstracted premises or the abstracted conclusions can be omitted while still maintaining valid L-consequence.          Subsequently we apply this denition to the classical logic (CL) consequence relation to obtain NTR-consequence, i.e. the relevant CL-consequence relation in our sense, and develop a sequent calculus that is sound and complete with regard to relevant CL-consequence. We present a sound and complete sequent calculus for NTR. In a next step we add rules for an object language relevant implication to thesequent calculus. The object language implication reflects exactly the NTR-consequence relation. One can see the resulting logic NTR-> as a relevant logic in the traditional sense of the word.       By means of a translation to the relevant logic R, we show that the presented logic NTR is very close to relevance logics in the Anderson-Belnap-Dunn-Routley-Meyer tradition. However, unlike usual relevant logics, NTR is decidable for the full language, Disjunctive Syllogism (A and ~AvB relevantly imply B) and Adjunction (A and B relevantly imply A&B) are valid, and neither Modus Ponens nor the Cut rule are admissible.


2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-695 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ili  ◽  
B. Bori i 

Author(s):  
A.M. Ungar

Different presentations of the principles of logic reflect different approaches to the subject itself. The three kinds of system discussed here treat as fundamental not logical truth, but consequence, the relation holding between the premises and conclusion of a valid argument. They are, however, inspired by different conceptions of this relation. Natural deduction rules are intended to formalize the way in which mathematicians actually reason in their proofs. Tableau systems reflect the semantic conception of consequence; their rules may be interpreted as the systematic search for a counterexample to an argument. Finally, sequent calculi were developed for the sake of their metamathematical properties. All three systems employ rules rather than axioms. Each logical constant is governed by a pair of rules which do not involve the other constants and are, in some sense, inverse. Take the implication operator ‘→’, for example. In natural deduction, there is an introduction rule for ‘→’ which gives a sufficient condition for inferring an implication, and an elimination rule which gives the strongest conclusion that can be inferred from a premise having the form of an implication. Tableau systems contain a rule which gives a sufficient condition for an implication to be true, and another which gives a sufficient condition for it to be false. A sequent is an array Γ⊢Δ, where Γ and Δ are lists (or sets) of formulas. Sequent calculi have rules for introducing implication on the left of the ‘⊢’ symbol and on the right. The construction of derivations or tableaus in these systems is often more concise and intuitive than in an axiomatic one, and versions of all three have found their way into introductory logic texts. Furthermore, every natural deduction or sequent derivation can be made more direct by transforming it into a ‘normal form’. In the case of the sequent calculus, this result is known as the cut-elimination theorem. It has been applied extensively in metamathematics, most famously to obtain consistency proofs. The semantic inspiration for the rules of tableau construction suggests a very perspicuous proof of classical completeness, one which can also be adapted to the sequent calculus. The introduction and elimination rules of natural deduction are intuitionistically valid and have suggested an alternative semantics based on a conception of meaning as use. The idea is that the meaning of each logical constant is exhausted by its inferential behaviour and can therefore be characterized by its introduction and elimination rules. Although the discussion below focuses on intuitionistic and classical first-order logic, various other logics have also been formulated as sequent, natural deduction and even tableau systems: modal logics, for example, relevance logic, infinitary and higher-order logics. There is a gain in understanding the role of the logical constants which comes from formulating introduction and elimination (or left and right) rules for them. Some authors have even suggested that one must be able to do so for an operator to count as logical.


2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 1803-1816 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Negri ◽  
Jan von Plato

Abstract.A sequent calculus is given in which the management of weakening and contraction is organized as in natural deduction. The latter has no explicit weakening or contraction, but vacuous and multiple discharges in rules that discharge assumptions. A comparison to natural deduction is given through translation of derivations between the two systems. It is proved that if a cut formula is never principal in a derivation leading to the right premiss of cut, it is a subformula of the conclusion. Therefore it is sufficient to eliminate those cuts that correspond to detour and permutation conversions in natural deduction.


Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Gainotti

Abstract The target article carefully describes the memory system, centered on the temporal lobe that builds specific memory traces. It does not, however, mention the laterality effects that exist within this system. This commentary briefly surveys evidence showing that clear asymmetries exist within the temporal lobe structures subserving the core system and that the right temporal structures mainly underpin face familiarity feelings.


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