Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?

Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.

2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 905-965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Bettauer

The North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994. Chapter Eleven of NAFTA contains provisions governing investment protection and investor-state arbitration. In general, NAFTA provides investors of one of the parties protections for their investments in another NAFTA party, guaranteeing: treatment at least as good as that of host or third country investors (NAFTA articles 1102-1104); treatment in accordance with the minimum standards of customary international law (NAFTA article 1105); and compensation for expropriation (NAFTA article 1110). NAFTA article 1139 defines “investment” broadly but excludes contracts for the sale of goods or services. After meeting specified threshold requirements, such an investor has the right to international arbitration against the host state to vindicate these protections.


Author(s):  
J. C. Thomas

SummaryChapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides for suits by foreign investors from the NAFTA Parties against one of the other Parties. The author reviews this provision and discusses its possible ambit in light of the decisions so far rendered. The author considers that, properly interpreted, Chapter 11 will provide an extraordinary means of redress and will not open the floodgates to all kinds of claims that second-guess legitimate governmental legislative activity or policymaking.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159 ◽  

A twenty-four-year-old agreement was reborn on October 1, 2018, when President Trump announced that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had been successfully renegotiated. The deal came after an arduous, year-long negotiation process that almost left Canada behind. As one indicator of its contentiousness, the deal lacks an agreed-upon name, but the United States is referring to it as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). It keeps some key NAFTA provisions mostly the same, including with respect to state-to-state dispute resolution, but eliminates, modifies, and adds other provisions. Among the changes: investor-state dispute settlement has been eliminated as between the United States and Canada; rules of origin for automobiles and rules for U.S. dairy products have been modified; and new provisions address labor protections, intellectual property rights, rights for indigenous persons, rules for trade negotiations with non-market countries, and the agreement's termination. The agreement was formally signed by the leaders of all three countries on November 30, 3018. It must be approved through the domestic ratification procedures of the three countries before it enters into force.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-677
Author(s):  
NOEMIE LAURENS ◽  
ZACHARY DOVE ◽  
JEAN FREDERIC MORIN ◽  
SIKINA JINNAH

AbstractThe renegotiation of what US President Trump called ‘the worst trade deal ever’ has resulted in the most detailed environmental chapter in any trade agreement in history. The USMCA mentions dozens of environmental issues that its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), overlooked, and in line with contemporary US practice, brings the vast majority of environmental provisions into the core of the agreement, and subjects these provisions to a sanction-based dispute settlement mechanism. It also jettisons two controversial NAFTA measures potentially harmful to the environment. However, this paper argues that the USMCA only makes limited contributions to environmental protection. It primarily replicates most of the environmental provisions included in recent agreements, and only introduces three unprecedented environmental provisions. Moreover, it avoids important issues such as climate change, it does not mention the precautionary principle, and it scales back some environmental provisions related to multilateral environmental agreements.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Jordan Jensen

Scientific developments, such as biologics and personalized medicine, have created an entirely new category of pharmaceutical drugs that were not considered when the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) was adopted in 1994. However, the rise of biologics has increased demand for a reconfigured NAFTA, particularly with respect to Chapter 17, which outlines NAFTA’s robust intellectual property standards, as well as Chapter 11, which both lays out the framework for foreign investment under NAFTA and introduces a controversial mechanism referred to as the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDS”). The intellectual property provisions of the original NAFTA should be revised to mirror the similar provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement, which better accommodates new medical advances. However, despite criticism of their lack of transparency, the investment provisions of the original NAFTA are likely sufficient to grant medical patent-rights holders the investment protection that they seek because they strengthen transparency, which is ultimately good for business.


Subject Social mobility in Mexico. Significance Despite recent reductions in inequality and the growth of the middle class, Mexican society is one of the most unequal in Latin America. Economic and political inequalities have also contributed to low intergenerational social mobility, with those born poor tending to remain so. Impacts Inequality and lack of opportunity for the young will exacerbate crime rates. Talks on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will highlight the issue of Mexico's low minimum wage. State failings on inequality will aid leftist presidential frontrunner Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador ahead of the 2018 election.


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen McBride

Abstract.This article focuses on the claim that authority is shifting from public into private hands. To partially test that thesis it examines the procedures for settling disputes under NAFTA Chapter 11 (itself an example of the broader category of investor-state provisions found in bilateral investment agreements and some international conventions). The article detects evidence of a delegation or transfer of public authority to private processes. It deals only incidentally with NAFTA Chapter 11's grant to investors of the right to make direct claims against signatory governments; rather, it concentrates on the procedures for resolving such claims, and the means available to states to assert the public interest. Specifically, this article examines the way that the NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism is rooted in private arbitration processes and seeks to determine the effectiveness of the means available to public authorities to alter decisions emanating from them, if they are deemed to be contrary to the public interest.Résumé.Cet article considère l'argument selon lequel l'exercice de l'autorité publique est en train de passer du domaine public au domaine privé. Afin de vérifier, au moins partiellement, cette thèse l'article passe en revue les procédures d'adjudication des différends aux termes du chapitre 11 de l'ALENA - qui est lui-même un exemple de la catégorie plus vaste des dispositions concernant le traitement des investisseurs, et leur droit d'apparaître devant les tribunaux d'arbitrage au même titre que les États, que l'on trouve dans certains traités bilatéraux et internationaux. L'article décèle les indices d'une délégation ou d'un transfert de l'autorité publique vers le secteur privé. Il ne porte que tangentiellement sur le chapitre 11 de l'ALENA et les droits des investisseurs de porter plainte contre les gouvernements signataires; il analyse, par contre,de manière plus approfondie les procédures utilisées pour résoudre de telles plaintes et les moyens dont disposent les États pour défendre l'intérêt général. L'auteur examine plus particulièrement l'enracinement de la procédure de résolution des différends du chapitre 11 de l'ALENA dans les processus d'arbitrage privé et cherche à déterminer l'efficacité des moyens dont disposent les autorités publiques pour modifier les décisions qui en résultent si elles s'avèrent être contraires à l'intérêt général.


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