Energy Charter Treaty Dispute Settlement System

Author(s):  
Coop Graham
Author(s):  
Stefan Griller

The author argues that the mega-regionals are incorporating WTO standards on the removal of technical barriers to trade (TBT), but do not go much further. Consequently, domestic policies on consumer or environmental protection are inevitably affected. However, in this regard, the mega-regionals would not result in a substantive change. By contrast, the relationship between the removal of TBT and investment protection standards is qualified as poorly balanced, unclear, and creating fresh problems. This includes the possibility that damages might be awarded even in cases where the party to the agreement has correctly used its ‘right to regulate’. Moreover, a critical account of the investor-state dispute settlement system foreseen is offered. It is presented as unnecessarily complex, and creating unbalanced advantages for investors. The better alternative would be integrating national courts into the system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.


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