Part V Judicial Review before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 Decentralized Judicial Review and Enforcement of EU State Aid Rules

Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter examines the recovery of unlawful and incompatible State aids, which is one of the cornerstones of free and undistorted competition in the European Union. The repayment of an aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the common market is of utmost importance, as it eliminates the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage afforded by the contested aid. In other words, by repaying an unlawful aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market and therefore the previously existing situation is restored; it is common ground in this respect that this objective is attained once the aid in question—increased, where appropriate, by default interests—has been repaid by the recipient.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter addresses access to justice in the context of centralized enforcement of EU State aid law and judicial review before the Union courts. The subject matter of litigation is State aid measures adopted in particular by the European Commission as the main supervisory body in this field pursuant to Article 108 TFEU. The term ‘access to justice’ is meant to comprise both the various conditions of standing for bringing direct actions against such measures before the General Court (GC), which essentially comprise actions for annulment (Article 263 TFEU), actions for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU), and actions for damages (Article 268 in combination with Article 340(2) TFEU). The chapter also looks at the nature and the types of acts that are possibly subject to judicial review before the GC.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.


2021 ◽  
pp. 47-49
Author(s):  
Matteo Gnes

This chapter assesses administrative procedure and judicial review in the European Union. The requirement of judicial oversight of administrative action, which results from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States of the EU, is a general principle of EU law, and it is applicable both to proceedings before the Court of justice and before national courts, when EU law is invoked before them. The EU courts carry out a generalized review on any binding acts. Although there are certain differences between acts that may be challenged according to the different remedies provided by EU law, in order to be challengeable, the acts must fulfil several conditions. The most important are: they must be binding and produce legal effects, be definitive and be taken by EU institutions in the exercise of their competencies. Article 263 TFEU provides that the acts of EU institutions may be annulled on grounds of 'lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers'. Acts or failure to act may give rise to the liability of EU institutions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.


2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panos Koutrakos

AbstractThe EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as an area ill-suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case law has interpreted in broad terms. This article will place this case law in the broader constitutional setting of the EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU's and domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is about the position of CFSP in the EU's constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the constitutional ambivalence that characterizes this position and how it is conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union governing the Court's jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent case law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent case law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system governing CFSP.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Michael Heinig

Approximately ten to fifteen years ago the “danger of Europeanization” of the German law on churches and religion was hotly debated. The churches in Germany feared that the influence of the European Union would dramatically change their legal framework. But also academic writers worried about the influence of the common market law or European antidiscrimination law on the legal situation of the churches in the member states – sometimes in rather shrill tone. One almost got the impression that Brussels replaced the Marxist Ideologiekritik (critique of ideology) as the main enemy of Christianity in Europe.


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