With the analysis of the key terms such as truth/use, proof - verification, falsification, inductive probability/semantic probability, winning/losing, winning strategy, it is shown that Dummett’s general theory of meaning does not include Hintikka’s game theory, that it, the conception of the winning strategy. The difference between them arises from the different understanding of Wittgenstein's idea about language games and from their attitudes toward theoretical proof theory. Hintikka’s semantic games about exploration of the world do not reject the bivalence principle but he gives it a different characteristic - one of the two players always has a winning strategy. Looking at Dummett’s philosophical theory of meaning and the most recent Hintikka’s suggestion about general information - seeking through questioning and answering, the author establishes that Dummett’s falsificational and dialogical games as well as Hintikka’s semantic games are subparts of Hintikka’s general information - seeking game Thus Dummett’s statement that Hintikka’s semantic games can be subsumed under Dummett’s conception is rejected and thus the answer is partly given to Saarinen’s suggestion that new affinity should be established. Apart from the comparison of these views with the outline of possible Wittgenstein’s general theory of meaning as rule - testing, together with his treatment (although not always adequate) of verification/falsification, inductive probability and čonfirmation/corroboration, the advantage of Wittgenstein’s view is affirmed.
Proportionality’s Lower Bound
