Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity

Author(s):  
Kenneth V. Iserson

Decision-making capacity (rather than “competence,” a legal term) is the ability to make decisions about one’s own medical care. Having decision-making capacity rests on the patient’s understanding their healthcare options and choosing an option consistent with their stable value system. Capacity is decision relative, meaning that the criteria to have decisional capacity depend on the complexity of the decision and the seriousness of possible outcomes. Individuals can have fluctuating decision-making capacity.

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107078
Author(s):  
Mark Navin ◽  
Jason Adam Wasserman ◽  
Devan Stahl ◽  
Tom Tomlinson

The capacity to designate a surrogate (CDS) is not simply another kind of medical decision-making capacity (DMC). A patient with DMC can express a preference, understand information relevant to that choice, appreciate the significance of that information for their clinical condition, and reason about their choice in light of their goals and values. In contrast, a patient can possess the CDS even if they cannot appreciate their condition or reason about the relative risks and benefits of their options. Patients who lack DMC for many or most kinds of medical choices may nonetheless possess the CDS, particularly since the complex means-ends reasoning required by DMC is one of the first capacities to be lost in progressive cognitive diseases (eg, Alzheimer’s disease). That is, patients with significant cognitive decline or mental illness may still understand what a surrogate does, express a preference about a potential surrogate, and be able to provide some kind of justification for that selection. Moreover, there are many legitimate and relevant rationales for surrogate selection that are inconsistent with the reasoning criterion of DMC. Unfortunately, many patients are prevented from designating a surrogate if they are judged to lack DMC. When such patients possess the CDS, this practice is ethically wrong, legally dubious and imposes avoidable burdens on healthcare institutions.


Author(s):  
Timothy E. Quill ◽  
Judith K. Schwarz

All seriously ill persons should complete advance directives specifying indications for limiting future provision of food and fluids. AD’s for SED specify When oral intake is to be limited and What limitations are to be imposed. Two categories include: (1) withholding all assisted oral intake from a person who has lost decision-making capacity, and previously indicated her wish to not receive any assisted feeding, and (2) Comfort Feeding Only (CFO) which involves providing as much or as little food and fluid as the patient seems to desire. CFO has three subcategories: (a) “Self-feeding only”—limiting oral intake to what the patient is able to self-administer. (b) Both “self-feeding” and “caregiver assisted-feeding” in whatever amount the patient enjoys. (c) “Minimum Comfort Feeding Only” is a modification for those who had expressed a desire to SED but lost decisional capacity before implementation, but now seem to desire food or fluid.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Marron ◽  
Kaitlin Kyi ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Allison Magnuson

Modern oncology practice is built upon the idea that a patient with cancer has the legal and ethical right to make decisions about their medical care. There are situations in which patients might no longer be fully able to make decisions on their own behalf, however, and some patients never were able to do so. In such cases, it is critical to be aware of how to determine if a patient has the ability to make medical decisions and what should be done if they do not. In this article, we examine the concept of decision-making capacity in oncology and explore situations in which patients may have altered/diminished capacity (e.g., depression, cognitive impairment, delirium, brain tumor, brain metastases, etc.) or never had decisional capacity (e.g., minor children or developmentally disabled adults). We describe fundamental principles to consider when caring for a patient with cancer who lacks decisional capacity. We then introduce strategies for capacity assessment and discuss how clinicians might navigate scenarios in which their patients could lack capacity to make decisions about their cancer care. Finally, we explore ways in which pediatric and medical oncology can learn from one another with regard to these challenging situations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wan-Zu D. Chang ◽  
Michelle S. Bourgeois

Purpose This study evaluated the decision-making capacity of persons with mild and moderate dementia on end-of-life care when using visual aids. A secondary purpose was to learn whether the judges naive to the experimental conditions would rate participants' decisional abilities as better when augmented by visual aids, thereby validating the behavioral changes due to the use of these external support. Method Twenty older adults with mild and moderate dementia demonstrated Understanding, Expressing a Choice, Reasoning, and Appreciation of 2 medical vignettes under 2 counterbalanced conditions: verbal alone or verbal with visual aids. Transcripts were analyzed and scored to measure decisional skills. Twelve judges rated participants' decisional abilities using a 7-point Likert scale. Results Participants demonstrated significantly better overall decisional capacity in Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation when supported by visual aids during the decision-making process. No significant differences between conditions were found in Expressing a Choice, the decisional skill Logical Sequence under Reasoning, and Acknowledgment under Appreciation. Overall, the judges' ratings validated these outcomes; the judges' ratings reflected greater agreement in the visual condition than in the verbal condition. Conclusions Findings indicated that visual aids (a) improved the decision-making capacity of individuals with dementia in comprehending medical information, employing supportive reasons, and relating this information to his or her own situation and (b) contain the potential for judges who majored or are majoring in speech-language pathology to reach a stronger consensus when determining the decision-making capacity of individuals with dementia.


Author(s):  
Stephen L. Read ◽  
James E. Spar

Medical decision-making based on informed consent is a fundamental principle of ethical medical practice. When a patient lacks medical decisional capacity and is unable to give truly informed consent, an agent must be sought to act on the behalf of the person. This chapter reviews the principles underlying determination of the capacity to give informed consent regarding healthcare decisions in a clinical setting. Cognitive loss, emotional distress, or disengagement or the perception that the patient is choosing unwisely or as a result of influence may be concerns that lead to consultation. In contrast to the clear standards for medical decision-making capacity, statutory guidance and case law are essentially nonexistent regarding what standard applies to the capacity to create or to change an advance health directive (AHCD) or to change or designate a healthcare agent. In addition to current decision-making capacity, the consultant must address broader issues of functional or management capacity when the patient’s ongoing capacity to manage personal care and health is at issue, as is relevant to the petition for guardianship. A comprehensive forensic geriatric psychiatry consultation will assist with the care of the patient.


Author(s):  
Andrew M. Courtwright

The medical view of autonomous decision making (MVAD)—in which a patient’s decision-making capacity is evaluated according to his beliefs and understanding of his clinical situation and how his decisions fit within the scope of other things he desires—has been extensively criticized within normative ethics and moral psychology. Using a case in which a newly disabled man refuses additional medical care because he does not want to live as a disabled person, this chapter discusses the MVAD framework that physicians use to evaluate decisions about forgoing life-sustaining treatment for otherwise survivable complications of disability. This approach is more ethically robust than is usually appreciated. However, it can be strengthened by considering autonomy as a Kantian property of the will and not merely a property of individual decisions. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how to approach the newly disabled who are struggling to adjust to their perceived impairments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Giovanna Parmigiani ◽  
Antonio Del Casale ◽  
Gabriele Mandarelli ◽  
Benedetta Barchielli ◽  
Georgios D. Kotzalidis ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Objectives: To perform a meta-analysis of clinical studies on the differences in treatment or research decision-making capacity among patients with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and healthy comparisons (HCs). Design: A systematic search was conducted on Medline/Pubmed, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Scopus. Standardized mean differences and random-effects model were used in all cases. Setting: The United States, France, Japan, and China. Participants: Four hundred and ten patients with MCI, 149 with AD, and 368 HCs were included. Measurements: The studies we included in the analysis assessed decisional capacity to consent by the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MAcCAT-T), MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR), Capacity to Consent to Treatment Instrument (CCTI), and University of California Brief Assessment of Capacity to Consent (UBACC). Results: We identified 109 potentially eligible studies from 1672 records, and 7 papers were included in the meta-analysis. The meta-analysis showed that there was significant impairment in a decision-making capacity in MCI patients compared to the HCs group in terms of Understanding (SMD = −1.04, 95% CI: −1.31 to −0.77, P < 0.001; I2 = 52%, P = 0.07), Appreciation (SMD = −0.51, 95% CI: −0.66 to −0.36, P < 0.001; I2 = 0%, P = 0.97), and Reasoning (SMD = −0.62, 95% CI: −0.77, −0.47, P < 0.001; I2=0%, P =0.46). MCI patients scored significantly higher in Understanding (SMD = 1.50, 95% CI: 0.91, 2.09, P = 0.01, I2 = 78%, P = 0.00001) compared to patients affected by AD. Conclusions: Patients affected by MCI are at higher risk of impaired capacity to consent to treatment and research compared to HCs, despite being at lower risk compared to patients affected by AD. Clinicians and researchers need to carefully evaluate decisional capacity in MCI patients providing informed consent.


Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
Tom O'Shea

AbstractThis paper draws upon the civic republican tradition to offer new conceptual resources for the normative assessment of mental capacity law. The republican conception of liberty as non-domination is used to identify ways in which such laws generate arbitrary power that can underpin relationships of servility and insecurity. It also shows how non-domination provides a basis for critiquing legal tests of decision making that rely upon ‘diagnostic’ rather than ‘functional’ criteria. In response, two main civic republican strategies are recommended for securing freedom in the context of the legal regulation of psychological disability: self-authorisation techniques and participatory shaping of power. The result is a series of proposals for the reform of decisional capacity law, including a transition towards purely functional assessment of decisional capacity, surer legal footing for advanced care planning, and greater control over the design and administration of decision making capacity laws by those with psychological disabilities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Elissa Kolva ◽  
Barry Rosenfeld ◽  
Rebecca M Saracino

Abstract Objective The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to identify the neuropsychological underpinnings of decision-making capacity in terminally ill patients with advanced cancer. Method Participants were 108 English-speaking adults. More than half (n = 58) of participants had a diagnosis of advanced cancer and were receiving inpatient palliative care; the rest were healthy adults. Participants completed a measure of decision-making capacity that assesses four legal standards of capacity (Choice, Understanding, Appreciation, and Reasoning), and several measures of neuropsychological functioning. Results Patients with terminal cancer were significantly more impaired on measures of capacity and neuropsychological functioning. Surprisingly, in the terminally ill sample, there were no significant correlations between neuropsychological functioning and decision-making capacity. Conclusion The terminally ill sample exhibited high levels of neuropsychological impairment across multiple cognitive domains. However, few of the measures of neuropsychological functioning were significantly associated with performance on the decisional capacity subscales in the terminally ill sample. It is possible that end-of-life decisional capacity is governed by general, rather than domain-specific, cognitive abilities.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-145
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Patterson

Decision-making capacity is a fundamental consideration in working with patients in a clinical setting. One of the most common conditions affecting decision-making capacity in patients in the inpatient or long-term care setting is a form of acute, transient cognitive change known as delirium. A thorough understanding of delirium — how it can present, its predisposing and precipitating factors, and how it can be managed — will improve a speech-language pathologist's (SLPs) ability to make treatment recommendations, and to advise the treatment team on issues related to communication and patient autonomy.


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