scholarly journals Belief, Rational and Justified

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weston Siscoe

Abstract It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justification and as to their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justification of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justification come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justified beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that ‘justified belief’ and ‘rational belief’ are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that Cohen’s argument is spurious. I will show that ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ occupy two distinct semantic categories—‘rational’ is an absolute gradable adjective and ‘justified’ is a relative gradable adjective—telling against the thought that ‘rational belief’ and ‘justified belief’ are synonymous. I will then argue that the burden of proof is on those who would equate rationality and justification, making the case that those who hold this prominent position face the difficulty of explaining how rationality and justification come to the same thing even though ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ are not synonymous.

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank W. Bond ◽  
Windy Dryden

Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.


Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Eyal Tal

ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic akrasia.


Author(s):  
Daniel Greco

How should we form beliefs concerning global climate change? For most of us, directly evaluating the evidence isn’t feasible; we lack expertise. So, any rational beliefs we form will have to be based in part on deference to those who have it. But in this domain, questions about how to identify experts can be fraught. This chapter discusses a partial answer to the question of how we in fact identify experts: Dan Kahan’s cultural cognition thesis, according to which we treat experts on factual questions of political import only insofar as they share our moral and cultural values. The chapter then poses some normative questions about cultural cognition: is it a species of irrationality that must be overcome if we are to communicate scientific results effectively, or is it instead an inescapable part of rational belief management? Ultimately, it is argued that cultural cognition is substantively unreasonable, though not formally irrational.


Author(s):  
Richard Foley

This chapter sketches a reorientation of epistemology. It first briefly reviews some relevant history in modern epistemology. The chapter then discusses the benefits of a separation of justified belief and knowledge, arguing that, among other things, both have very different initial foci, and as such the working presupposition should be that the theories are distinct. Separate and equal, as it were. It then proceeds to develop an approach to justified and rational belief that comfortably places them within a general theory of rationality, thus connecting them not only with the concept of rational actions, plans, and strategies but also with our everyday assessments of each other's opinions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 1440003
Author(s):  
ELIAS TSAKAS

In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel probability measures that assign a rational probability to every Borel event. Then, he constructed the corresponding Harsanyi type space model that represents the rational belief hierarchies. As he showed, there are rational types that are associated with a non-rational probability measure over the product of the underlying space of uncertainty and the opponent's types. In this paper, we define the universally rational belief hierarchies, as those that do not exhibit this property. Then, we characterize them in terms of a natural restriction imposed directly on the belief hierarchies.


Author(s):  
Richard Foley

This chapter details the core concepts of this reoriented epistemology. These are true belief and epistemically rational belief. Knowledge and justified belief are derivative concepts explicated in terms of these core concepts together with human goals, needs, and values, which explains why the standards of both knowledge and justified belief become more demanding as the stakes go up. In the case of knowledge there cannot be important truths of which one is unaware, and in the case of justified belief the level of effort one expends in gathering evidence and deliberating should be commensurate with what it is epistemically rational to believe about the importance of the matter at hand.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Moldovan ◽  
P. Ferre ◽  
M. Guasch ◽  
R. Sanchez-Casas

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