China’s Global Governance Interactions

2020 ◽  
pp. 156-180
Author(s):  
Katherine Morton

In recent years the Chinese approach toward global governance has shifted beyond a traditional defensive stance and toward more active engagement. This new alignment in Chinese foreign policy suggests a growing confidence on the part of the CCP leadership in China’s domestic governing arrangements as well as its capacity to lead by example in international affairs. New shifts in Chinese discourses, diplomacy, and responses to key global challenges seem to reflect a new global leadership ambition on the part of the Xi Jinping administration. China’s deepening engagement in global governance is a reflection of its rising power and international status as well as a long-standing aspiration to contribute toward the making of international order on its own terms.

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 160-167
Author(s):  
Artyom Rinchinov

Amid the escalating disagreements in US-China relations, which became the main theme of the global foreign policy agenda in 2010s, the contours of the new policy of Chinese Foreign Ministry have been showing more and more clearly. Traditionally, the narrative of Western analysts has described this policy as a well-thought-out scheme designed by Beijing to take over the global leadership, linked directly to the figure of the Communist Party of China Chairman, Xi Jinping. The purpose of this article is to examine the origins and milestones of the current Chinese foreign policy doctrine. Having analyzed them, the author came to the conclusion that the PRC’s behaviour in international politics is largely reactive. During the Republican administrations in the U.S. it was China that was the main advocate of the idea of «global peace» and was forced to undertake fundamentally new international commitments.


Author(s):  
Anthony Petros Spanakos

US-Venezuelan relations display both confrontation and cooperation. Chinese relations with Venezuela are a most likely case for rebellion against the global governance system over which the US presides. This chapter makes a structuralist argument, arguing that the way that the three countries are positioned within global and regional governance structures conditions the underlying character of their relations with each other. Simply put, the US, China, and Venezuela have very different interests and capabilities and their structural positions in South America explain why the increased Chinese presence in Venezuela is neither a threat to the US nor does it substantially aid Venezuelan intentions toward multi-polarizing the region or world. To make this argument, the chapter assumes that US foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as regional hegemon, Chinese foreign policy toward Venezuela is informed by its position as an extra-regional commercial state, and Venezuelan foreign policy toward both is informed by its position as a petrostate.


Author(s):  
Courtney J. Fung

Abstract A fundamental question facing global governance today is whether the UN peacekeeping regime can function with enough skilled troops to execute increasingly demanding and complicated mandates. The People’s Republic of China is informally thought of as a potential lead troop-contributing country. China typically deploys non-combat enabler troops, and recently began deploying combat troops, which may have to engage in live fire to defend the mandate. The risks and costs associated with dispatching combat troops challenge the benefits that China derives from supporting peacekeeping. I first establish China’s feedback mechanisms to facilitate simple and complex learning against China’s peacekeeping trajectory and motivations for participation. I then address the implications of China’s combat troop deployment, focusing on the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali and the UN Mission in South Sudan. The article draws insights from interviews with Chinese foreign policy elites and UN officials, and participant observation at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (01) ◽  
pp. 2040004
Author(s):  
DREW THOMPSON

Xi Jinping’s rise to power has heralded a new foreign policy that is more assertive and uncompromising toward China’s neighbors, the United States, and the rest of the world. This change presents challenges for the United States and Taiwan in particular which must be addressed with a sense of urgency due to Xi Jinping’s ambitious objectives and his firm grip on the levers of power which increase the likelihood that the Communist Party and government of China will seek to achieve them without delay. This paper reviews changes to Chinese foreign policy in the Xi Jinping era and argues how the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over time has increased the threat to Taiwan, with concurrent risks for the United States. Taiwan and the US can address the challenge presented by China by strengthening their relationship to adapt to the new era under Xi Jinping’s leadership. According to CIA (2018), China’s economy now stands at approximately US$12 trillion, second only to the United States (CIA [2018]. World fact book). Unlike in 1978, China’s economy today is dependent on access to globally sourced raw materials, and access to overseas consumer markets for its industrial and consumer goods. This dependency on overseas markets has increased China’s global presence and interests, driving the need to protect them. The Chinese Government’s now ample resources have been allocated to both hard and soft power means toward this purpose. The PLA has greatly benefitted from economic development and the expansion of the Chinese economy, transforming from a backward institution focused on private-sector moneymaking into the sharpest tool of China’s power and influence. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s foreign policy and strategy have undergone a dramatic shift away from Deng Xiaoping’s focus on increasing domestic productivity and avoiding potentially costly overseas entanglements. The confluence of accumulated national wealth, diplomatic, economic, and military power, and the will to use those levers of power, has dramatic implications for the United States and China’s neighbors. A more assertive China, confident in its wealth, power, and international status, is increasingly unafraid of overt competition with its neighbors and the United States, unwilling to back down or compromise in the face of disputes. This dynamic has resulted in a new paradigm in the Indo-Pacific region that is unlike previous challenges of the past 40 years. The shift in China’s foreign policy and the PLA’s modernization threaten to challenge the credibility of US security assurances and alliances in the region, making the cultivation and strengthening of the US–Taiwan relationship, and the network of US bilateral alliances in the region an urgent imperative.


2004 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 1095-1097
Author(s):  
Patrick Belton

Suisheng Zhao has assembled this volume from articles recently published in the Journal of Contemporary China, which he edits. Its chapters cover recognizable terrain for political scientists: whether China, as a rising power, will seek to maximize its relative or absolute gains; the likelihood its increasing power will tend towards status-quo or belligerent lines; and the degree of Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ when compared with other countries. As the subtitle might suggest, the contributions present China in a favourable light, stressing how China's leaders have spurned ideological purism for the pragmatic weighing of national interests, with only nationalism to serve as a double-edged sword by conferring legitimacy on the government, but potentially also taking it away. The assertion that strategic calculations govern Chinese foreign policy contrasts with other interpretations, such as those of David Lampton in Same Bed, Different Dreams, who assigns a large role to domestic politics, or Peter Gries in Understanding Chinese Nationalism, who highlights the constraining role of nationalist ideology on the ability of China's leaders to de-escalate crises with other countries. Zhao's contribution lies less in defending the assertion of pragmatism against those competing perspectives and more in drawing upon it in offering fresh material.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 105-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm Cook

Rapid changes in power relativities inevitably aggravate security fears among smaller, weaker states and those in relative decline. The closer these states are to the major power and the deeper their historical relationships with it, the more this is true. It is preponderant on rising or remerging major powers to assuage these worries in word and action. If not, the rising or reemerging power will face resistance. Under Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign policy has embraced China's status as the leading power in East Asia and one of two major powers globally. Acceptance and support for China's new major power status and corresponding regional initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and a "new Asian security order" face three particular challenges in East Asia. The first challenge is increasingly public concerns about possible future Chinese hegemony with the East and South China Sea disputes, in particular aggravating these worries among the non-Chinese disputants. The second challenge is the disruption of the liberal virtuous cycle between growing economic interdependence and more aligned strategic interests and greater strategic trust. The third is the strengthening of alliance and security partnerships between the United States and a growing number of East Asian states from Vietnam and Singapore to the Philippines and Japan. Chinese foreign policy under and after Xi Jinping will have to respond to these concerns and reassure its East Asian neighbours in order to succeed.


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