The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the United States and Taiwan

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (01) ◽  
pp. 2040004
Author(s):  
DREW THOMPSON

Xi Jinping’s rise to power has heralded a new foreign policy that is more assertive and uncompromising toward China’s neighbors, the United States, and the rest of the world. This change presents challenges for the United States and Taiwan in particular which must be addressed with a sense of urgency due to Xi Jinping’s ambitious objectives and his firm grip on the levers of power which increase the likelihood that the Communist Party and government of China will seek to achieve them without delay. This paper reviews changes to Chinese foreign policy in the Xi Jinping era and argues how the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over time has increased the threat to Taiwan, with concurrent risks for the United States. Taiwan and the US can address the challenge presented by China by strengthening their relationship to adapt to the new era under Xi Jinping’s leadership. According to CIA (2018), China’s economy now stands at approximately US$12 trillion, second only to the United States (CIA [2018]. World fact book). Unlike in 1978, China’s economy today is dependent on access to globally sourced raw materials, and access to overseas consumer markets for its industrial and consumer goods. This dependency on overseas markets has increased China’s global presence and interests, driving the need to protect them. The Chinese Government’s now ample resources have been allocated to both hard and soft power means toward this purpose. The PLA has greatly benefitted from economic development and the expansion of the Chinese economy, transforming from a backward institution focused on private-sector moneymaking into the sharpest tool of China’s power and influence. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s foreign policy and strategy have undergone a dramatic shift away from Deng Xiaoping’s focus on increasing domestic productivity and avoiding potentially costly overseas entanglements. The confluence of accumulated national wealth, diplomatic, economic, and military power, and the will to use those levers of power, has dramatic implications for the United States and China’s neighbors. A more assertive China, confident in its wealth, power, and international status, is increasingly unafraid of overt competition with its neighbors and the United States, unwilling to back down or compromise in the face of disputes. This dynamic has resulted in a new paradigm in the Indo-Pacific region that is unlike previous challenges of the past 40 years. The shift in China’s foreign policy and the PLA’s modernization threaten to challenge the credibility of US security assurances and alliances in the region, making the cultivation and strengthening of the US–Taiwan relationship, and the network of US bilateral alliances in the region an urgent imperative.

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Lidya Christin Sinaga

This essay examines the impact of the assertiveness of China’s Foreign Policy in the South China Sea under Xi Jinping on United States and Australian foreign policy. The essay focuses on the  Xi Jinping period from 2013 because Xi has a different approach in foreign policy making from that of his predecessors. His determination to defend and advance maritime claims and interests as well as the external developments, have made his foreign policy  more assertive. This essay will argue that China’s assertive foreign policy in South China Sea under Xi Jinping has paved the way for a greater role for the US in Southeast Asia, and deepened the rivalry between China and the US. This rising tension in turn has put Australia in a challenging situation, torn between its security alliance with the United States, and its economic interests in  China. However, Australia does not have to choose one, but Australia can play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the two.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Winger

Abstract In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.


Author(s):  
Natalia B. Pomozova ◽  

The complex development of China and its transformation into a superpower arouses the US fears, what results in the trade and economic wars between the two countries, as well as in a discursive confrontation. As the conflict between the United States and China escalates, the struggle will intensify not only for markets, but also for the hearts and minds of Europeans (in this article, in particular, Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy are considered). Reflection on Beijing’s behavior in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic will become one of the important sociological factors that will affect the attitude of European citizens towards China, what, in turn, will have a significant impact on the implementation of the PRC’s foreign policy strategy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-795
Author(s):  
Claude Cadart

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.


Author(s):  
D. V. Dorofeev

The research is devoted to the study of the origin of the historiography of the topic of the genesis of the US foreign policy. The key thesis of the work challenges the established position in the scientific literature about the fundamental role of the work of T. Lyman, Jr. «The diplomacy of the United States: being an account of the foreign relations of the country, from the first treaty with France, in 1778, to the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, with Great Britain», published in 1826. The article puts forward an alternative hypothesis: the emergence of the historiography of the genesis of the foreign policy of the United States occurred before the beginning of the second quarter of the XIX century – during the colonial period and the first fifty years of the North American state. A study of the works of thirty-five authors who worked during the 1610s and 1820s showed that amater historians expressed a common opinion about North America’s belonging to the Eurocentric system of international relations; they were sure that both the colonists and the founding fathers perceived international processes on the basis of raison d’être. The conceptualization of the intellectual heritage of non-professional historians allowed us to distinguish three interpretations of the origin of the United States foreign policy: «Autochthonous» – focused on purely North American reasons; «Atlantic» – postulated the borrowing of European practice of international relations by means of the system of relations that developed in the Atlantic in the XVII–XVIII centuries; «Imperial» – stated the adaptation of the British experience. The obtained data refute the provisions of scientific thought of the XX–XXI centuries and create new guidelines for further study of the topic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 11-21
Author(s):  
Matthew Dotzler

The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is once again reaching a boiling point. Following the defeat of ISIL in northern Iraq and Syria, Turkey is now concerned that the returning Kurdish militias pose a threat to its national security. The United States, as an ally to both parties, finds itself in a unique position to push for diplomatic solutions and to mediate the conflict before it grows out of control once again. This paper will examine the history of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the actors involved, and how US foreign policy can be used to try and deter yet another war in the region.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-81
Author(s):  
E. V. Kryzhko ◽  
P. I. Pashkovsky

The article examines the features of the US foreign policy towards the Central Asian states in the post-bipolar period. The imperatives and constants, as well as the transformation of Washington’s Central Asian policy, have been characterized. It is shown that five Central Asian states have been in the focus of American foreign policy over the past thirty years. In the process of shaping the US foreign policy in Central Asia, the presence of significant reserves of energy and mineral resources in the region was of great importance. Therefore, rivalry for Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes came to the fore. In addition to diversifying transport and logistics flows and supporting American companies, the US energy policy in Central Asia was aimed at preventing the restoration of Russia’s economic and political influence, as well as countering the penetration of China, which is interested in economic cooperation with the countries of the region. During the period under review, the following transformation of mechanisms and means of Washington’s policy in the Central Asian direction was observed: the policy of “exporting democracy”; attempts to “nurture” the pro-American elite; striving to divide states into separate groups with permanent “appointment” of leaders; involvement in a unified military system to combat terrorism; impact on the consciousness of the population in order to destabilize geopolitical rivals; building cooperation on a pragmatic basis due to internal difficulties and external constraints. Central Asian states sympathized with the American course because of their interest in technology and investment. At the same time, these states in every possible way distanced themselves from the impulses of “democratization” from Washington. Kazakhstan was a permanent regional ally of the United States, to which Uzbekistan was striving to join. The second echelon in relations with the American side was occupied by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. A feature of the positions of the Central Asian countries is the maximum benefit from cooperation with Washington while building good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, which is in dissonance with the regional imperatives of the United States. In the future, the American strategy in Central Asia will presumably proceed from the expediency of attracting regional allies and stimulating contradictions in order to contain geopolitical rivals in the region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.


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