Composing the Nation

2020 ◽  
pp. 215-240
Author(s):  
Keith Howard

In North Korea, with songs fundamental to ideology and central to cultural production, composers face challenges. How can large-scale pieces for instrumental ensembles and orchestras be composed? This chapter begins by discussing how composition activity developed in North Korea, initially with Japanese and then Soviet influence. It considers key early compositions that are no longer acceptable for performance in North Korea. It then shows how early, Japanese-colonial-era popular song structures were upscaled to create symphonic poems, and, from these, how combining the songs and interpretations of the dramatic action of revolutionary operas allowed these to be upscaled into symphonic works. The focus then shifts to the avant-garde composer Isang Yun (1917–1995), who was the best-known Korean composer of the twentieth century in international circles. Yun, after being forced to return to South Korea from Germany and being tried for sedition, was latterly celebrated in North Korea, and his story became the subject of four feature-length films made in Pyongyang. The chapter analyzes three of his most political works to explain why, despite his celebrity, his musical style was never fully acceptable to North Korea, and how he failed to fully embrace the socialist realism frame that North Korean ideology required.

2020 ◽  
pp. 225-251
Author(s):  
Ernest Ming-Tak Leung

This article explores a commonly ignored aspect of Japan–North Korean relations: the Japanese factor in the making of Korean socialism. Korea was indirectly influenced by the Japanese Jiyuminken Movement, in the 1910s–1920s serving as a stepping-stone for the creation of a Japanese Communist Party. Wartime mobilization policies under Japanese rule were continued and expanded beyond the colonial era. The Juche ideology built on tendencies first exhibited in the 1942 Overcoming Modernity Conference in Japan, and in the 1970s some Japanese leftists viewed Juche as a humanist Marxism. Trade between Japan and North Korea expanded from 1961 onwards, culminating in North Korea’s default in 1976, from which point on relations soured between the two countries. Yet leaders with direct experience of colonial rule governed North Korea through to the late 1990s.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Andrew Jackson

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.


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