Humor as Philosophical Subversion

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-226
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Major Function ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Recent Philosophy

Positive philosophical projects and humor do not generally go together. When humor is used, it is often to draw attention to where one might go wrong: someone or something is made fun of. This point is first illustrated with cases in Aristotle. But if this is a major function of humor in philosophy, it offers special opportunities to those whose entire approach to philosophy is critical rather than constructive—those who are suspicious of the whole project of philosophy. This chapter examines a number of instances of this subversive form of humor in philosophy. For the reason just stated, it concentrates on the ancient Greek skeptics, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, with a particular focus on Sextus Empiricus, the only Greek skeptic of whom we have complete works. But Stoics and Epicureans (and, in passing, Plato) also receive some attention, and there are occasional comparisons with examples in more recent philosophy (Nietzsche and Gettier).

Scepticism, Renaissance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Popkin
Keyword(s):  
Fifteenth Century ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Strong Recommendation ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Weak Recommendation ◽  
Knowledge Claims

Ancient Greek scepticism was revived during the Renaissance, and played an important role in the religious and philosophical controversies of the time. There is little evidence that ancient scepticism was known directly during the Middle Ages, or that its perplexing questions played any significant role in medieval thought. It was indirectly known from the writings of Augustine; some manuscripts of the texts of Cicero and Sextus Empiricus were available; and occasionally vague reference to some sceptical details appears in medieval discussions. However, the interests of scholastic philosophers were, by and large, far removed from the questions about the sources, reliability and certainty of knowledge claims that concerned the ancient sceptics. With the humanistic revival of interest in ancient literature there came a rediscovery of scepticism as presented in the writings of Cicero, Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. Cicero’s Academics (Academica) was read from the fourteenth century on; Life of Pyrrho by Diogenes Laertius was rediscovered in the early fifteenth century; and Greek manuscripts of the writings of Sextus were brought from Constantinople into Italy in the mid-fifteenth century. These treasuries of sceptical argumentation were used in many ways in the Renaissance. At first they were seen largely as sources of information about the ancient world, but gradually more attention was paid to the actual arguments they contained. Some saw these arguments as a basis for rejecting Aristotelian philosophy, as well as other ancient dogmatic claims about nature and humanity. Others used them as ammunition in the great religious controversies between Catholics and Protestants. A full-fledged scepticism about knowledge claims was developed in the second part of the sixteenth century, through the work of Sanches and Montaigne. Montaigne was particularly inspired by the first published Latin translations of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Scepticism in all its forms was closely associated with fideism. If it is impossible to acquire knowledge of anything through the senses and reason, then it is impossible to acquire knowledge of God in these ways, and one can argue that religious truth must be accepted on the basis of faith in divine revelation. The weak recommendation of ancient sceptics to suspend belief while accepting local customs as the guide for conduct was thus turned into a strong recommendation to adopt Christian beliefs. Only later did epistemological scepticism become associated with scepticism about religious beliefs themselves. Renaissance scepticism in its various guises was a major intellectual force in the transition from scholasticism to modern thought.

On Pyrrhonism, Stances, and Believing What You Want

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 126-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
Main Question ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Ancient Greek Philosophy ◽  
Epistemic Stances

The paper considers the relations between the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus and epistemological voluntarism, as applied both to epistemic stances and to individual beliefs. In the first part, the main question is whether ancient skepticism is congenial to the idea of alternative epistemic stances (and hence, potentially, to voluntarism about them). The answer proposed is that skepticism does not in fact recognize this possibility. However, this is not due to any essential features of skepticism itself; rather, it is because, like ancient Greek philosophy in general, the stance skepticism in fact unquestioningly assumes is that of realism. In the second part, the focus is more directly on voluntarism and its compatibility with skepticism. The difficulty with bringing these two together, it is argued, is that, while voluntarism gives one license to hold either of two opposing beliefs, skepticism is in the business of subverting beliefs; in this respect their orientations are in opposite directions. A closing suggestion is that if there is any place where ancient skepticism and voluntarism might meet, it is not in the Pyrrhonist tradition, but in the mitigated skepticism of the late Academy, which allowed the holding of (albeit tentative) beliefs.

Sextus Empiricus

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
Physical World ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Cause And Effect ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Advanced Students ◽  
Motion Time ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Sextus Empiricus' Against the Physicists examines numerous topics central to ancient Greek inquiries into the nature of the physical world, covering subjects such as god, cause and effect, whole and part, bodies, place, motion, time, number, coming into being and perishing and is the most extensive surviving treatment of these topics by an ancient Greek sceptic. Sextus scrutinizes the theories of non-sceptical thinkers and generates suspension of judgement through the assembly of equally powerful opposing arguments. Richard Bett's edition provides crucial background information about the text and elucidation of difficult passages. His accurate and readable translation is supported by substantial interpretative aids, including a glossary and a list of parallel passages relating Against the Physicists to other works by Sextus. This is an indispensable edition for advanced students and scholars studying this important work by an influential philosopher.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document