Constitutional Limitations

Author(s):  
Scott Burris ◽  
Micah L. Berman ◽  
Matthew Penn, and ◽  
Tara Ramanathan Holiday

This chapter describes “due process,” a Constitutional restriction on governmental actions that impact individuals, in the context of public health. It outlines the doctrines of procedural and substantive due process, including the legal tests that courts apply to decide whether individuals’ due process rights have been violated. It uses examples from Supreme Court cases that have defined due process in the context of public health, including those that struggle to define the scope of reproductive rights. It also examines two cases where public health principles were raised as a justification for governmental action: one about involuntary sterilization and one about Ebola. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the “state action doctrine” that defines which public health actors may be challenged on due process grounds.

Author(s):  
Eileen P. Ryan ◽  
Elizabeth Ford

Chapter 13 includes three cases that have each shaped the way adolescents are treated in the justice system. In re Gault was a critical case in establishing due process rights for adolescents who have been charged with a juvenile offense. Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama are recent Supreme Court cases that have defined the limits of punishment, specifically limiting life without parole, for adolescents charged in the adult system.


Author(s):  
Eileen P. Ryan ◽  
Elizabeth Ford

Chapter 13 includes three cases that have shaped the way adolescents are treated in the justice system. In re Gault was a critical case in establishing due process rights for adolescents who have been charged with a juvenile offense. Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama are recent Supreme Court cases that have defined the limits of punishment, specifically limiting life without parole, for adolescents charged in the adult system.


2019 ◽  
pp. 223-258
Author(s):  
Benjamin S. Yost

The final chapter illuminates the book’s most significant implications. It first highlights the project’s improvements on extant versions of proceduralism. Targeting both legal and philosophical proceduralist critiques, it recounts how they fall prey to the retributivist challenge and unwittingly entail wholesale abolition. The procedural abolitionism developed here, it turns out, has no such shortcomings. The second part of the chapter assesses the book’s contributions to the constitutional debate over capital punishment, analyzing Judge Rakoff’s opinion in United States v. Quinones. Rakoff holds that the specter of irrevocable mistake renders capital punishment unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds; this ruling suggests that substantive due process furnishes the vehicle by which proceduralism could make inroads with a future Supreme Court. However, Quinones was overturned, mainly because its emphasis on error correction conflicts with the hallowed value of finality. Chapter 5 argues that the associated concerns do not generate reasons to reject abolitionism.


1986 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 384-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth A. Luckasson

The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson indicated substantial restrictions on the ability of students and their families to recover legal expenses incurred in pursuing their due process rights under the Education of the Handicapped Act. The Act's reliance on private enforcement by parents coupled with the difficulties inherent in attempting to pursue administrative and legal remedies without legal training suggest that Congress intended that reimbursement of attorneys' fees be available.


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