The Prospects of the New Proceduralism

2019 ◽  
pp. 223-258
Author(s):  
Benjamin S. Yost
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Error Correction ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Substantive Due Process

The final chapter illuminates the book’s most significant implications. It first highlights the project’s improvements on extant versions of proceduralism. Targeting both legal and philosophical proceduralist critiques, it recounts how they fall prey to the retributivist challenge and unwittingly entail wholesale abolition. The procedural abolitionism developed here, it turns out, has no such shortcomings. The second part of the chapter assesses the book’s contributions to the constitutional debate over capital punishment, analyzing Judge Rakoff’s opinion in United States v. Quinones. Rakoff holds that the specter of irrevocable mistake renders capital punishment unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds; this ruling suggests that substantive due process furnishes the vehicle by which proceduralism could make inroads with a future Supreme Court. However, Quinones was overturned, mainly because its emphasis on error correction conflicts with the hallowed value of finality. Chapter 5 argues that the associated concerns do not generate reasons to reject abolitionism.

Constitutional Limitations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Burris ◽  
Micah L. Berman ◽  
Matthew Penn, and ◽  
Tara Ramanathan Holiday
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Reproductive Rights ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Health It ◽  
State Action ◽  
Substantive Due Process ◽  
State Action Doctrine ◽  
Due Process Rights

This chapter describes “due process,” a Constitutional restriction on governmental actions that impact individuals, in the context of public health. It outlines the doctrines of procedural and substantive due process, including the legal tests that courts apply to decide whether individuals’ due process rights have been violated. It uses examples from Supreme Court cases that have defined due process in the context of public health, including those that struggle to define the scope of reproductive rights. It also examines two cases where public health principles were raised as a justification for governmental action: one about involuntary sterilization and one about Ebola. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the “state action doctrine” that defines which public health actors may be challenged on due process grounds.

Punishment Legalized: Protest Against Corporal Punishment in Schools

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-293
Author(s):  
Hania W. Ris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
School Children ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
School Official

An unexpected and repressive decision affecting school-children was reached in October 1975 by the United States Supreme Court. It allows the states, if they so choose, to permit teachers to spank students as long as due process is maintained. This implies that other means for control of misbehavior have to be used first, that the student must be informed in advance about the nature of misbehavior which warrants spanking, and that another school official must be present at the time of spanking.

Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists

1983 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phoebe C. Ellsworth ◽  
Lee Ross
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Response Rate ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Self Image ◽  
Legal Implications

A survey designed to examine the attitudinal and informational bases of people's opinions about the death penalty was administered to 500 Northern California residents (response rate = 96 percent). Of these, 58.8 percent were proponents of capital punishment, 30.8 percent were opponents, and 10.4 percent were undecided. When asked whether they favored mandatory, discretionary, or no death penalty for various crimes, respondents tended to treat these options as points on a scale of strength of belief, with mandatory penalties favored for the most serious crimes, rather than considering the questions of objectivity and fairness that have influenced the United States Supreme Court's considerations of these options. For no crime did a majority favor execution of all those convicted, even when a mandatory penalty was endorsed. Respondents were generally ignorant on factual issues related to the death penalty, and indicated that if their factual beliefs (in deterrence) were incorrect, their attitude would not be influenced. When asked about their reasons for favoring or opposing the death penalty, respondents tended to endorse all reasons consistent with their attitudes, indicating that the attitude does not stem from a set of reasoned beliefs, but may be an undifferenti ated, emotional reflection of one's ideological self-image. Opponents favored due process guarantees more than did Proponents. A majority of respondents said they would need more evidence to convict if a case was capital. Theoretical and legal implications of the results are discussed.

The U.S. Supreme Court: Garcia V. Texas

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
David P. Stewart
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vienna Convention ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Icj ◽  
The U.S

On July 7, 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of Humberto Leal García, a Mexican national who had been convicted some sixteen years ago in Texas of murder.1 Relying on the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘‘ICJ’’) in the Avena case,2 García contended that the United States had violated his right to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘‘Consular Convention’’).3 He sought the stay so that the U.S. Congress could consider enactment of proposed legislation to implement the ICJ decision.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected his argument, stating that ‘‘[t]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.’’5 García was executed by lethal injection that evening.

scholarly journals New Methods in Due-Process Cases

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-250
Author(s):  
Albert M. Kales
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Governments ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Fundamental Requirement

In addressing the court in due-process cases one should not commence with the usual salutation “May it please the Court.” Instead, one should say “My Lords.” Backed by and charged with the enforcement of the due-process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the Supreme Court of the United States is the American substitute for the British house of lords. It constitutes the real and only conservative second chamber of the federal government. It is a second conservative chamber for each of the state governments.The time has come when the political scientists of the country should recognize, in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court under the due-process clause, the functioning of a second chamber, organized to defeat the popular will as expressed in legislation when that will appears to endanger what the court may regard as a fundamental requirement of the social structure itself.Like all conservative second chambers, the Supreme Court and the due-process clause are in a hopeless dilemma. If the popular will were frustrated as often as the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice McReynolds indicate that it should be, the second chamber function of the court would be assailed by the recall of judicial decisions. If the court bowed to the popular will as often as the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes indicate that it should, the second chamber function of the court would cease to be exercised.

scholarly journals Measures Necessary to Ensure: The ICJ's Provisional Measures Order in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT D. SLOANE
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Institutional Legitimacy ◽  
Binding Effect ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Icj

This article analyzes the provisional measures order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ after its decision in LaGrand holding that such orders have binding effect. After reviewing the background to Mexico's action, the article focuses on Avena's place in the Court's provisional measures jurisprudence, its international legal significance, its potential effects, if any, on the ICJ's perceived institutional legitimacy and authority, and its legal and political consequences for the United States. In particular, the article examines the domestic legal implications of the Court's order for the United States in the context of developing international norms on capital punishment and the due process standards governing its implementation in states that continue to practise it.

scholarly journals Revisiting Death's Difference: The Philosophical Anthropology of the U.S. Death Penalty and the Impossibility of Capital Due Process

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-208
Author(s):  
G.P. Marcar
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Eighth Amendment ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWithin the United States, legal challenges to the death penalty have held it to be a “cruel and unusual” punishment (contrary to the Eighth Amendment) or arbitrarily and unfairly enacted (contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Eighth Amendment requires that punishments not be disproportionate or purposeless. In recent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a piecemeal approach to this matter. In regard to particular classes of defendant, the Court has sought to rule on whether death is likely to be a proportional and purposeful punishment, as well as whether—given the condition of these defendants—such a determination can be reliably and accurately gauged. This article will suggest a different approach. Instead of asking whether, given the nature of certain categories of human defendant, the death penalty is constitutional in their case, I will begin by asking what—given the nature of the U.S. death penalty—one must believe about human beings for death to be a proportionate punishment. From this, I will argue that to believe that these penal goals are capable of fulfilment by the death penalty entails commitment to an empirically unconfirmable philosophical anthropology. On this basis, it will be further argued that the beliefs required for the U.S. death penalty's proportional and purposeful instigation (pursuant to the Eighth Amendment) are not congruent with the demands of legal due process.

scholarly journals Litigating in the Shadow of Innocence

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Marshall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Justice System ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court

In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States, allowing optimism to trump experience, accepted various states’ assurances that new death penalty procedures the states had then recently adopted would avoid the vices that had led the Court to strike down the death penalty in 1972. Now, some thirty years later, a body of evidence has developed demonstrating that this experiment has failed—that the problems of arbitrariness, racism and propensity to error are endemic to the criminal justice system (particularly with regard to capital punishment) and cannot be cured by what Justice Blackmun called “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death.” Despite the Court’s best intentions, the death penalty procedures of the 1980s and 1990s and the first half of this decade reflect little if any significant improvement over the condemned pre-1972 systems.

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