From the Company Town to the Innovation Zone: Frontiers of Public Policy, the State Action Doctrine, and the First Amendment

This article draws on the state action doctrine and the case Marsh v. Alabama to evaluate a recent proposal to create an unprecedented public-private partnership in the state of Nevada. In Marsh, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a private citizen was protected under the U.S. Constitution's First and Fourteenth Amendments in distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a “company-owned” town. We make the case that both the state policy under consideration and a number of political and economic trend lines indicate that the issue central to Marsh remains pressing at the start of our new millennium: what are the circumstances under which concentrated private power amounts to something akin to government authority, thereby implicating the protections of the national Constitution? Our goal in this piece is not to offer an exhaustive or thorough review of the particulars of the “Innovation Zone” bill under consideration, but to consider, in advance, constitutional problems that might arise from granting corporations broad powers traditionally wielded by governments.

What is Public? Big Questions Emerging from the Clash of Legal and Policy Paradigms

This article draws on three main sources to define the constitutional boundaries for outsourcing public goods and services in the age of new governance: (1) public administration research related to public–private distinctions; (2) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, federal policy on “inherently governmental” functions; and (3) the State Action Doctrine, the judiciary’s approach for distinguishing state actors from non-state actors for the purpose of redressing constitutional infringements. While these three sources have developed independently, approach the public–private debate from different vantage points, and allow significant ambiguities to remain, we contend that common ground can be leveraged theoretically to derive criteria to resolve many government outsourcing decisions in a way that is efficient and effective. Our main contribution is in providing first steps toward the development of a modern legal and administrative framework that aligns outsourcing theory and practice with the realities of new governance.

Constitutional Limitations

This chapter describes “due process,” a Constitutional restriction on governmental actions that impact individuals, in the context of public health. It outlines the doctrines of procedural and substantive due process, including the legal tests that courts apply to decide whether individuals’ due process rights have been violated. It uses examples from Supreme Court cases that have defined due process in the context of public health, including those that struggle to define the scope of reproductive rights. It also examines two cases where public health principles were raised as a justification for governmental action: one about involuntary sterilization and one about Ebola. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the “state action doctrine” that defines which public health actors may be challenged on due process grounds.

The American Constitution: First and Second Foundings

Officially, the U.S. Supreme Court hews to a strong state action requirement and rejects the idea that constitutional rights can shape what private parties owe each other. To highlight some of the peculiarities of the state action doctrine, this chapter begins with a detailed discussion of a modern case, Brooks v. Flagg Brothers. Then, to understand the doctrine’s origins, the chapter turns to history. This chapter illuminates the political logic of the state action requirement at the time when the Court first imposed it, in the late nineteenth century. The chapter also highlights more flexible approaches to conceptualizing rights in the American tradition that were closed off with the choice for a strong state action rule.

Things Invisible To See

This Article revisits the state action doctrine, a judicial invention that shields “private” or “non-governmental” discrimination from constitutional scrutiny. Traditionally, this doctrine has applied to discrimination even in places of public accommodation, like restaurants, hotels, and grocery stores. Born of overt racial discrimination, the doctrine has inflicted substantial injustice throughout its inglorious history, and courts have continuously struggled in vain to coherently apply the doctrine. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has not fully insulated “private” or “horizontal” relations among persons from constitutional scrutiny. The cases in which it has applied constitutional norms to non-governmental actors should be celebrated rather than shunned. This Article proposes reinterpreting the state action doctrine to mitigate its historical and contemporary harms. Ultimately, the Authors draw from property law theory to contend that the doctrine should be fundamentally reformed in favor of a more egalitarian conception of the state’s role in ensuring equal protection of law. The insights of property law theory lead the Authors to conclude that: (1) equal protection depends on law, not action; (2) common law is law and, whether it is coercive or permissive, it must comply with the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) common law that allows discriminatory exclusion from the marketplace violates the Equal Protection Clause. What matters, for the purposes of constitutional protection, is not “state action” but whether the law violates the norms of liberty, equality, and dignity recognized by free and democratic societies.