Equal Citizenship and Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley ◽  
Lori Watson
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Gendered Division Of Labor ◽  
Historical Sites ◽  
Equal Citizenship

This book is a defense of political liberalism as a feminist liberalism. The first half of the book develops and defends a novel interpretation of political liberalism. It is argued that political liberals should accept a restrictive account of public reason and that political liberals’ account of public justification is superior to the leading alternative, the convergence account of public justification. In the second half of the book, it is argued that political liberalism’s core commitments restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. Here it is demonstrated how public reason arguments can be used to support law and policy needed to address historical sites of women’s subordination to advance equality; prostitution, the gendered division of labor and marriage, in particular, are considered.

scholarly journals Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley ◽  
Lori Watson
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Recognition Respect ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Equal Citizenship

Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship.

Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Recognition Respect ◽  
The Social ◽  
Equal Citizenship

This chapter makes the case that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism. It is argued that political liberalism’s ideas of reciprocity and equal citizenship limit reasonable political conceptions of justice to only those that include principles that yield substantive equality for all, including women (and other marginalized groups). To this end, it is claimed that the criterion of reciprocity calls for (1) the eradication of social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to democratic deliberation among free and equal citizens and (2) the provision of the social conditions of recognition respect. As a result, the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship.

Integrity and the Case for Restraint

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Ideal ◽  
Democratic Societies

This chapter discusses the concern that exclusive accounts of public reason threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens in democratic societies. It discusses various notions of integrity that might be claimed to ground such a concern. It is argued that purely formal accounts of integrity that do not distinguish between the integrity of reasonable and unreasonable persons, as specified within political liberalism, cannot underwrite integrity challenges that should concern political liberals. It is further argued that if the inquiry is limited to conceptions of integrity that distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons, the supposed burdens persons of faith face are not burdens different from those that all citizens face equally. It is claimed the concern is best understood as a challenge to the account of public justification and the account of public reason as a moral ideal.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

Autonomy in Transactions

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-183
Author(s):  
Thomas Gutmann
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Normative Foundations

Abstract The article presents a ‘critique from within’ of Peter Benson’s book ‘Justice in Transactions’, while sharing its premise that a theory of contract has to be liberal one. It identifies three problems with Benson’s answer to the question of how the relation between freedom and equality in contract law should be understood. It criticizes Benson’s Hegelian metaphysics and claims that a principle of mutual recognition and respect between juridical persons does not require that contracts only allow the alienation and appropriation of different things of the quantitatively same value. It demonstrates that Rawls’s idea of a ‘division of labor’ within principles of justice is more plausible than Benson’s reformulated account, which loses sight of the premise that a liberal theory of contract must locate the normative foundations of ‘contract’ in individual rights, and, in addition, is at odds with Rawls’s project in ‘Political Liberalism’ and its concept of public justification.

A Feminist Defense of Political Liberalism

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 249-262
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley ◽  
Lori Watson
Keyword(s):  
Social Power ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Social Hierarchies ◽  
Internal Resources ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Subordination ◽  
Equal Citizenship

Some feminists claim that liberal theories lack the resources necessary for fully diagnosing and remedying the social subordination of persons as members of social groups. Part of the problem is that liberals focus too narrowly on the state as the locus of political power. However, equal citizenship is also affected by systems of power that operate in the background culture and that construct social hierarchies in which persons are subordinated as members of social groups. This chapter argues that political liberalism, properly understood, entails a commitment to substantive equality such that it has the internal resources to address the kinds of inequality produced by unjust forms of social power. Although some will claim that if the basic structure is the subject of justice, political liberalism will still fall short of securing gender justice, we explain why this worry is misplaced.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Special Concern ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
Democratic Societies

The introduction acknowledges that although liberalism promises equality for all citizens, liberal democratic societies fall short of this ideal in many ways. Of special concern is the inequality that members of socially subordinated groups endure despite the guarantee of formal equality. Liberal theorists have not yet adequately shown that liberalism can address such group based subordination and can secure substantive equality for all. The introduction explains that the aim of this book is to show that at least one version of liberalism—political liberalism—is a feminist liberalism and that the core commitments of this view restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. An overview of each chapter is provided.

Free Speech and the Duty of Civility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Legal Enforcement

This chapter critically examines which arguments for free speech may be consistent with Rawls’s political liberalism, in order to establish whether there are good reasons, within political liberalism, for rejecting the legal implementation of the duty of civility. Among the various arguments for freedom of speech, the chapter argues, only those from democracy and political legitimacy seem to justify Rawls’s opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. However, the chapter concludes, since Rawls’s own conception of political legitimacy is not merely procedural but grounded in the ideas of public justification and public reason, political liberalism is in principle consistent with some restrictions on free speech, including those which would result from the legal enforcement of the duty of civility.

Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew March
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Civil Union ◽  
Union Status ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Domestic Partnerships ◽  
The Right ◽  
Female Equality

AbstractThis paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy.

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