How Constitutional Rights Matter

Author(s):  
Adam Chilton ◽  
Mila Versteeg

How Constitutional Rights Matter explores whether constitutionalizing rights improves respect for those rights in practice. Drawing on global statistical analyses, case studies in Colombia, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and Tunisia, and survey experiments in Turkey and the United States, this book advances three claims. First, enshrining rights in constitutions does not automatically ensure that those rights will be respected in practice. For rights to matter, rights violations need to be politically costly, which can happen when citizens mobilize against governments that encroach upon their rights. Successfully resisting the government, however, is no small feat for unconnected groups of citizens, and governments can often get away with constitutional rights violations. Second, some rights are more likely to be enforced than others. The reason is that some rights come with natural constituencies that are able to mobilize for their enforcement. This is the case for rights that are practiced by and within organizations, or “organizational rights,” such as the rights to religious freedom, unionize, and form political parties. Because religious groups, trade unions, and political parties are highly organized, they are well equipped to use the constitution to resist rights violations. Indeed, we find that these organizational rights are systematically associated with better practices. By contrast, rights that are practiced on an individual basis, such as free speech or the prohibition of torture, usually lack constituencies to enforce them, which makes it easier for governments to violate them. Third, even highly organized groups armed with the constitution face an uphill battle. Although such groups may be able to successfully resist repressive practices, they often can only delay governments that are truly dedicated to rights repression.

Author(s):  
Adam S. Chilton ◽  
Mila Versteeg

This chapter presents findings from two survey experiments that explore popular support for individual rights: one focused on free speech in Turkey and one focused on torture in the United States. For both countries, we designed a survey experiment to gauge whether people’s support for a policy changes when they are informed that this policy violates the constitution, and whether people are willing to mobilize to protect their constitutional rights in the face of violations. The goal of the survey experiments was to explore the mechanisms through which rights mobilization can occur and, specifically, whether constitutional violations change people’s positions or motivate them to take action. Both experiments found that being informed that a certain policy violates the constitution does not change popular opinion, which might be one of the reasons why constitutional rights are hard to enforce in the absence of formal organizations.


Author(s):  
Cherian George

The United States has exceptionally strong Constitutional protections for free speech, but also for religious freedom. This chapter considers how this unique legal framework affects hate spin in the country. It finds that although hate speech can be expressed with a high degree of impunity, strong anti-discrimination laws limit the harms caused by such speech. Hate spin can, nonetheless, succeed in fostering fear and cultivating prejudice against minorities. The chapter examines how a network of anti-Muslim activists have used hate spin to campaign against mosque building, to oppose multi-cultural textbooks, and to introduce legislation protecting states from the fabricated threat of encroaching Muslim law. Beyond their stated goals, which may be frustrated by courts, these campaigns often have the symbolic purpose of spreading Islamophobia.


1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detlev F. Vagts

For 167 years the shadow of the Logan Act has fallen upon those Americans who trespass on the Federal monopoly of international negotiations which it creates. In theory, up to three years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine await those Americans who, without authority, communicate with a foreign government intending either (a) to influence that government with respect to a controversy with the United States or (b) to defeat the measures of the United States. Though only one indictment and no trial have taken place under the Act, who can tell when a new Administration, thinner skinned or harder pressed than its predecessors, may in its irritation call into play this sleeping giant? Now, at a time when domestic opposition to certain aspects of our foreign policy has reached a pitch unknown for many years, it would be well to reflect upon this curious product of the confluence of criminal law and foreign relations law before we are in fact confronted by a test of its strength. All could be the losers from an unpremeditated encounter—the defendant by finding himself, perhaps to his very great surprise, the first person subjected to the Act’s severe criminal penalties, the Government by finding itself stripped of its long accustomed protection by a ruling that the statute as it now reads is unconstitutionally vague or restrictive of free speech. Despite its long desuetude as a criminal statute, the Act represents a principle which I cannot help but think is, at its core, a salutary one; that America in sensitive dealings with other governments “speaks with one voice.” It embodies the concept of bipartisanship, that quarrels about foreign relations are fought out domestically and not with the adversary. It deters sometimes very ill-advised attempts to take the conduct of foreign affairs into foolish and unauthorized hands. On the other hand, it cuts into freedoms which we regard as having the highest value, and many of the situations in which its use has been suggested clearly involve no danger that would justify such a restraint.


1939 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-211
Author(s):  
F. A. Hermas

Political parties have been subjected to more vigorous criticism than any other institution of modern democracy. It is charged that their divisions split a country artificially. It is further contended that the line-up into the two camps of government and opposition makes it impossible for a country to avail itself of all its political talent, since those belonging to the opposition party are, temporarily at least, unavailable for constructive work, and are instead making every effort to obstruct the government in power. In the United States the point has frequently been made that the two major parties are no longer justified because neither of them contains anything which it could consider characteristic of itself. “The party term Republican isn't definitive any more. It isn't even descriptive. No more so is the party term Democrat. They are labels on empty bottles, signs on untenanted houses, cloaks that cover but do not conceal the skeletons beneath them.” More recently a similar charge has been made by Dr. Mortimer Adler, a writer who brilliantly combines his analysis of the present with a knowledge of the past. He directs attention to the fact that parties, instead of responding to issues, tend to create them. According to Dr. Adler, parties would be justified if they served only the purpose for which they have been created and then dissolved; of course, in reality, they perpetuate their existence. On somewhat similar lines the famous biographer of the modern party organization, Ostrogorski, proceeded from theoretical criticism to practical suggestions. His plan was to replace existing parties by “leagues,” which were to respond to one issue only, and be dissolved as soon as that issue should be settled.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003776862110210
Author(s):  
James T Richardson

This article discusses places and historical circumstances where religious freedom is generally protected by governments, including their judicial systems, and contrasts this with examples where such is not the case. Societal conditions contributing to religious freedom derived from theorizing on the ‘sociology of religious freedom’ are discussed, focusing on the characteristics of legal systems. Included is an application of sociology of law theories concerning how minority religious groups sometimes prevail in legal battles, followed by discussion of ‘judicialization of religious freedom’ concept. International legal systems and organizations that promote religious freedom are briefly described before discussing recent developments in the United States involving conflicts between the Supreme Court and Congress as well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), with its generally strong record concerning religious freedom. Russia and China, where religious freedom is severely limited or virtually nonexistent, demonstrate conditions not conducive to religious freedom, causing minority faiths to suffer severe consequences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
M. CHRISTIAN GREEN

The Article Examines Religious Persecution, In The United States And Abroad, Through The Lens Of An Extreme Result Of Persecution: Martyrdom. It Examines Maximal And Minimal Definitions Of Martyrdom And Recent Claims And Instances Of Martyrdom, Both In United States Law And Political Culture And Against Christian And Other Religious Groups Around The World. The Article Concludes With Some Principles From Which To Discern An Ethic Of Martyrdom And Claims Of Martyrdom, Recommending Especially Attention To The Role Of The Martyr As Witness. KEYWORDS: Religious Persecution, Martyrdom, Law And Religion, Human Rights, Religious Freedom, Ethics, Witness


1984 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna R. Gabaccia

Although writers like Stephenson (1979) have questioned the assumption, many historians of immigration continue to argue that geographic mobility and levels of working-class consciousness (as expressed in trade unions, strikes, or workers’ political parties) are negatively related. In so arguing, recent studies follow the work of MacDonald and MacDonald, who claim that where migration from Italy was high, labor militance was low (MacDonald, 1963, 1958; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964). For example, Barton (1975) and Yans-McLaughlin (1977) argue that familist southern and eastern European peasants living in fluid, complex societies were most likely to emigrate to the United States, in hopes of improving their positions in their home villages. Their familism—strong solidarity within the nuclear family and concomitant competitiveness in relations with those outside the nuclear group—discouraged voluntary associations, including participation in workers’ organization both in Italy and in the United States.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (71) ◽  
pp. 13-54
Author(s):  
Alexander Curtis Alton

Brazilian scholars, politicians, legal practitioners, and judges consistently refer to Brazil as a lay state, suggesting a type of secularism similar to French laïcité. However, in practice, the interaction between government, religion, and society in Brazil more closely resembles religious freedom in the United States. Among the twenty-six most populous countries, Brazil has the lowest governmental restrictions on religious freedom. The Brazilian government protects religious liberty through extensive constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as numerous international conventions. Notwithstanding these governmental protections, the country has recently experienced a dramatic increase in social hostilities directed toward people of faith. Thus, while Brazil is an example to the world with regard to minimal governmental restrictions on religious liberty, both the government and Brazilian citizens must find ways to minimize social hostilities and religious intolerance. This paper compares religious liberty in Brazil to French laïcité and U.S. religious freedom, explores governmental protections of religion in Brazil, exposes the growth of social hostilities towards religious groups in Brazil, highlights the work of government and grassroots organizations to turn back this rising tide of religious intolerance, and offers several suggestions on how the Brazilian government might further decrease social hostilities.  


Author(s):  
Tony Gill

In the contemporary era, and indeed ever since the Age of Enlightenment, the issue of civil liberties has taken an increasingly important role in the world of politics and economics. These civil liberties frequently include the rights to free speech, to petition government, to a fair trial before a jury of one's peers, to assemble peacefully, and prohibitions on the arbitrary seizure of property. Given that religious freedom is a crucial link in the economic explanation of religion, it behooves us to understand how this vital civil liberty produces religious pluralism and vibrancy, and how religious freedom develops within polities. This article frames religious freedom in the United States as a regulatory issue, proposes an economically rooted explanation for why politicians would deregulate the religious marketplace, and discusses why religious civil liberties are important for promoting spiritual vibrancy and a strong civic culture in society. It also examines the link between religious liberty and political economy.


Author(s):  
Adam S. Chilton ◽  
Mila Versteeg

This chapter develops a theoretical account of why organizations are key to enforcing constitutional rights. The starting point for our argument is that rights enforcement is not automatic; governments that wish to violate rights will only refrain from doing so when violations are politically costly. Yet punishing governments for violating rights requires overcoming two problems: dedicated citizens must agree that certain government actions indeed constitute a violation (a coordination problem) and devise a strategy to impose such costs (a collective action problem). Formal organizations are well equipped to overcome these problems. When rights are practiced by or within organizations, these organizations will be motivated to protect their rights, even when rights protection is not their core mission. For example, religious groups are not established to protect religious freedom, but they have strong incentives to nonetheless do so when religious freedom is under threat. When rights are practiced on an individual basis, equivalent organizations do not exist. While civil society groups can attempt to enforce these rights, they rely on members dedicated specifically to rights protection and are therefore typically weaker than mass-membership organizations like organized religion, trade unions, or political parties.


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